
Book /Li: 



SMITHSONIAN DEPOSIT. 



Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2011 with funding from 
The Library of Congress 



http://www.archive.org/details/processofabstracOOmoor 



UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PUBLICATIONS 

IN 

PSYCHOLOGY 

Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 73-197, 6 text- figures November 12, 1910 



THE PROCESS OF ABSTRACTION 

AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 



Eg 

THOMAS VERNER MOORE 



BERKELEY 

THE UNIVERSITY PRESS 



UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PUBLICATIONS 

Note.— The University of California Publications are offered in exchange for the publi- 
cations of learned societies and institutions, universities and libraries. Complete lists of 
all the publications of the University mil be sent upon request. For sample copies, lists 
of publications or other information, address the Manager of the University Press, Berkeley, 
California, U. S. A. All matter sent in exchange should be addressed to The Exchange 
Department, University Library, Berkeley, California, U. S. A. 



OTTO HARRASSOWITZ R. FRIEDLAENDER & SOHN 
LEIPZIG BERLIN 
Agent for the series in American Arch- Agent for the series in American Arch- 
aeology and Ethnology, Classical Philology, aeology and Ethnology, Botany, Geology, 
Education, Modern Philology, Philosophy, Mathematics, Pathology, Physiology, Zool- 
Psychology. ogy, and Memoirs. 

Cited as Univ. Calif. PuM. Psychol. 

PSYCHOLOGY. —George M. Stratton, Editor. 

Vol. 1. 1. The Judgment of Difference, ■with Special Reference to the Doctrine 
of the Threshold, in the Case of Lifted Weights, by Warner Brown. 
Pp. 1-71, 4 text figures. September 24, 1910 50 

2. The Process of Abstraction, an Experimental Study, by Thomas Verner 

Moore. Pp. 73-197, 6 text figures. November 12, 1910 1.00 

PHILQSOPKY-^George H. Howison, Editor. Price per volume, $2.00. Cited as Univ. 
Calif. Publ. Philos. 

The first volume of the University of California Publications in Philosophy appeared in 
November, 1904, and was prepared in commemoration of the seventieth birthday of Pro- 
fessor George Holmes HoWison, under the direction of a committee Of his pupils composed 
of Evander Bradley McGilyary, Charles Henry Rieber, Harry Allen Overstreet and Charles 
Montague Bakewell, The price of the volume is $2.00. It may be had bound, or the papers 
may be obtained separately. Its contents are: 

Vol. 1. 1. The Summum Bonum, by Evander Bradley McGilvary. Pp. 1-27 $0.25 

2. The Essentials of Human Faculty, by Sidney Edward Mezes. Pp. 28-55 .25 

3. Some Scientific Apologies for Evil, by George Malcolm Stratton. Pp. 

56-71 ... 15 

4. Pragmatism and the a priori, by Charles Henry Rieber. Pp. 72-91 .20- 

5. Latter-Day Flowing-Philosophy, by Charles Montague Bakewell. Pp. 

92-114 .................. 20 

6. Some Problems in Evolution and Education, by Ernest Norton Hender- 

son. Pp. 115-124 „ 10 

7. Philosophy and Science in the Study of Education, by Jesse Dismukes 

Burks. Pp. 125-140 .. ...... .._ 15 

8. The Dialectic of Bruno and Spinoza, by Arthur Oncken Lovejoy. Pp. 

141-174 .............. 35 

9. The Logic of Self -Realization, by Henry Waldgrave Stuart. Pp. 175- 

205 30 

10. Utility and the Accepted Type, by Theodore de Lopez de Laguna. Pp. 

206-226 „ 20 

11. A Theory of the Syllogism, by Knight Dunlap. Pp. 227-235 10 

12. The Basal Principle of Truth-Evaluation, by Harry Allen Overstreet. 

Pp. 236-262 .: 25 






UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PUBLICATIONS 

IN 

PSYCHOLOGY 

Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 73-197, 6 text-figures November 12, 1910 



THE PROCESS OF ABSTRACTION 

AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 

BY 
THOMAS VEENEE MOOEE. 



CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

Introduction 74 

I. Literature of the Problem 76 

II. The Method of Eesearch 116 

1. The Problem and the Experiments 116 

2. The Apparatus 119 

3. Instructions to the Subject 119 

4. Classification of the Experiments 120 

III. Experimental Eesults 122 

1. The Analysis of the Groups 122 

(a) Isolation of the Common Element 122 

(6) The Disappearance of the Surrounding Elements 124 

2. The Process of Perception 127 

3. The Factor of Memory in the Process of Abstraction 139 

(a) The Method of Memorizing 139 

(6) Memory as Belated to the Sequence of the Sur- 
rounding Figures 153 

(c) Memory as Eelated to the Focality of Perception.... 158 

4. The Process of Eecognition 160 

(a) Analysis of the Experiments 160 

(&) Interpretation of the Eesults 172 

(i) The Immediate Experimental Conclusions 172 

(ii) The Basis of Judgment in Eecognition 176 

IV. The Product of the Process of Abstraction 180 

Summary 190 

A List of Eeferences 192 

Appendix I: The Influence of Association on Perception 194 

Appendix II: Generic Images 196 



74 University of California Publications in Psychology. [To 1 - 1 



INTRODUCTION. 

The decade that is just now drawing to a close has witnessed 
a notable extension of the field of psychological research. In 
the beginnings of modern psychology the field of experiment 
was seldom extended beyond the domain of sensation. Progress 
in physics and physiology made it possible to subject our sensa- 
tions to experiment, and for some time the sensory processes 
received the chief share of the attention of psychologists. It 
was not long, however, before the emotions began to receive their 
due amount of consideration and the invention of the plethys- 
mograph opened the way to a new line of research. But only 
within the last ten years has the experimental study of such 
higher processes of thought, as abstraction, commenced to de- 
velop. The impetus to this new development has come mainly 
from Professor Oswald Kiilpe at the University of "Wiirzburg. 
The present research, although its origins are not to be traced 
to the school of Wiirzburg, belongs to the field which Professor 
Kiilpe and his students have so admirably developed. Our 
problem was to study the mental processes involved in the 
formation of our abstract ideas. It is indeed true that the very 
existence of such ideas has been called in question. Still we 
may at present assume, for the purpose of stating our problem, 
that it is possible for the mind to perceive a series of objects, and 
to recognize some one quality or group of qualities as recurring 
constantly in every member of the series. The botanist exam- 
ining a set of specimens will classify them according to certain 
characteristics which mark off the genera and species. The 
group of characteristics constitutes what may be termed his 
concept of the genus or species that he has segregated. Of each 
species he has a more or less definite "concept," by which he 
can represent to himself a number of specimens, no two of which 
are precisely the same. Such "concepts," whatever may be 
their real nature, are facts of conscious experience; we form 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 75 

them and use them incessantly. But what after all is the 
"concept"? What is the process of its formation? This is 
the problem of the present research. 

The history of the problem dates back to the days of the 
Greek philosophy; but only within the last few years has it 
been subjected to an experimental investigation. The more 
recent literature is of immediate interest for our present prob- 
lem. The metaphysical discussions, valuable as they are within 
their own sphere, bear only indirectly on the experimental 
question. Consequently, only the experimental literature bear- 
ing in some manner on the process of abstraction has been 
analyzed. Not every allusion in the extensive psychological 
literature of the day could be picked out, but a general account 
of the important pieces of experimental work from Galton to 
the present time has been given. The individual studies have 
been analyzed with some completeness because the history of 
the literature is an integral part of the evidence on one point 
of the present study, viz.: Is there or is there not a distinction 
between thought and imagery ; and if so, in what sense is thought 
to be interpreted? 



76 University of California Publications in Psychology. t Vo1 - 1 



LITERATURE OF THE PROBLEM. 

The first experiments which in any way approached the 
domain of our abstract ideas were made by Francis Galton in 
1878. In the Proceedings of the Royal Institution of Great 
Britain for 1879 1 was published his memoir on Generic Images. 
In this article he refers to an earlier one in the Journal of the 
Anthropological Institute for 1878. 2 The bearing of these ex- 
periments on abstraction is suggested rather than direct. But 
they have become the basis of the now famous composite-image 
theory of ideas, and are therefore deserving of mention. Galton 
described in this article the composite photographs which he 
had just succeeded in obtaining. These he compared to "our 
general impressions." Just what he meant by "our general 
impressions" is not clear; but he congratulates himself that his 
explanation coincides with that of Professor Huxley in his work 
on Hume. "I am rejoiced," he says, "to find that from a 
strictly physiological side this explanation is considered to be 
the true one by so high an authority, and that he has, quite 
independently of myself, adopted a view which I also enter- 
tained, and had hinted at in my first description of composite 
portraiture, though there was no occasion at that time to write 
more explicitly about it." 3 

Huxley's meaning is clearer, and to him we may turn for 
an outline of the theory. In the above-mentioned work on 
Hume, the following quotation gives a clear idea of the generic 
image theory of general concepts. 



i Pp. 161-171. 

2 This article is mainly concerned with the technique of composite 
photographs. 

3 Proceedings of the Royal Institution of Great Britain, 9, 1879-1881, 
p. 166. 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 11 

"Now when several complex impressions which are more or 
less different from one another — let us say that out of ten 
impressions in each, six are the same in all, and four are dif- 
ferent from all the rest — are successively presented to the mind, 
it is easy to see what must be the nature of the result. The 
repetition of the six similar impressions will strengthen the 
six corresponding elements of the complex idea, which will 
therefore acquire greater vividness; while the four differing 
impressions of each will not only acquire no greater strength 
than they had at first, but in accordance with the law of asso- 
ciation, they will appear at once, and will thus neutralize one 
another. 

"This mental operation may be rendered comprehensible by 
considering what takes place in the formation of compound 
photographs — where the images of the faces of six sitters, for 
example, are each received on the same photographic plate for 
a sixth of the time requisite to take one portrait. The final 
result is that all those points in which the six faces agree are 
brought out strongly, while all those in which they differ are 
left vague; and thus what may be termed a generic portrait 
of the six, in contradiction to a specific portrait of any one, is 
produced. . . . 

"The generic ideas which are formed from several similar, 
but not identical, complex experiences are what are commonly 
called abstract or general ideas; and Berkeley endeavored to 
prove that all general ideas are nothing but particular ideas 
annexed to a certain term which gives them a more extensive 
signification, and makes them recall, upon occasion, other indi- 
viduals which are similar to them. Hume says that he regards 
this as 'one of the greatest and the most valuable discoveries 
that has been made of late years in the republic of letters,' and 
endeavors to confirm it in such a manner that it shall be 'put 
beyond all doubt and controversy.' 

' ' I may venture to express a doubt whether he has succeeded 
in his object; but the subject is an abstruse one; and I must 
content myself with the remark, that though Berkeley's view 



78 University of California Publications in Psychology. [Vol. 1 

appears to be largely applicable to such general ideas as are 
formed after language has been acquired, and to all the more 
abstract sort of conceptions, yet that general ideas of sensible 
objects may nevertheless be produced in the way indicated, and 
may exist independently of language." 4 

It would thus seem that Huxley's theory — and probably 
Galton's also — is that only our abstract ideas of sensible objects 
are to be compared with the composite photographs. Galton 
points out that the mind in forming its generic images is much 
less perfect in its mechanism than the camera. "Our mental 
generic composites are rarely defined; they have that blur in 
excess which photographic composites have in a small degree and 
their background is crowded with faint and incongruous im- 
agery. The exceptional effects are not overmastered, as they 
are in the photographic composites, by the large bulk of ordinary 
effects." 5 

The experiments on composite photographs were not experi- 
ments on abstract ideas — they merely suggested a theory of 
general concepts. Nor did Galton's later experiments on mental 
imagery 6 approach very much nearer the problem. They called 
general attention to mental imagery and perhaps stimulated the 
next investigation of any importance 7 which was made by Ribot. 

In October, 1891, M. Ribot published in the Revue Philoso- 
phique 8 his "Enquete sur les idees generates. " This he after- 
wards amplified in the fourth chapter of his book, L'E 'volution 
des idees generales. 9 His problem was this : At the moment of 
thinking or reading or hearing a general term, what is there in 
consciousness — immediately and without reflection? On the 
basis of the imagery which his subjects reported he classified 



4 Huxley, David Hume. New York, 1879, pp. 92-94. 

s Loc. cit., p. 169. 

e Cf. Inquiries into Human Faculty, 1883, Section on Mental Imagery. 

7 The article entitled ' ' Observations on General Terms, " by S. E. 
Wiltse, in the American Journal of Psychology, 3, 1890, pp. 144-148, was 
only tentative and contained no definite results. 

s Vol. 32, pp. 376-388. 

9 Paris, 1897. 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 79 

them into: (1) The concrete type (visual or muscular imagery 
of an object). (2) Typographic visual type (visual image of 
the printed word). (3) Auditory type. A great many of his 
subjects said that they had nothing in mind. For example, 
fifty per cent, of the answers to the imagery of the word 'cause' 
said that the subjects had represented to themselves nothing at 
all. M. Ribot then asked himself the question, "What is this 
"nothing"? The word alone? No. Otherwise there would be 
no difference between a general term and a word of a language 
that one did not understand. The word is a sign of some object. 
We have learned the mental habit of designating many objects 
that have some point of agreement by this symbol. The objects 
designated lie hidden and are unconsciously represented by this 
general term. "General ideas are habits in the intellectual 
order. ' ' Our higher concepts consist of two elements — one clear 
and conscious, and this is always the word which may at times 
be accompanied by some shred of imagery. The other element 
is obscure and unconscious. M. Ribot refrains from saying 
precisely what this obscure and unconscious element is. From 
the context it would seem that he means the unconscious trace 
left by the habitual use of the word to designate various objects. 
A word of criticism may be said in passing. M. Ribot 's 
interpretation of this "nothing," which accompanies the per- 
ception of a general term, is purely theoretical and is not based 
on any published data given by his subjects. Furthermore, 
he has not followed out his sign theory to its logical conse- 
quences. For every sign, we have on the one hand the object 
signified and on the other, the signification. Smoke has on the 
one hand fire, of which it is a sign, and on the other a signifi- 
cation in the mind of the observer. If, then, general terms are 
signs, they have on the one hand the objects that they signify, 
and on the other a signification. This signification, as M. Ribot 
admits, is not the image and not the word itself. It certainly 
is not the unconscious factor he speaks of — for he would scarcely 
maintain that his subjects were not conscious of the meaning 
of the word. It is therefore a clearly conscious mental process 
distinct from both the image and the word. 



80 University of California Publications in Psychology. t Vo1 - 1 

M. Ribot's work comes closer to being an experimental study 
of the problem than Galton's experiments on composite photo- 
graphs. Had he examined the state of mind of his subjects 
when they lacked imagery and not trusted to theory on that 
point, he would have carried his investigation into the heart of 
the problem of abstract ideas. 

After Galton and Ribot the study of mental imagery took 
up no small portion of the time and labors of psychologists. 
But the extensive literature on imagery is not directly concerned 
with the problem of abstraction. 

An excellent piece of work in this field of research is that 
of William Chandler Bagley of Cornell University. 10 He under- 
took to study the effect of imperfectly formed words on the 
perception of spoken sentences, and parts of sentences. The 
words and sentences were first recorded by a phonograph, the 
initial, middle, or final consonants being unpronounced. The 
subject listened to the phonograph, and was called upon to 
repeat what he heard, and analyze the mental processes he 
experienced. The section of the work which bears upon our 
problem is that entitled "The Conscious Process Involved in 
the Apperception of Spoken Symbols." In comparison with 
the later German experiments, Dr. Bagley 's are remarkable for 
the very frequent occurrence of imagery of one kind or another. 
His subjects in perceiving the meaning of sentences report with 
surprising frequence the presence of visual, auditory or kin- 
esthetic imagery. This might be due to the fact that Dr. 
Bagley 's subjects were capable of sharper introspection than 
the German psychologists. Still this can hardly be the case. 
The German psychologists, among whom are such men as Pro- 
fessor Kiilpe, cannot be supposed to be lacking in the power 
of introspection. Another possible explanation is that Bagley 
laid special stress upon the report about imagery and in that 
way developed in his subjects a "task" to associate definite 
images with the given sentences. 



10 "The Apperception of the Spoken Sentence: a Study in the Psychol- 
ogy of Language." American Journal of Psychology, 12, 1900-01, pp. 80- 
134. 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 81 

Though his subjects generally experienced imagery in the 
perception of the meaning of a sentence, still he finds cases 
in which this imagery is lacking. One factor which has to do 
with the lack of imagery is that "familiarity with the sentence 
sometimes militates against a clear and direct reference on the 
part of the observer." In this his results agree with those of 
Dr. Taylor reported below. 11 Bagley's general conclusion is 
that, 

"The consciousness concomitant with the apperception of 
auditory symbols is made up of sensational and affective ele- 
ments — some peripherally, some centrally aroused — in connec- 
tions which vary in character with different individuals and 
under different conditions. These connections are arranged in 
patterns which change rapidly into one another, and are in 
general transitory and fleeting. When the attention is directed 
to the peripherally excited elements exclusively — when the ex- 
ternal stimuli occupy the burning point of apperception — the 
meaning which they as symbols should convey is not clearly 
apperceived. When the attention is directed upon the centrally 
aroused ideas which the symbols suggest, the 'meaning' is ap- 
perceived, but errors and lapses in the stimuli are apt to pass 
unnoticed." (p. 125.) 

He thinks that Stout goes too far in suggesting the existence 
of representative mental contents different from "visual, audi- 
tory, tactual, and other experiences." He thinks that his ex- 
periments lead him to no such conclusion. "From the series 
of observations which were made in the course of our experi- 
ments, no conscious 'stuff' was found which could not be classed 
as sensation or affection, when reduced to its ultimates by a 
rigid analysis. Neither do our experiments show that there is 
in the apperception of spoken sentences such a thing as 'image- 
less apprehension.' " (p. 126.) 

Still Dr. Bagley finds something which he does not feel 
justified in putting down as either imagery or feeling. To 
this something which is not imagery or feeling and still has to 

ii See p. 87. 



82 University of California Publications in Psychology. [Vol. 1 

do with the understanding of the sentence, he applies the name 
'mood.' "We may say with Stout that the new is referred to 
a mental 'system/ in so far as such a system is a mood, an 
attitude, a tendency, an adaptation. The mind adjusts itself 
uniformly to uniform conditions: this seems to be the essence 
of the apperceptive 'mood.' When C, in the sentence 
"The play was bad," interpreted 'play' as a drama, her mind 
adapted itself in a degree to the drama environment. This 
was not necessarily a focal reference to a given play, but the 
mind was in the dramatic 'mood.' Should particular parts 
of a typical play-environment have been ideally reproduced, the 
situation would only have been reinforced. Should certain 
verbal ideas such as 'drama,' 'theaters/ 'Shakespeare,' etc., have 
been reproduced in consciousness, either visually, auditorily or 
kinesthetically, these ideas would have been constituents of 
the dramatic 'mood,' but not necessarily the fundamental con- 
stituents. The fundamental constituents may and do vary from 
time to time. Only very seldom can they be called constant, 
and the 'constant supplements' which we have noticed are in- 
stances of such occasions. The fact that the focal constituents 
of the apperceptive consciousness are not necessarily consistent 
with the situation represented bears testimony to this point of 
view. "There was not room for a stove in the corner"; with 
this sentence one observer imaged distinctly a stove in the 
corner of a small, otherwise bare room. His own surprise at 
the inconsistency of this imagery was shown by his exclamation 
upon recording the introspection: "But there was a stove 
there!" (p. 127.) 

A 'mood/ therefore, is something that has to do with the 
past experience of the subject in regard to the words of the 
sentence that is understood. Just what it is, as a present psy- 
chical state, Dr. Bagley does not say. It is the revival of past 
experience. It is not mental imagery, although mental imagery 
enters in as a partial element in the complex termed 'mood.' 
If this is so, what is that present psychical state in the mood, 
which is neither imagery nor feeling ? It is not past experience, 
for the past is not present. It is not revived imagery and 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 83 

feeling, for Dr. Bagley admits that the mood contains something 
besides imagery and feeling. It therefore seems that Dr. Bagley 
has found something more than he is willing fully to recognize. 
His experiments, like those of the later German writers, reveal 
the existence of an imageless mental content. Just what we call 
this is not of prime importance. But its existence should be 
recognized. 

In 1901 appeared Marbe's 12 experimental study of judgment. 
His main problem is not that of the present work, but it is an 
early attempt to apply the experimental method to supra- 
sensuous mental processes. He also mentions, as a side issue, 
his attempt to develop the experiments of Ribot. The work 
was done in Professor Kiilpe's laboratory at the University of 
Wurzburg, where Dr. Marbe was at the time Privatdozent of 
Philosophy. The method is essentially the same as that of the 
later Wurzburg experiments which are described below. His 
final conclusion in regard to the judgment is that any special 
mental process — a word or gesture or image — may become a 
judgment. Taken literally, this conclusion is not borne out by 
the experiments. What they seem to prove is that a judgment 
may be signified by a variety of different processes. And this 
may be the author's meaning (cf. Chapter III). The perception 
of a judgment, however, is not a sensation or an image or a 
feeling, or anything that can be pointed out in consciousness. 
The perception of a judgment is a knowing — a "Wissen" (cf. 
p. 17). 

In his concluding remarks on experimentation in the domain 
of logic Dr. Marbe mentions Ribot 's work, L' Evolution des 
idees generates, and refers to some similar experiments of his 
own on ideas and imagery. His meaning is not clear to me, so 
I quote entire the brief account of his work in this field (pp. 99- 
101). 

"Seit den Zeiten des Sokrates hat man angenommen, da8 
den Begriffen im Bewusstsein ausser den zugehorigen Worten 
irgend etwas direkt entspreche, d. h., daB es neben diesen Worten 



12 K. Marbe, Experimentell-psychologische Untersuclmngen iiber das 
Urteil. Leipzig, 1901. 



84 University of California Publications in Psychology. [ Vo1 - 1 

psychische Gebilde gabe, welche der Gesamtheit der Gegen- 
stande, auf welche sich die Worte beziehen, korrespondieren 
sollen. Diese Gebilde wurden urspriinglich, wie gelegentlich 
noch heute im Gegensatz zu den Worten, die nur Zeiehen ihrer 
Bedeutungen sind, als Abbilder derselben aufgefasst, indem sie 
die gemeinschaftlichen Merkmale ihrer Gegenstande im Bilde 
enthalten sollten. Solche psychischen Gebilde hat man spater 
je nach dem Grade der Abstraktheit, den man ihnen zuschrieb, 
bald als Gemeinbilder, bald als allgemeine Vorstellungen, bald 
als Begriffsvorstellungen bezeichnet. Obgleich, wie bekannt, 
ihre Existenz schon im Altertum nnd Mittelalter bestritten und 
in der Neuzeit hauptsachlich dureh Berkeley bekampft wurde, 
so halt man doch auch heute noch vielfach in der einen oder 
anderen Form an derselben fest. Auch die Frage, ob es solche 
psychologische Aquivalente der Begriffe giebt, ist eine rein psy- 
chologische, und ihre Behandlung sollte nicht, wie es in der 
Regel geschieht, mit logischen Untersuchungen vermiseht wer- 
den. Die Aussagen unserer Versuchspersonen liber die Bewusst- 
seinsvorgange, welche sie nach dem Erleben von Urteilsworten 
und Urteilssatzen zu Protokoll gaben, enthalten iibrigens nichts 
von solchen Parallelerscheinungen der Begriffe, ebensowenig, wie 
die wertvollen Untersuchungen von Ribot, 13 in welchen dieser 
Forscher einer Reihe von Beobachtern Substantiva zurief, um 
sich dann von ihnen sagen zu lassen, was die gehorten Worte 
fur Erlebnisse auslosten. Ich selbst habe mehreren Beobachtern 
ca. 20 Substantiva zugerufen und mir dann von ihnen berichten 
lassen, was fur Erlebnisse die zugerufenen Worte erzeugten. 
Dann gab ich denselben Beobachtern der Reihe nach verschiedene 
Karten in die Hand, auf welchen jeweils ein Substantivum auf- 
gedruckt war, wahrend sie nach einigen Augenblicken die Erleb- 
nisse zu Protokoll geben mussten, die dureh den Anblick der 
gedruckten Worte in ihnen ausgelost wurden. Endlich stellte 
ich ihnen die Auf gabe, die Begriffe: Baum, Volk, Gesellschaft, 
Zeit u. a. zu denken und mir dann die Resultate ihrer Bemii- 
hungen mitzuteilen. In alien diesen Fallen zeigten die Proto- 



13 L'Evolution des idees generates. Paris, 1897, p. 127ff. 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 85 

kolle nichts von Begriffsvorstellungen u. dergl. Die Erlebnisse 
der Beobachter bestanden vielmehr aussehliesslich in Wahrneh- 
mungen, Vorstellungen und Bewusstseinslagen, die teilweise 
gefiihlsbetont, teilweise o-hne jeden Gefiihlston verliefen. Man 
wird also wohl sagen diirfen, daB es keine psychologischen 
Aquivalente der Begriffe im Sinne der Begriffsvorstellungen 
giebt. Jedenfalls aber sehen wir leicht ein, daB auch diese Frage 
experimentell behandelt werden kann und muB und daB sie die 
Logik weiter nicht tangiert." 

The obscurity arises from the fact that it is not perfectly 
clear whether Marbe merely denies the existence of the general 
images which Bishop Berkeley 14 termed abstract ideas, or that 
he claims that there are neither general images nor universal 
concepts. 

It would seem, however, that Marbe found no evidence for 
the existence of a general image in the understanding of the 
words given to his subjects. He did find, however, Wahrneh- 
mungen, Vorstellungen, and Bewusstseinslagen. This latter is 
a term introduced by Mayer and Orth 15 to represent certain 
"states of mind" which are more or less refractory toward all 



14 <■ ' Whether others have this wonderful faculty of abstracting their 
ideas, they can best tell; for myself I dare be confident I have it not. I 
find indeed I have indeed a faculty of imagining, or representing to 
myself, the ideas of those particular things I have perceived, and of 
variously compounding and dividing them. I can imagine a man with 
two heads, or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse. 
I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself or separated 
from the rest of the body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it 
must have some particular shape and colour. Likewise, the idea of man 
that I frame to myself must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, 
a straight or a crooked, a tall or a low, or a middle-sized man. I can not 
by any effort of thought conceive the abstract idea described [in his 
previous account of the abstract ideas of the traditional logic]. And it 
is equally impossible for me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct 
from the moving, and which is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor 
rectilinear; and the like may be said of all other abstract general ideas 
whatsoever." A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. 
Introduction, 10, pp. 141-142, vol. I of Fraser's Oxford (1871) Edition 
of his Works. 

It is evident from the context that Bishop Berkeley does not dis- 
tinguish between the mental image and the abstract concept — between 
what is termed by the later Wiirzburg School the Vorstellung and the 
Begriff. 

is < ' Zur qualitativen Untersuchung der Association. ' ' Zeitschrift fur 
Psychologie und Physiologie, 26, 1901, p. 6. 



86 University of California Publications in Psychology. [Vol. 1 

analysis — and in which images (Vorstellungen) are not to be 
found. In a later study 10 Dr. Orth attempted to show that the 
Bewusstseinslage was not a state of feeling. 

That part of Dr. Narziss Ach's work Uber die Willenstdtig- 
Jceit und das Denken, 17 which refers to thought has a direct 
relation to this line of work, which we may consider as originat- 
ing in Ribot's "Enquete sur les idees generales. " The Bewusst- 
seinslage of Marbe appears under the name of Bewtisstheit. 
This author too has recognized the existence of mental states 
in which there "could not be detected any such phenomenal 
elements as visual, auditory, or kinesthetic sensations or memory 
pictures of such sensations which qualitatively determined the 
mental content reported as knowledge" (p. 210). There are 
often present along with such states of consciousness words or 
fragments of words. "Such a presence of kinesthetic or audi- 
tory kinesthetic images may well be the cause of the widely dis- 
seminated hypothesis that our thought continually takes place 
in an inner speech or adequate visual, acoustic, or similar kinds 
of memory images. Against such a view one must point to 
the fact that there are very complex contents in which, as already 
mentioned, the partial contents are consciously represented in 
their manifold opposing relations and still these individual con- 
tents are not expressed by any adequate vocal designations and 
the like — and indeed, it is absolutely impossible that they should 
be" (p. 215). 

The question then arises, what are these imageless states of 
consciousness ? This Dr. Ach explains by an example : ' ' Every 
idea which is given in consciousness, for example, the word 
'bell' puts, as is well known, a number of ideas in readiness, 
with which it stands in associative connections. This putting 
of ideas in readiness, or stimulation of tendencies to reproduc- 
tion, suffices for the conscious representation of what we call 



is Dr. Johannes Orth, Gefuhl und Bewusstseinslage. Sammlung von 
Abhandlungen aus dem Gebiete der Padagogischen Psychologie und Physi- 
ologie, edited by Ziegler and Ziehen. Vol. 6, No. 4. Berlin, 1903, cf. 
especially pp. 69-75. 

it Gottingen, 1905. 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 87 

'meaning' without its being necessary that the ideas should act- 
ually become conscious" (p. 217). A nonsense syllable or a 
word in an unknown language does not place in readiness any 
such set of tendencies to reproduction and consequently has no 
meaning. Every signification and every idea is an associative 
abstraction because it picks out some of a vast number of pos- 
sible associations. And no signification is identical with any 
other but only more or less analogous. 18 

The problem of the understanding of words and sentences 
was taken up by Dr. Clifton 0. Taylor in 1906. 19 His first 
experiment was based upon a similar one made by Marbe in 
the "Philosophischen Gesellschaf t " during the winter semester 
of 1904, and may be considered as a continuation of Marbe 's 
line of work. He read to his subjects the following sentence : 
"Imagine that in a rectangular space a plane is laid passing 
through the upper and lower edges of two opposing sides. The 
plane then must stretch obliquely through the space. How 
many such planes can you imagine in this space?" Then fol- 
lowed seven subordinate tasks based upon this fundamental 
problem. 

From the protocol obtained from his subjects it was evident, 
that for the understanding of sentences expressed in concrete 
terms the development of mental images can be useful, but 
that they are not indispensable. These auxiliary images be- 
come less frequent the more familiar the subject is with the text. 

A second experiment was carried out in which the subject 
read a text from Gegenbauer's "Anatomic" He had to take 
care that he understood the text perfectly, and while reading 
marked the places where he experienced any mental imagery. 
Visual imagery aided materially in understanding the text. 
But on writing out the text and then rereading the written copy, 
the imagery was reduced from fourteen pictures to but one in 
the third reading. On the other hand, from experiments with 



is For a criticism of Dr. Ach's view see below, p. 181 ff. 

19 ' - Ueber das Verstehen von Worten und Satzen. ' ' Zeitschrift fiir 
Psychologie, 40, 1906, pp. 225-251. 



88 University of California Publications in Psychology. ITol. 1 

sentences composed of abstract terms, it seemed that the ap- 
pearance of images hindered rather than helped the under- 
standing of the text. With Taylor, as with other members of 
this school, the Beivusstseinslage comes into prominence, and it 
is found that these attitudes of consciousness are the more 
frequent as the subject is less familiar with his text. 

"We must now go back a few years to an independent line 
of research. Two years after the appearance of Marbe's ex- 
perimental study of judgment, .Binet published his brilliant 
L' Etude experimental de V intelligence.- His experiments were 
commenced before the appearance of Marbe's work, for we read 
on page 76 of a series made in November, 1900. Binet may 
therefore be considered as a real pioneer in this field. He must 
too have exercised no little influence on later German authors, 
for he showed how the method of controlled introspection could 
give very valuable assistance in the study of our higher mental 
processes. He used in his experiments a variety of subjects, 
but most of all his two daughters, Marguerite fourteen years 
old, and Armande thirteen. His first experiment was to give 
them the task of writing twenty words — any that they might 
wish. By questioning he then found out in what sense the words 
had been used — and how they came to be thought of. By class- 
ification of the words used in repeated experiments M. Binet 
found very characteristic differences in the vocabularies of his 
two children. Their environment having always been the same, 
this difference, he concluded, was due to their temperaments. 
Temperament therefore has its influence on our choice of words. 
From the fact that the words written formed well-defined 
groups, M. Binet concluded that association alone does not 
entirely account for our train of thoughts. Association ac- 
counts for word after word in any group — but it does not 
account for the origin of a new group. 

In another series of experiments the two little girls were 
given a word and instructed to tell their father of what they 
had thought. Binet was able to analyze this experiment into 

20 Paris, 1903. 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 89 

the following stages: (1) The hearing of the word. (2) The 
perception of its sense. (3) An effort to call up an image or 
determine a thought. (4) The appearance of the image. One 
of the observations of Armande shows very clearly the distinc- 
tion between stages two and three. ■ ' As yet there are no images 
(at the moment of choice) and I know why there are none: 
When there are many things such — for example, a house, there 
are many houses — it is necessary to choose. Just then I think 
about it without representing anything to myself as an image" 
(p. 75). Sometimes, however, says Binet, the image comes with- 
out being sought. 

Binet gives a special chapter to the problem of thought 
without images. The conclusion at which he arrives is that 
neither visual imagery nor internal words, either alone or to- 
gether, account for that complex mental process which we term 
thought. The grounds for this conclusion are the many in- 
stances in which his subjects had not and could not find any 
visual imagery for their thoughts. And again there were times 
when he thought that he could determine that word-imagery 
was also entirely lacking. 

Binet also attempted, and with success, to have his little 
girls give a rating for the clearness of their images. These 
ratings ranged from for very weak images up to 20 for images 
as clear and well defined as actual sensations of sight. 

In Marguerite there were three well-defined groups: 

I. A group in which the rating was usually 20, or a little 
below. This group contained memory images of well known 
objects or things recently seen. 

II. A group in which the rating ranged from 10 to 15. This 
group contained memory images of objects not recently seen. 

III. A group in which the rating ranged from 3 to 6. This 
contained memory images of things read or heard about and 
fictitious images of imagination. 

With his other subject, Armande, the differences were not 
so clear. M. Binet gave up hope of finding any regularity. 
He published, however, the ratings for the three classes. The 



90 University of California Publications in Psychology. [ Vo1 - 1 

averages, which he did not give, are for Class I, 6.2; Class II, 
4.9; Class III, 2.8. Considering that Armande's ratings ranged 
from 0-12, and Marguerite's from 0-20, one would not expect 
the classes to be so well defined. The ratings of Armande, 
however, show the same tendency as those of Marguerite — only 
not so marked. The small number of cases, however, leaves the 
result uncertain. 

In his discussion of the theory of abstract thought and images 
M. Binet says that his data would support any theory. He 
makes this claim on the basis of a strange assumption that the 
discussions between nominalists and realists and conceptualists 
have always concerned images and not thoughts. He does not 
exactly state this assumption but it is evident from the text. 
He then comes to his intentional theory of the image. The 
image may be used by the person to represent a particular or 
general signification. It represents whatever the subject intends 
that it should. He would place, therefore, intentionism as a 
new theory alongside of realism, nominalism, and conceptualism. 
"With Binet then there is thought, image, and object. The 
image is an arbitrary sign to which the subject gives at will 
a particular or general significance. In our mental life there 
are those distinct classes of phenomena — thought, image, and 
interior language. Association alone does not account for the 
mechanism of thought. It is more complex and supposes con- 
stantly such operations as choice and direction. The stream 
of thought is far wider and deeper than that of our imagery. 
The last sentence of the book is this: "Finally — and this is 
the main fact, fruitful in consequences for the philosophers — 
the entire logic of thought escapes our imagery." 

The next experimental work on abstraction was that of 
Professor Kiilpe. A report of this was read at the German 
Psychological Congress, which met at G-iessen in the summer 
of 1904. This was the beginning of a series of experimental 
studies by several of Kiilpe 's students in his laboratory at 
Wiirzburg. 

The first experiments of Professor Kiilpe were made in the 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 91 

summer of 1900, with Professor Bryan of Indiana. 21 Kiilpe 
was not satisfied with these and decided to take up the problem 
again with improved methods. By means of a stereopticon 
lantern he projected upon a screen in a dark room the figures 
that were to be observed by the subject. The objects pro- 
jected were nonsense syllables, four in number, which were 
grouped at equal distances around a given point of fixation. 
Each nonsense syllable consisted of a vowel and two consonants. 
The syllables might be in four different colors — red, green, 
purple, or black. In the different experiments also the four 
syllables were grouped so as to form various figures. A group 
of syllables forming with their different colors some kind of 
a figure was termed by Kiilpe an object. The subject could be 
instructed to observe the object from some definite point of 
view, or he could be left to observe the object without any 
prescribed task. There were four points of view given to his 
subjects : 

1. The determination of the entire number of letters visible. 

2. The determination of the colors and their approximate 
positions in the field of consciousness. 

3. The determination of the figure which the grouping of 
the syllables formed. 

4. The determination of as many letters as possible, with 
their positions in the field of vision. 

The number of statements possible to any subject about the 
individual letters could be classified as follows: (a) The entire 
number of statements made; (6) the correct statements; (c) the 
incorrect; (d) the indeterminate statements; and (e) those that 
could have been made but were not. Each division could then 
be rated by its proper percentage of the entire number of state- 
ments. Where task and statement come together (i.e., in the 
statements about the task) the percentage of correct (&) state- 
ments is a maximum and that of unmade (e), indeterminate (d), 
and in general also false (c) statements is a minimum. This 



2iO. Kiilpe, "Versuehe iiber Abstraktion. " Bericht uber den I. Kon- 
gress fur experiment elle Psychologie in Giessen, 1904. Leipzig, 1904. 



92 University of California Publications in Psychology. [Vol. 1 

proves that "Abstraction in the sense of an accentuation of 
certain portions of a mental content, i.e., positive abstraction, 
succeeds best when a preoccupation of consciousness — a predis- 
position for the partial content, is given or provided for." 
(op. cit., p. 61.) 

Negative abstraction — the tendency to neglect or forget all 
but the one thing abstracted — is the more complete the greater 
the difficulty of the task. 

In explaining these results Kiilpe asks what is the reason 
for the effect of the task? "Were," he writes, "the elements 
or the colors seen differently under the influence of correspond- 
ing or heterogeneous tasks, or were they apprehended (aufge- 
fasst) differently? . . . According to our protocol and the 
entire conditions of the experiment, to that question one can 
only answer that the difference lies merely, or at least chiefly, 
in the apprehension and not in the sensations" (p. 66). The 
task does not affect sensation but it does affect apperception. 
If that is so, then there must be a distinction between sensations 
and our perception of them. "That this distinction must be 
made in much the same sense in which we distinguish between 
physical phenomena and our consciousness of them; that, in 
other words, the old doctrine of an inner sense with the in- 
volved idea of a distinction between the reality of consciousness 
and objectivity must now have its opportune renewal in the 
domain of psychology — this is the principal result that I would 
draw from my experiments." (p. 67.) 

Henry J. Watt, a student of Professor Kiilpe, published 22 
in 1905 his ingenious attempt to approach the experimental 
treatment of the supra-sensuous mental processes by a study of 
reactions of association. As is well known, the reaction-time 
of association was originally measured by experiments in which 
the subject was instructed to respond to a given word with 
the first that occurred to his mind. Watt modified this form 
of procedure by limiting the freedom of the subject, setting 



22 < ' Experimentelle Beitrage zu einer Theorie des Denkens. ' ' Archiv 
fiir die ges. Psychol., 4, 1905, pp. 289-436. 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 93 

before him a more definite "task." He was to respond, not 
with any word at all, but with a word that bore a certain kind 
of relation to the word given as a stimulus. The subject had 
six of these tasks, constituting six separate sets of experiments. 
They were : 

1. Seek a word under whose meaning the given word is 
included. 

2. Seek one which is included under the meaning of the 
given word. 

3. Seek the corresponding whole. 

4. Seek a part. 

5. Seek a coordinate idea. 

6. Seek another part of the common whole. 

All the words given were familiar nouns, nearly always 
consisting of only two syllables, and never evidently compound 
words. Five hundred such words were found and printed for 
use in the various "tasks." 

One of the principal objects of research in this study was 
the influence of the "task" on the whole course of events in 
a given experiment. In analyzing the results it appears that 
there are two general classes into which the experiments may 
be divided: (1) That in which the association is found by a 
simple and direct process which suffers no disturbance in its 
course. Verbal and visual images may be present but they help, 
or at least do not hinder, the finding of the required association. 
(2) The second class is that in which the development is com- 
plex. The subject tries two or more paths before he hits upon 
the one that gives the desired result. 

The first class of associations is subdivided according as 
(a) visual images give rise to the association, or (b) a verbal 
image or a group of verbal images, or a condition of recollection, 
etc., or (c) no kind of imagery or media of association can be 
determined to show how the word spoken was found. 

In reproduction of complicated development one can point 
to two subclasses: (a) The subject sought for something else, 
or some other idea hung in his mind without his being able to 



94 University of California Publications in Psychology. ITol. 1 

determine just what it was. (b) The subject sought after some 
more or less definitely determined idea, but could not find it; 
or he had something in mind, but for one reason or another 
rejected it. 

One way in which the influence of the task manifested itself 
was the mode in which it determined the means of the associ- 
ation. Task 3 (whole), 4 (part), and 6 (part of the common 
whole) tend to increase the use of visual images. Task 2 
(species) tends to increase the use of verbal images, and Task 5 
(coordinate ideas) tends to do away with the use of both verbal 
and visual imagery. 

Under the head of visual images Watt brings forward some 
interesting facts that bear in the main upon two important 
problems. One is the problem with which Berkeley found so 
much difficulty: Are all images definite and concrete, or is 
there any such thing as a general image? The introspection 
of his subjects seems to point to the existence of what is at least 
a very indefinite image. We quote some examples that he has 
given as typical: "Hide: Image of an animal torso thickly 
covered with hair (very unclear). To what animal it belonged 
I do not know. Grain : Fleeting image of a rye or wheat field 
— the species was not clear. Mouth (Maul) : Beast. Dark 
image of an utterly undefinable animal. It could have been 
an ox, or a horse, or a dog with stronger definition of the head 
and mouth region." 23 Watt calls attention to the fact that 
in this last case the image did function as if it were universal. 
One can, he says, maintain that it was in reality concrete and 
definite, but he can not prove his contention. Still, scarcely 
any one would wish to make such a contention. Vague, indis- 
tinct images are often like a child's drawing — they need inter- 
pretation. When we label them we know what they are, but 
to the uninstructed observer they may stand for a number of 
things. After calling attention to the existence of such "gen- 
eral" images, Watt then points out how illogical it would be 



23 Op. cit., p. 364. 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 95 

to infer from the existence of the general image the non-exist- 
ence of the universal idea. 

The second problem on which he touches under this heading- 
is the position of the mental image in our mental mechanism. 
The mere mention of the theory of types suffices to remind us 
that some authors write as if certain people made use of visual 
images in their mental operations to the exclusion of all others 
because they belong to what is termed the visual type. Watt 
points out that the kind of image used depends upon the "task" 
which the subject performs. 24 By changing the task the subject 
passes from the visual to the verbal type. 

Another point that he makes is this : The mental image is 
not always a merely secondary phenomenon like the illustration 
in a novel. It may seem at times merely to accompany the 
word used as a stimulus. On other occasions it is clearly the 
starting point for the solution of the task. In all probability 
the mental image never comes into the field of consciousness 
without exerting some influence on the development of associ- 
ations. Whether by inhibition or furtherance or direct sug- 
gestion of new ideas, it has its influence on the way in which 
the task is performed. 

In conclusion Watt sketches the outline of his theory of 
thought. It is an attempt to account for the flow of conscious- 
ness. He first calls attention to the fact that consciousness is 
not discrete but continuous. He then asks what determines the 
entrance of an idea into consciousness? The chief factor is the 
"task" that the mind is attempting to accomplish. The ten- 
dency of one idea to reproduce another is determined in 9 
merely mechanical way by the number of times that the two 
ideas were perceived together in the past. But the many possi- 
bilities, the many tendencies to reproduction, are limited by the 
"task." 

In the much discussed problem of the relation between image, 
word, and concept, Watt admits the existence of all three and 



24 Op. tit., p. 367. 



96 University of California Publications in Psychology. ITol. 1 

does not attempt to explain away the concept in terms of im- 
agery or words. From the statements of his subjects it was 
clear 4hat there was a distinction between the word and the 
understanding of the word. One could exist without the other, 
therefore they must be distinct. But is the understanding of 
the word the crowding into consciousness of a number of dark 
associations? One hears nothing of such associations in the 
understanding of the word used as a stimulus ; though in seeking 
for the word of response such associations do occur. The burden 
of evidence in his experiments rather favors the view that the 
understanding of a word is something other than crowding in 
of obscure associations. But for the final determination of this 
point he deems that further experiment is necessary. 

The following year August Messer 25 published the next study 
of the Wiirzburg School. Dr. Watt was one of his subjects. 

The general purpose of the study was expressed by the author 
as an attempt to investigate the conscious processes that are 
found in simple acts of thought. The method of the experi- 
ment was based on that of Watt's work, which has just been 
mentioned. There were fourteen series of experiments, some 
of which were taken from the "tasks" invented by Watt. 

1. In the first series the subject was shown a word, and his 
task was to speak out as quickly as possible the first word that 
came to his mind. 

2. In the second series the task was more restricted; the 
word of response had to be a word representing a coordinate 
object — that is, one that belonged to one whole along with the 
object represented by the given word. 

3. In the third, the subject was to mention a coordinate 
concept — that is, one belonging to the same genus as the given 
word. 

4. The response was to be any adjective. 

5. A characteristic of the idea designated by the given word 
— but not its genus. 



25 ' ' Experimentell-psyehologiscke Untersuchimgen iiber das Denken. ' ' 
Archiv fior die ges. Psychol., 8, 1906, pp. 1-224. 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 97 

6. Remember an object belonging under the concept of the 
given word and make a statement concerning it. 

From the seventh to the eleventh experiment two words 
were shown one above the other. The upper was to be read first. 
The subject's tasks were: 

7. Express the relation between the ideas designated by the 
given words. 

8. Express the relation between the objects designated by 
the given words. 

9. In the ninth series the two words were the names of 
celebrated men and the subject was to pass on their relative 
value, expressing a judgment which had real claim to objective 
validity. 

10. In the tenth series the persons, things, or conditions 
represented by the given words were to be compared and a 
judgment expressed; but the judgment was to be one of merely 
subjective value and express what would be the subject's 
preference. 

11. In the eleventh, a noun and an adjective were shown to 
the subjects. He was instructed to regard the two words either 
as a question or an assertion, and where possible to pass a 
judgment about them. 

12. In this series the subject was shown sentences or groups 
of sentences and his task was to understand them and take up 
a position in regard to them. The groups of sentences repre- 
sented logical premises and conclusions formally correct. 

In the last two series of experiments the subject was shown 
real objects or pictures. 

13. He was to speak the first word that came into his mind. 

14. He was to make a statement about the object or picture. 
In the first series, though no special task was given, the 

subject made one for himself. He involuntarily sought a word 
that bore some relation to the given word. In other series also 
the tendency was noticed to specialize still further the task 
assigned. 

In the visual imagery of the subjects there is again found 



98 University of California Publications in Psychology. ITol. 1 

the "general image" mentioned by Watt. This proves to be 
an image so imperfect that the subject can designate it only 
by some such word as an animal, a bird, etc. Such an image may 
be spoken of as general because it can stand in consciousness for 
an entire class. 

The author also gives some account of the motor imagery 
that his subjects experienced during the experiments. Then 
after a discussion of the process of association he passes on to 
a problem more closely allied to our own, the understanding 
of the word — the concept as distinct from word and imagery. 

Generally the meaning seems to come with reading the word. 
But even in such cases the meaning is not a constant factor. It 
may exist in all degrees of perfection. The word may be scarcely 
understood at all. It may be perceived, but merely as a sound 
without meaning. Or the understanding may come partially 
with reading and take some time to grow. This latter form 
leads up to the case in which there is an actual separation 
between the perception of the word and the apprehension of 
its meaning. The conditions for the separation of the word 
from the apprehension of its meaning are as follows : 

1. The strangeness of the word. 

2. Incorrect reading of the word. 

3. Equivocal character of the word. 

4. Imperfect knowledge of the language. 

5. Number and length of the words. 

6. The occurrence of a purely automatic reaction on the basis 
of verbal association, e.g., Laut-Schall, Haustier-Maus. 

7. Fatigue. 

8. Excitement. 

The "meaning" of the word was often something that the 
subjects found it difficult to explain. It was frequently ex- 
pressed by such an expression as "I knew what was meant." 
The subjects were sometimes enabled to analyze this abstract 
"meaning" a little further. "The understanding of the word 
existed in the consciousness of that general sphere to which 
the word belonged" (p. 77). One of the subjects expressed it 



1910] Moore : The Process of Abstraction. 99 

as "the consciousness that something appropriate could be asso- 
ciated." Sometimes the " sphere "-consciousness is identified 
with the generic idea to which the object belongs; again, with 
the entire domain in which an object belongs. For example, 
Subject 2 with the word of stimulus, "Hegel," said: "It 
seemed to me at first as if the word were 'Hagel. ' As soon as 
the auditory image of ' e' sprang into consciousness, there came 
a direction toward the History of Philosophy." 26 

At times the "sphere" of consciousness was an emotional 
element or word, or something similar. Again in the process 
of understanding, there was a consciousness of synonymous 
words or related objects, or some prominent characteristic of 
the thing represented by the word of stimulus. Sometimes the 
word instead of being understood in a general sense was taken 
in a special one, as where the word "garden" aroused the idea 
of a garden around a former home of the subject's family 
(p. 82). From all this it seems to the author extremely prob- 
able that in the process of understanding a word we have to 
do with phenomena of association and reproduction. 

What part, if any, has the subject's imagery in his under- 
standing of a word? The more perfect the imagery the less 
does it seem to cover what is meant by the general significance 
of the word. But the more schematic and faded the imagery, 
the less does it differ from the "meaning." 27 More important 
than the relation between the clarity of the image and the 
meaning, is the question: To what extent is imagery necessary 
to the signification? And here he says there is not one single 
example from which it is clearly evident that the understanding 
of the word was dependent on the awakening of a visual image. 
The most that can be said is that in a few solitary instances 
it was recorded that with the help of a visual image the meaning 
became clearer or more precise. But in the further progress 



26 Page 79. 

27 From what follows it is evident that the author does not mean to 
suggest that the meaning is nothing but faded imagery. The imagery fades 
into nothing, long before it gets anywhere near the ' ' meaning, ' ' which may 
at times be clear without imagery. 



100 University of California Publications in Psychology. IT o1 - * 

of the experiment the subject's imagery plays an important 
part in the solution of the task. As to the understanding of 
the word of response, it often takes place before the subject 
can express his meaning, and when the word is found it does 
not always express fully the subject's mind. Sometimes too, 
the word of response is uttered before its meaning is understood. 

The further sections of this work on the psychology of 
judgment, etc., are more remotely connected with our problem. 
The more kindred section on "Begrifflichen und gegenstand- 
lichen Denken" confirms still further the distinctions between 
word, image and concept. 28 

In immediate connection with the work of Watt and Messer 
is that of Dr. Schultze. 29 The foundation for his analysis is 
daily observation confirmed by his own experiments and those 
of others. His own experiments at the time of this article were 
to appear shortly under the title of "Beitrag zur Psychologie 
des Zeitbewusstseins. " 30 He was subject in Messer 's experi- 
ments and among his own subjects he numbered Kiilpe, Watt, 
and Messer. 

His own work claims to be in the domain of descriptive 
psychology. His first problem, and the one with which we are 
concerned, is this : In the classification of mental processes is 
it justifiable to make a distinction between the sensible appear- 
ances of things and thoughts (Erscheinungen und Gedanken) ? 
Originally he answered this question in the negative, but he 
was forced to give up this position on approaching the problem 
from the experimental point of view. The relinquishment of 
the old position seems to have required some effort, for he 



28 For a criticism of the technique in Messer 's experiments, cf. E. Meu- 
mann, "Ueber Associationsexperimente mit Beeinflussung der Keproduk- 
tionszeit." Archiv fiir die ges. Psychol., 9, 1907, pp. 117-150. Messer re- 
plied in his article, "Bemerkungen zu meinen Experimentell-psychologischen 
Untersuchungen iiber das Denken. ' ' Archiv fiir die ges. Psychol., 10, 1907, 
pp. 409-428. 

29 E. E. O. Schultze, ' ' Einige Hauptgesichtspunkte der Beschreibung in 
der Elementar-psychologie. I. Erscheinungen und Gedanken. ' ' Archiv fiir 
die ges. Psychol., 8, 1906, pp. 241-338. 

so Cf. Archiv fiir die ges. Psychol., 13, 1908, pp. 275-351. See especially 
Sec. 11, pp. 329-333. 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 101 

writes : "It cost me a great resolution to say, that on the basis 
of immediate experiment, appearances and sensible apprehen- 
sions (Erscheinungen und Anschaulichkeiten) are not the only 
things that can be experienced. But finally I had to resign 
myself to my fate" (p. 277). 

His reason for doing so was that the data of appearances 
did not exhaust the content of experience. There are marked 
differences between appearances and thoughts. Appearances 
are apprehensible by the senses (anschaulich) but not so 
thoughts. Appearances are more or less localized. When there 
comes a pause in any series of appearances, during that pause 
we are conscious indeed of various sensations from the organs 
of the body — but is the consciousness of the pause the perception 
of such sensations? When there comes a blank over the mind, 
what is it that is lacking — sensation or thought? Thought. 
Thoughts are as much a matter of immediate experience as our 
sensations. Thoughts are not to be explained in terms of 
imagery. Thought can be perfectly clear and certain but the 
accompanying imagery is of various degrees of clarity or is 
altogether lacking. Thoughts are not feelings. (1) Because 
we can pass judgment upon matters of feeling without actually 
experiencing the slightest tremor of an emotional state. (2) 
We can experience feelings without any intellectual state con- 
nected with them, as for example, in certain unwarranted and 
inexplicable emotional states. (3) There is the same independ- 
ence between the clearness and importance of thought and feeling 
in our mental states as there is between thoughts and images. 

What then is our act of thought? Not the sensations that 
were active in the process of its acquisition. For we make 
frequent use of abstract concepts but seldom in connection 
with these concepts do we use the definitions and sensations 
necessary to their original formation. No sensation can con- 
ceivably exhaust all the characteristics of the concept. Con- 
cepts then are not sensations, not mental images, not feelings. 
They stand apart by themselves as special factors of our 
mental life. 



102 University of California Publications in Psychology. [Vol. 1 

The work of Watt, Messer, and Schultze was continued by 
Karl Biihler. 31 He thought it advisable to study the process 
of thought with materials which offered far more difficulty than 
the comparatively simple tasks of Watt and Messer. Accord- 
ingly such questions as the following were proposed to his 
subjects : 

"When Eucken speaks of a world-historical apperception 
do you know what he meant thereby?" The subject had to 
answer with a simple yes or no, and then give an account of all 
the mental processes he experienced in arriving at his answer. 

In a section on the Elements of our Mental Life of Thought 
he propounded the question — what are these elements, and which 
among them is the real bearer of the process of thinking ? From 
the protocol of his subjects there is one group of mental pro- 
cesses that may be easily characterized — the sense imagery, 
whether visual, or auditory, or sensomotor. To this may be 
added the consciousness of space. There are also feelings and 
such states as doubt, astonishment, etc. But this is not all. 
The most important phenomena do not fall in any of the above 
categories. There is something else that possesses neither the 
qualitative nor quantitative characteristics of the senses. These 
elements of our mental life are what the subject characterized 
as "the consciousness that," etc., or more properly and fre- 
quently as his 'concepts' (Gedanken) . 

Do we think by means of imagery or by concepts? 

The answer, based upon the subjective analyses given by his 
subjects, is that "what enters into consciousness so fragmen- 
tary, so sporadically, so very accidentally as our mental im- 
ages can not be looked upon as the well-knitted, continuous 
content of our thinking" (p. 317). Concepts then, not images, 
are the essential elements of our thinking. 

What then is the concept? Not an image nor a series of 
images, nor the relation to a series of images. The concept is 
a unit, a mental element, the ultimate result of the analysis 



si ' ' Tatsaehen und Probleme zu einer Psyckologie der Denkvorgange. ' ' 
Archiv fur die ges. Psychol, 9, 1907, pp. 297-365; 12, 1908, pp. 1-92. 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 103 

of thought. As seeing is related to a sensation of sight as 
"sensing" to our sensations, so is knowing related to our 
thoughts. "Knowing" is distinct from "sensing." It may be 
accompanied by sensations but cannot be supplanted by them. 
Word imagery does not give us the signification of words. "A 
meaning can never be imaged but only known (Eine Bedeutung 
kann man uberhaupt nicht vorstellen, sondern nur wissen)." 

The solution of the task is not accomplished by a single 
series of concepts. Between concepts there goes on a great deal 
of thinking — the consciousness of the task to be performed — the 
relation of the given concepts to others and to the task. The 
general consciousness of the task and the consciousness of mani- 
fold relationships constitute a kind of setting or background in 
which special concepts appear. 

The understanding of words and sentences "is nothing less 
than a conscious logical relation, which brings into consciousness 
the connection between the thought to be understood and one 
already known" (12, p. 13). In many cases understanding 
took place by the entrance into consciousness of a more general 
concept, and thereupon the subject knew how and why the idea 
before him belonged under that concept. The mere entrance 
into consciousness of the more general concept does not seem 
to suffice, but it must be perceived as bearing a relationship to 
the problem before the subject. Sometimes the thought that 
the given idea suggests is not a more general one, but one which 
the subject perceives to be identical with the given thought. 
Sometimes the given sentence is understood by its suggesting a 
thought that would prove it. 

The analogy, between the process of understanding a sentence 
and the process of perceiving a geometrical figure, will be seen 
at once by comparing the above analysis of Biihler's work with 
our own section on the process of perception. 32 

The division of Biihler's work entitled "Ueber Gedankener- 
rinerungen" is of great interest and value in the study of 
memory, but bears less directly on the general problem before 



32 Below, pp. 127-139. 



104 University of California Publications in Psychology. \y<A. ! 

us. It tends to establish more and more conclusively the ex- 
istence of an imageless process of thought — not, of course, 
directly and ex professo; but still, as Biihler's study unfolds, 
the possibility of accounting for thought by imagery decreases. 
Shortly after the first section of Biihler's "Tatsachen und 
Probleme" had appeared, "Wundt published 33 a criticism of the 
methods of the Wiirzburg School. 34 He summed up (p. 358) 
the chief points of his criticism as follows : 

(1) "The 'question experiments' are not experiments but 
self-observations under disadvantages. Not one of the requisite 
conditions for psychological experiments is found in them — but 
they rather exemplify the very opposite of these conditions. 

(2) "Among the old forms of self -observation they represent 
the most imperfect; they occupy the attention of the observer 
with an unexpected, more or less difficult intellectual problem 
and demand of him that over and above this he should observe 
the behavior of his own consciousness. 

(3) "In both forms of its use the method of questioning is 
objectionable: As a question before the experiment it places 
self-observation under the very unfavorable condition of the 
pressure of examination; as a question after the experiment it 
opens door and gate to the disturbing influence of suggestion. 
In both forms it is most seriously prejudicial to self -observation 
by the very fact that the subject who must observe his own self 
is himself the object of inspection. 

(4) "The representatives of the 'method of questioning' 
place themselves above the time-honored rule that in order to 
solve complex problems one must first be familiar with the simple 
ones that the former suppose. As a consequence they confound 
attention with consciousness and fall into the popular error of 
believing that everything which transpires in consciousness can 
be followed out without more ado in self-observation. The latter 



33 ' ' Ueber Ausf rageexperimente und iiber die Methoden zur Psychologie 
des Denkens. " Psychologische Studien, 3, 1907, pp. 301-360. 

34 For Biihler's answer see Archiv fur die ges. Psychol., 12, 1908, pp. 
93-123. Wundt replied to Biihler in this same Archiv, 11, 1908, pp. 444-459. 



191 °] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 105 

ground alone would sufficiently explain the bootlessness of the 
question experiments. ' ' 

If then the question experiments have not proved that 
thoughts are not images, but have proved nothing, how then 
are we to go on about the study of our processes of thought? 
Wundt outlines the method as follows: 

(1) Self -observation under favorable conditions of solitude 
will teach: 

(a) That thought precedes the language by which it is ex- 
pressed. 

(6) That this thought is made up of (a) feelings that are 
adequate to the character of the thought and also (j8) single 
fragments of images and words which suddenly come into con- 
sciousness and as suddenly disappear. These images seem to 
have been inhibited by the unfavorable conditions of the question 
experiments. 

(2) The confirmation of the results of self -observation is 
to be sought in the experiments on association which show the 
tremendous importance which feelings have in such processes. 
Wundt refers to the discussion of "idea feelings" in his Physio- 
logische Psychologie, in which it is maintained, and perhaps 
proved, that in the development of a complex idea feeling often 
precedes imagery. From such experiments one may conclude 
that very faint ideas can betray their presence by very clear 
feelings; and it would be far better to speak of an unconscious 
substrate of ideas or even refer the total idea to this sphere of 
the unconscious than to talk of "thoughts" and the revised 
Aristotelian concept of imageless ideas. But the experiments 
on the compass of consciousness point to a gradation from the 
clearly conscious to the dimly conscious, and finally to a distinct 
break between the conscious and the unconscious. Consequently 
the partial elements of an idea are not to be referred to the 
unconscious but to the subconscious. They are elements in one 
complex process which is bound together in a single conscious 
whole. 

A "thought" therefore in the Wundtian sense is a complex 



106 University of California Publications in Psychology. IT o1 - 1 

of images and the "adequate" feelings which are involved in 
their conscious unity. These feelings are combinations of his six 
fundamental feelings which come together to form ever higher 
and higher complexes. In each complex there is a total feeling 
peculiarly characteristic of the complex and qualitatively dif- 
ferent from the elements that constitute it. The total feeling 
of the idea is ultimately analyzable into the six fundamental 
elements of feeling — and the final product of their combination 
is adequate to the character of the thought. 35 

Somewhat later E. von Aster, of Munich, 36 undertook a 
criticism of the line of study which culminated in the work of 
Biihler. The chief point of his criticism is that Buhler's sub- 
jects, in giving an account of their so-called concepts, were not 
describing actually present mental states, as a man who de- 
scribes a visual scene, but they were making mere declarations 
concerning something which they had indeed experienced, but 
whose real nature remained to be explained. He himself leaves 
the problem of the nature of our ' ' thoughts ' ' to future research. 
His own opinion seems to be that our thoughts are in some 
manner composed of sensations and mental images and are not 
mental processes different from the currently recognized 
elements of our mental life. 

A little later there appeared a criticism by E. Diirr, 37 one 
of Buhler's own subjects. He finally came to an opinion which 
takes on very closely the form of von Aster's objection. 38 

The designation of a mental process as a thought is by no 
means a description of the character of the thought. The main 
issue between Diirr and Biihler is in the analysis of the 



35 This analysis is based not merely on the article in the Psychologische 
Studien, but also on various portions of Wundt's Grundzuge der physiol- 
ogischen Psychologie. For a criticism of Wundt's opinion see the last 
chapter of the present monograph, pp. 184-187. 

36 "Die psychologische Beobachtung und experimentelle Untersuchung 
von Denkvorgangen. " Zeitschrift fur Psychologie, 49, 1908, pp. 56-107. 

37 < ' Ueber die experimentelle Untersuchung der Denkvorgange. ' ' Zeit- 
schrift fur Psychologie, 49, 1908, pp. 313-340. 

38 Biihler in his answer denied that Diirr 's objection was the same as 
von Aster's. Biihler, "Zur Kritik der Denkexperimente. " Zeitschrift 
fur Psychologie, 51, 1909, p. 118, note 1. 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 107 

"thoughts" to which Biihler's experiments had given so much 
prominence. Diirr would be far from agreeing with von Aster 
that our thoughts are ultimately reducible to sensation and 
mental imagery. Diirr 's point of view can best be expressed 
in his own words: 

' ' Biihler expressly stated that thoughts are not mental images 
(Vorstellungen) and that they have nothing in common with 
sensations. Now, the next question that arises is this: In our 
representative mental processes is there not something besides 
sensation; and if so, what is the relation of our thoughts to 
this plus?" 39 

Diirr thinks that along with our sensations there is our 
consciousness of time and space, of identity and similarity, etc. 
These things are not sensations or reducible to sensations. They 
might all be classed under the expression "consciousness of 
relationship," and this it is that will prove to be the ultimate 
analysis of thought. 

In February, 1907, there appeared in the Psychologischen 
Studien a long article, "Ueber abstrahierende Apperzeption, " by 
Kuno Mittenzwei. " 40 It was an attempt of the Leipzig School 
to enter the field in which the ground had already been broken 
by the men of Wiirzburg. Mittenzwei preludes his experimental 
work with an historical account of the problem of abstraction 
from the days of Socrates to modern times. Between this his- 
torical account and his own experimental work there is no very 
close connection. 

There are two distinct parts of the experimental work. In 
the first set of experiments the subject was required to direct 
his attention to a single circular disk (in reality the opening 
in an iris diaphragm). The disk was exposed twice in each 
experiment and the subject was required to tell what difference 



39 Page 326. I have taken some liberty in translating this last sentence. 
But the terminology I have chosen will, I think, give a true representation 
of the author's mind to English readers. The original is as follows: 
' ' Nun liegt doch die Frage nahe : Gibt es im Vorstellungsleben nicht noch 
etwas ausser den Empfindungen und wenn ja, wie verhalten sich die Ge- 
danken zu diesen plus." 

40 Psychologische Studien, 2, 1906-7, pp. 358-492. 



108 University of California Publications in Psychology. t Vo1 - 1 

there might be in the size, position, or brightness of the disk 
in the two exposures. 

In the second set of experiments the subject was called upon 
to observe a group of six disks, any one of which might undergo 
the above mentioned changes. 

One is struck with the glaring difference between the task 
of the subject in these experiments and that of one who in real 
life forms what is termed an abstract idea of a group of objects. 
Mittenzwei's subjects had to look for a difference and neglect 
identity, whereas in abstraction one usually neglects all differ- 
ences and finds identity. Hence, after reading the long disser- 
tation on abstract ideas and having the appetite whetted for an 
experimental treatment of an old metaphysical problem, one is 
sadly disappointed to find that the author seems to have missed 
his problem. Instead of the question of abstraction he is really 
dealing with the perception of differences. But in spite of this 
serious defect Mittenzwei's experiments are not without value. 
One interested in the theory of spatial perception would find 
a very suggestive line of experiment. The problem of apper- 
ception is also helped along, even though the apperception is not 
— strictly speaking — that of abstraction in the logical sense of 
the word. 

In the first series of experiments Mittenzwei measured the 
threshold for the perception of change, — A. Of size : Enlarge- 
ment, reduction. B. Of position : Right and left, up and down. 
C. Of brightness : Increase, decrease. 

For each of these changes he obtained two values: (a) one 
in which the subject was forewarned what change would take 
place, and (&) one in which the subject was not warned what 
kind of change to expect. In all changes except that of enlarge- 
ment the threshold obtained when the subject was forewarned 
was smaller than when he was not warned. In the "enlarge- 
ment" series it made no difference in the threshold whether the 
subject was or was not forewarned. 

In the second series of experiments any one of six disks 
might be changed in size, position, or brightness. 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 109 

It is here that the author stumbles upon some stages of 
development in the perception of difference. He does not name 
these stages, but, as the body of this work will show, 41 some of 
the points to which he calls attention as general phenomena are 
the same as certain stages that our own experiments revealed 
in the process of perceiving identity. 

Under the name of "der veranderte Gesamteindruck"* 2 Mit- 
tenzwei speaks of a perception of change without any knowledge 
of just what particular in the object was varied. The best 
description of this phenomenon is given in the subject's remark, 
"Das Objekt ist verandert, aber ich kann nicht angeben wie. " 

The author asks himself the question, how can such an inde- 
terminate judgment be caused by such a particular and deter- 
minate change? This he explains by pointing out that: 

(a) The second impression is involuntarily assimilated to 
the first, and 

(b) The actual concrete change is often forgotten. Good 
observers have remarked, "Ich habe die Veranderung eben 
gehabt, aber ich habe sie schon wieder vergessen." 

Under the heading of "Partiell bestimmte Verschieden- 
heitsurteile" the author describes what are really stages in the 
perception of difference that are a little more developed than 
the general impressions of change. The subject was required 
to give information on two points: (a) What was the nature 
of the change? (&) Where was it located? The determination 
of the location of the change comes first in the order of per- 
ception. The evidence for this lies in the fact that the erroneous 
or indeterminate judgments about the place of change are rare, 
while they are much more frequent in regard to the kind of 
change. 

It is interesting to note how psychologically similar are the 
processes of perceiving identity and diversity. This will be 
apparent at once by the comparison of Mittenzwei's results with 
those reported below. 



41 Cf. below, Section III, 2, pp. 127-139, more especially p. 129 ff. 

42 Page 459. 



110 University of California Publications in Psychology. [vol. 1 

The opposite of Mittenzwei's problem was taken up by A. A. 
Griinbaum under the title : ' ' Ueber die Abstraktion der Gleich- 
heit." 43 Historically it is connected with the Wiirzburg mono- 
graphs and also with the first experiments of our own work. 
Griinbaum became acquainted with the method of research 
adopted in the present piece of research during the winter 
semester of 1904-5, when he was one of my subjects at the 
University of Leipzig. He has modified and developed the 
method, and for some purposes improved it. Instead of a series 
of exposures, each lasting but a fraction of a second, he exposed 
simultaneously two groups of figures for a period of three 
seconds. The subject was instructed to look for identical 
figures in two groups, thrown by a stereopticon upon a screen 
4.25 m. from the subject. He was not required to fixate any 
point, but to distribute his attention equally over the entire 
field. After finding the identical figures, the subject was then 
to take notice of the others. After the time of exposition (3s.) 
was over the subject was called upon to draw all the figures 
remembered, but especially the identical figures common to the 
two groups. After drawing what could be remembered, the 
subject was again shown the groups just exposed and was called 
upon to indicate the figures he actually recognized. The seeking 
and reproduction of the identical figures was termed the primary 
task, the noting and recognition of the remaining figures, the 
secondary task. 

In reporting his results the author starts with the preparation 
of the subject for the task set before him and follows on down 
to the final determination of equality. The preparation of the 
subject for his task consisted in the picturing of a kind of frame 
in which there often flitted in and out vague figures. Two 
of the five subjects paid attention to some kind of sensory aid 
in their preparation. Three looked rather to the end before 
them and thus performed their task better than those looking 
to the means. 



43 Archiv fur die ges. Psychol, 12, 1908, pp. 340-478. 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. Ill 

The process by which the task was performed manifested 
eight more or less distinct forms. 

1. The method of exclusion. 

The subject looks at one figure and then seeks one like it in 
the other group — not finding it, he takes another figure, and 
so on till he discovers the figure that is in both groups. 

2. Successive comparison without accentuation. 

The subject looks first at one group and then at the other 
until he recognizes one figure as having been seen before. Be- 
fore recognition the common figure does not require any special 
prominence over the other figures. 

3. Successive comparison with simple accentuation. 

This method is the same as that of number two, only that 
before the determination of identity one figure suddenly becomes 
prominent — is accentuated in a characteristic way which can 
only be fully understood by one who has taken actual part in 
the experiments. 

4. Successive comparison with accentuation and a realization 
of the task of the experiment. 

In the former method the prominence of one figure seemed 
altogether independent of any idea of its being the one common 
to each group. In this method there is indeed no conjecture 
that the prominent figure might be the common one, but the 
subject is spurred on by something which one cannot express, 
except by some such words as the "point of view of the task 
before him." 

5. Successive comparison with accentuation and the conjec- 
ture of identity. 

This form of procedure is but a step removed from the last. 
With the perception of the prominent figure is united the con- 
jecture that this may be the common one. 

6. Rapid succession with accentuation of both identical 
figures. 

In this form one figure is noticed and suddenly the other 
springs into prominence, sometimes so suddenly that the subject 
can not say but that the two figures were noticed simultaneously. 



112 University of California Publications in Psychology. C Vo1 - 1 

7. Simultaneous perception of the two figures. 

In this form both identical figures are noticed simultaneously, 
and as a rule, none other. 

8. Intuitive perception. 

In this form the subject perceives one figure and knows at 
once that it is one of the identical figures without having seen 
the others. 

Some of these divisions represent different methods of pro- 
cedure, others are probably stages in one and the same method. 
The author, however, does not bring out this distinction. The 
intuitive method would have appeared less mysterious had Dr. 
Griinbaum pushed the inquiry a little further and taken into 
consideration our subconscious or unanalyzed mental content. 

The primary task of the subject is the perception of a figure 
common to the two groups. In the fulfillment of the primary 
task it is interesting to notice the way in which the subject falls 
short of perfection in his reproduction of the common figure. 

1. Instead of the perfect and complete form he will often 
give one that is schematically correct. 

2. The subject will often draw a part of the figure and will 
know that something is lacking, but will be unable to supply it. 

3. The correct form will be changed, but still remain recog- 
nizable. The most interesting case of this kind is what Griin- 
baum has called "mirror-drawing." The figure is drawn as 
if from its reflection in a mirror. 

The success with which the primary task is accomplished 
decreases with the increasing number of figures in the groups. 
But the rate of decrease is not constant. It reaches a maximum 
in going from four to five figures in a group, and then rapidly 
declines. 

The secondary task consisted in the reproduction of all the 
figures that could be remembered after drawing the common 
figure. The greater the number of figures in each group, the 
greater the number recalled. The ratio of figures remembered 
to those exposed decreases as the number of figures exposed 
increases. The author compared the fulfillment of the secondary 



191 °] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 113 

task in recognition by the method of successive perception, with 
and without accentuation of the figures. It appears that the 
accentuation of one figure during the process of perceiving 
identity lessens the number of figures that are remembered over 
and above the common element. From this it would seem that 
with the accentuation of one figure the negative process of 
abstraction from the surrounding figures is already begun. 

In connection with this conclusion is the evidence that the 
secondary task is fulfilled better when the primary task is not 
accomplished — or, in other words, the perception of the common 
element tends to obliterate the surrounding figures. 

From the experiments of Grunbaum it would seem that the 
process of abstraction is brought about by an apperceptive ac- 
centuation and separation of the common element. On the 
other hand, the surrounding figures are forced into the back- 
ground and lose something of their conscious value. 

Here it may be well to append the abstract of the early 
experiments of this study which appeared in the report of the 
Fifth International Congress of Psychology, held at Rome in 
1905. 

THE PEOCESS OF EECOGNITION. 

"The problem of research undertaken in this set of experi- 
ments may be briefly stated as follows : 

When a series of groups of figures (e.g., a square, triangle, 
etc.) is represented to a subject and in each group one figure 
is always repeated, what mental process will be involved in 
recognizing that a figure has recurred in the series? It was 
not required of a subject that he should be certain that a figure 
recurred in each group, but only that he could say with certainty 
that some figure had been repeated. 

Hitherto the problem of recognition has been mainly con- 
fined to the comparison of the sensations or perceptions of dis- 
tance, etc., which the subject was to judge of as the same or 
different. But to surround the elements to be recognized with 
varying sensations brings the problem of recognition nearer to 
the conditions of real life and also enables us to approach by 



114 University of California Publications in Psychology. [Vol. 1 

experimental methods somewhat closer to philosophical problems 
with which metaphysics has long been engaged. 

In order to simplify the mental processes involved as much 
as possible the time of exposing a group of figures and the 
interval between exposures were both limited to a fourth of a 
second. A longer interval in either case would have given time 
for reflection, comparison, acts of the will to remember certain 
figures, and other rather complicated mental processes. The 
shorter interval eliminated in great measure these processes, for 
before there was time for reflection or comparison a new group 
of figures was represented. 

The mechanism by which the expositions were given con- 
sisted of a metronome and Dr. Wirth's memory apparatus. 

When a subject had perceived that a figure had been 
repeated, he was asked to give an account of the development 
of this process of recognition which he had just experienced. 
The subjective analysis thus obtained was in later experiments 
tested by limiting the number of expositions, so that the series 
of exposures ended before the observer had arrived at complete 
certainty. He was then asked to give an opinion and describe 
his state of mind. A control over the experiments was always 
kept by introducing from time to time a series of exposures in 
which no figure was repeated. 

The following steps (naturally with various graduations) in 
the process of recognition were noted by means of this method: 

1. An intimation of some kind of a figure being repeated 
without any knowledge of its form. 

2. An intimation of some kind of a figure being repeated 
and a very imperfect idea of its form (e.g., a dark spot, a cloudy 
spot which afterwards cleared up, an unsymmetrical figure, etc.). 

3. Certainty that a figure is repeated but a clear image of 
only a part of the figure. 

4. Certainty that a figure is repeated and a clear image of 
the form. 

These steps seem to be but points in the more common and 
fuller order of development. 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 115 

The subjects often remarked, when they first saw the common 
figure, it had already a tone of familiarity. 

It sometimes happens that the blind intimation of a figure 
being repeated increases to certainty without any image of the 
figure being formed. This was especially the case when two 
figures were alternately repeated in a series of exposures. 

The perception of the figure repeated has a tendency to 
force the other figures out of consciousness. E.g., Subject K, 
in experiments where no figure was recognized as repeated, could 
afterwards draw the following numbers of figures as remem- 
bered: 3, 2, 2, 4, 4, 2, 1, 3. When, however, he had perceived 
a common figure he could draw as remembered only 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 
0, 0, 1. 

It would thus seem that under the simple conditions of the 
experiments the progress of recognition is by no means a simple 
act, and that the formation of a mental picture is not the only 
or the most important factor. ' ' 44 



44 Atti del V. Congresso internasionale di Psicologia tenuto in Boma, 
dal 26 al 30 Aprile, 1905, pp. 286-287. 



116 University of California Publications in Psychology. ITol. * 



II. 
THE METHOD OF RESEARCH. 

1. The Problem and the Experiments. 

It is very seldom, if at all, possible to reproduce in the 
laboratory the exact conditions of real life. Most of our ex- 
periments can only approximate more or less closely the actual 
occurrences in the external world. This is not, however, an 
insurmountable difficulty for experimental psychology. We 
have not one mind for the laboratory and another for the world. 
The same mental processes that take place in the world are 
observed in the laboratory, but under different conditions. The 
change in conditions is in the direction of greater simplification. 
The mental process of the laboratory is, as it were, a purified 
product and its true properties can therefore be more easily 
determined. The process of abstraction as studied in our ex- 
periments is certainly not the same as that of ordinary life. 
But it involves those very elements which are essential to the 
extra-laboratory mental operation. For this reason the present 
work is truly a study of abstraction. 

The first method of experiment that I conceived of would 
have reproduced in the laboratory, almost exactly, the process 
of abstraction as it often occurs in actual life. It would have 
consisted in presenting to the subject a series of sentences, each 
containing a common idea. The subject's task would be to find 
the common idea, and report the mental processes he experienced 
in doing so. This method, however, is hard to bring under 
experimental conditions. I then thought of exposing to a sub- 
ject a series of drawings. Each drawing would represent a 
single object, e.g., a series of net-veined or parallel- veined leaves. 
The subject's task would be to pick out the common charac- 
teristic. Dr. Thorndike, of Columbia University, recently told 
me that he had thought of the same experiment, and suggested 



1910] Moore : The Process of Abstraction. 117 

exposing a series of bilaterally symmetrical figures. By a little 
ingenuity a sufficiently complete material could be worked up, 
and this method of experiment would afford the opportunity for 
a valuable piece of research. 1 

But neither of these methods of experiments is as simple 
as the one finally adopted, which, though farther away from 
the actual conditions of outside life, still involves the essential 
factors of the process of abstraction. It may be well to note 
here that, when in the future I speak of "the process of ab- 
straction," I mean, of course, the process as it existed under 
the conditions of these experiments. The analysis which results 
from our experiments is applicable to the real process of actual 
life only in so far as it appears that factors are analyzed in the 
laboratory which do occur in the more complete processes outside 
the laboratory. 

The method I finally decided upon may be described as 
follows : 

Let a group of geometrical figures stand for a group of 
qualities. Such a group has not indeed the unity that we see 
in the qualities of any object. However, when one is allowed 
but a single glance for one-fourth of a second at such a group, 
it really approximates the desired unity much more closely than 
would be expected. Let us expose in succession to a subject 
a series of groups of figures. In each group let there be one 
common element that constantly recurs. Of all the other ele- 
ments that go to make up the groups of the series, let no two 
be the same. Eepresenting our geometrical figures by letters, 
the following will give some idea of what is meant. Let us 
for example take a series of five groups with three figures in 
each group. This would be represented by : 

1. A B C. 2. D A F. 3. G H A. 4. A IJ. 5. K A L. 
There is one element common to each group, and this one 
element is the common quality that is to be abstracted. The 



1 1 wish to express here my indebtedness to Dr. Thorndike. It was his 
discussion of a paper I read in his class of Educational Psychology at 
Columbia University which was, although only indirectly, the first stimulus 
to the present work. 



118 University of California Publications in Psychology. E Vo1 - 1 

letters of the alphabet might serve for such an experiment were 
it not that their number is altogether too small. Instead of 
letters I used a specially designed set of figures. 

i«OADolDCAa7Z\OXBO«S)i 
i5 ©M*^«oO«!i$8(I /7<?$a© 
i4 OO^KGDHIK-fr ? Bd>OfiflA<8> 
is OAZ*?*? v^^c Q InltdQW© H 
12 ©05G W <^zs<^V(? s "H , 'B , T©¥QSQ 

io ff>*. § £ ®\*.P &&.*& Q o © 6 Wv P 

■ 9?W ^ i" & * & BfltlPSRft® «?a ^s 
1 %* % 8^© S3® HdP^&O'&t? & 

12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 

Fig. 1. — The originals used were each about 1% times as large as in this 
reproduction (see Fig. 2, p. 122 for actual size). The numerals at the side 
and bottom are merely for convenience of reference in the text. In these 
references, the first numeral (in lighter face) indicates position along the 
axis of abscissas; the second numeral (in heavier face) indicates position 
along the axis of ordinates. Not all of the figures were actually used. 
On account of their very evident associations the following were ex- 
cluded: (1, 2)-(2, 2)-(5, 2)-(6, 2) -(11, 2)-(14, 5). 

The figures possess one great advantage. On account of their 
strangeness, the process of perceiving them goes through a longer 
course of development and thereby one is enabled to detect 
points which it would otherwise be impossible to notice, or at 
least could be obtained with difficulty and uncertainty. 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 119 

The groups of figures in the actual experiments (see cuts on 
pages 122 and 123) contained five figures instead of three. This 
drew out to some length the process of isolating and perceiving 
the common elements, thereby allowing a better opportunity to 
observe the development of the mental processes involved. 

2. The Apparatus. 

For the experiments in Leipzig, Wirth's memory apparatus 
with rotating disk was used. At the University of California 
I used Ranschburg's memory apparatus. Each performs the 
same function and the same disks may be used in either ap- 
paratus. Each rotates a disk and exposes suddenly a small 
surface and as suddenly removes it from view. In this ex- 
periment a group of five figures was exposed for a quarter of 
a second and then a blank space for a quarter of a second and 
so on till the series of twenty-five exposures came to an end 
or as much of the series was used as necessary for the experi- 
ment. It was at Professor Wundt's suggestion that I used this 
short time of exposure and interval between exposures. It tends 
to reduce the experiment to simpler and therefore more constant 
conditions by cutting out to a large extent such variable factors 
as reflection on what was seen, comparison, and voluntary 
association. 

To beat time I have used both the metronome and the time 
sense apparatus, but generally the former, which is sufficiently 
accurate for the purpose. Care was taken to keep both these 
pieces of apparatus out of the room in which the observer was 
seated. 

3. Instructions to the Subject. 

The subject was instructed to look for the repetition of some 
figure and to turn a switch, which stopped the rotation of the 
disk, as soon as he was certain that he had seen some figure 
repeated. It was not required of him to see this figure in each 
group as it passed by, but merely to be sure that he had seen 
some figure twice. He was told not to wait until he knew all 



120 University of California Publications in Psychology. t Vo1 - 1 

about the figure but only to make sure that one and the same 
figure had occurred more than once. He was required at the 
end of the experiment to describe his state of mind during the 
experiment, and especially to tell what it was that he first 
noticed. 

4. Classification of the Experiments. 

It soon became apparent that the method offered exceptional 
advantages for a genetic study of the process of abstraction. 
In handling the results and attempting to reduce them to some 
kind of order, the complex nature of abstraction became evident. 
And at the same time its analysis was greatly facilitated. Our 
five figures were found to constitute something of a unit which 
underwent a real process of breaking up. This was evidenced 
by the fact that the elements of a group have a different mental 
value after the perception of a common element than before. 2 
Before the common element is noticed, the figures of any group 
have a tendency to persevere in memory, which varies with the 
foeality of their perception 3 and with their own inherent at- 
tractiveness. 4 After the common element has been perceived 
the tendency of the other figures to persevere in memory is 
greatly reduced. The group is no longer what it was before it 
was broken up. This breaking up of the group is one of the 
several processes which form the mental complex that we call 
abstraction. The breaking up of the group is intimately bound 
up with the perception of the common element. Perception 
then is another factor in abstraction. The figure perceived is 
remembered and recognized again upon its recurrence. We 
have then four points in our preliminary analysis of abstraction : 
(1) The breaking up of the group; (2) The process of per- 
ception; (3) The process of memory; (4) The process of recog- 
nition. Each one of these has been made the object of experi- 
ment and form the four main headings in our experimental data. 



2 See below, pp. 124-127. 
s See below, pp. 158-159. 
* See below, pp. 122-124. 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 121 

These experiments were commenced in Wundt's laboratory 
at the University of Leipzig. They were afterwards continued 
at the University of California. My thanks are due Professor 
Wundt for his kindly and valuable suggestions as to the method 
of experiment and also to Dr. Felix Krueger for his constant 
interest and assistance while I was working at Leipzig. I wish 
also to express my indebtedness to Professor Stratton and Dr. 
"Wrinch, with whose valuable cooperation the experiments were 
conducted at the University of California. 

The subjects who took part in the experiments were Miss 
Ball (B), Dr. Bessmer (Be), Dr. Brown (Br), Herr Blosfeldt 
(Bl), Miss Deamer (D), Herr Griinbaum (G), Dr. Krueger (K), 
Dr. Moore (Mo), Miss Mower (Mw), Miss Ross (R), Professor 
Stratton (S), Professor Eustachius von Ugarte (U), Mr. Wa- 
beke (W), Dr. Wrinch (Wr), and Herr Ziembinski (Z). 



122 University of California Publications in Psychology. t Vo1 - 1 

III. 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS. 

1. The Analysis of the Groups. 
(a) Isolation of the Common Element. 
In abstraction some element or characteristic is always picked 
out from a group and is recognized as identical with that which 
was found in another group. In our experiments this element 
was the repeated figure. We may ask what is it in any element 
that accelerates the process of its isolation and perception? 
The answer as one might expect is — whatever attracts attention 
to the element. This may be the pure accident of its focal 



£ £ *p 



v 




■ b 



o® 



R 



S> 



O 



V®^ 



A ®^-*D 



Fig. 2. — Showing grouping of 'elements' for actual display upon the 
disk, the common element following in the order 1, 3, 5, 3, 1, 3, 5. 



1910] Moore : The Process of Abstraction. 123 

perception. It may be the fact that it is rather larger than 
the other figures or blacker or more open. 

Small but symmetrical figures, e.g., 4, 12, and 5, 12, in Fig. 
1, seem to pass by easily without being noticed. Another 
drawback is apparently the complication of the figure. This, 
however, is probably only apparent. The subject involuntarily 
waits to be informed about the complicated figures. Compli- 
cation is, in itself, an advantage because it attracts attention. 
But the subject waits to know just what is repeated. In spite 
of instructions, he cannot stop the apparatus as soon as he is 
sure of the bare fact that a figure of some kind has been repeated. 

The attempt was made to find out whether the sequence of 
position had any influence in the perception of the common 
element. If we number each of the five positions in a group 



00 



41 <F 

Fig. 3. — Showing the grouping of the figures when the sequence of 
the common element is altogether irregular. 




124 University of California Publications in Psychology. ["Vol. 1 

of five elements 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, we have a means of recording this 
sequence of position. In the first group the common element 
may come in position one ; in the second in two, and so on. We 
may have such an order as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 1, 3, 5, 3, 1, 
3, 5 or 1, 5, 1, 5, etc., or the sequence of the common element 
may be altogether irregular. Whatever influence the sequence 
of position might have, it is so slight that it is obscured by the 
varying attractiveness of the figures themselves. So long as 
the common element does not come twice or oftener in the same 
position, the sequence of position seems to have but little effect. 
If it comes twice in the same position and the subject happens 
to see it, he involuntarily looks at the same place in the next 
exposition. In a word, then, it would seem that what was nat- 
urally to be expected is here the case. Everything that calls 
attention to the figure, either accidental circumstances or in- 
herent qualities, tends to accelerate the process of its isolation 
and perception. 

(b) The Disappearance of the Surrounding Elements. 

Once the common element has been perceived, the surround- 
ing elements are swept from the field of consciousness. They 
do not merely become less prominent, as one of the surrounding 
elements does when another is noted. They are forced into 
oblivion, usually complete. Rarely, one or two can still be 
remembered. In the passage quoted from the Atti del V Con- 
gresso 2 I reported that "Subject K, in experiments where no 
figure was recognized as repeated, could afterwards draw the 
following numbers of figures as remembered : 3, 2, 2, 4, 4, 2, 1, 3. 
When, however, he had perceived a common figure, he could 
draw as remembered only 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1." 

This condensed account of the experiments needs explanation 
in order that it may be understood. I think that it was reading 
the account of Kiilpe's " Abstractionsversuche" that first sug- 
gested to me that I could test one of the results that he obtained 
in Wiirzburg. In his paper before the first German Congress 

2 See p. 115. 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 125 

of Experimental Psychology he reported 3 that "negative ab- 
straction has its most evident effect in the most difficult task" 
(p. 65). The greater, therefore, the absorption of the attention 
in the principal task, the less is remembered of the secondary 
task. It might therefore be concluded as a general law that 
the perception of the element to be abstracted has a tendency 
to obliterate the memory of the other elements. To test this 
result by our own method I asked the subjects at the end of 
the experiments to draw the figures which they remembered. 
Sometimes they had noticed a common element and sometimes 
it happened that they had seen no common element — either 
because there was none to see, or through some accident they 
failed to notice the common element that was present. Whether 
or not a common element is actually present made no very 
great difference so long as it was not noticed. I did not 
put this latter point to a careful test, and a common element 
that is not noticed at all may have some slight effect which is 
lacking when no common element is present. But there is a 
very great difference in the number of figures which can be- 
remembered after an experiment in which no common element 
was perceived, and one in which the subject did see a common 
element, i The numerals given above for subject K give the 
number of figures that he could draw in experiments where he 
had not seen, and again where he had seen, a common element. 
They seem to prove that the perception of a common element 
places the surrounding elements at a great disadvantage so far 
as their preservation from oblivion is concerned. But the 
figures as given are open to objection. It did not occur to me 
at the time that the series where no common element was per- 
ceived were generally longer than those where one was perceived. 
Hence there was a greater chance to remember more figures. 
However, the subjective analysis leaves no room for doubt on 
the matter. It is with great difficulty that one remembers the 
other figures after perceiving the common element. Whereas 



s Bericht iiber den I. Kongress fur experiment elle Psychologie in Giessen, 
1904, pp. 62 ff. 



126 University of California Publications in Psychology. ITol. 1 

when no common element is perceived, several figures are usually 
drawn readily and with ease. 

However we are not left entirely to subjective analysis in 
the matter. Even when we take into consideration the relation 
of the length of the series to the number of figures remem- 
bered, we see that the memory of the surrounding elements is 
at a decided disadvantage whenever the common element is 
perceived. 

The following results make this point clear: 





Subject K, 






Common Element Not Seen. 


Common Element Seen. 


Figures 
remembered. 


No. of 
expositions. 3 


Figures 
remembered. 




No. of 
expositions. 

14 


3 


25 





10 


2 


25 





11 


2 


25 


1 


13 


4 


25 





9 


4 


25 





7 


2 


24 





11 


1 


25' 





20 


3 


25 


1 


12 



21 



199 



107 



10.5 = Percentage of figures remembered when the common element 
was not seen. 

1.9 = Percentage of figures remembered when the common element 
was seen. 





Subject W. 






Common Element Not Seen. 


Common Element Seen. 


Figures 
remembered. 


No. of Figures 
expositions. remembered. 


No. of 
expositions, 






3 


20 


7 


25 


5 


24 


3 


25 


2 


9 


9 


25 


3 


25 


7 


25 





12 


3 


25 


2 


11 


4 


25 





20 



33 



150 



15 



121 



22.0 = Percentage of figures remembered when the common element 
was not seen. 

13.2 = Percentage of figures remembered when the common element 
was seen. 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 127 



Subject G 
Common Element Not Seen. 



Figures 
membered. 


No. of 
expositions. 


2 


25 


4 


25 


5 


25 





25 


5 


25 


3 


25 


6 


25 


3 


25 



Common Element Seen. 


Figures 
remembered. 


No. of 
expositions. 





15 


4 


21 





4 





4 





4 


1 


7 





8 





7 





4 


1 


13 



28 200 6 87 

14.0 = Percentage of figures remembered when the common element 
was not seen. 
6.9 = Percentage of figures remembered when the common element 
was seen. 

2. The Process op Perception. 

It would seem at first sight that the sense-perception of a 
given object is a matter which concerns, almost exclusively, the 
sensations involved in the act of perceiving. Suppose for in- 
stance that we have to do with the visual perception of some 
object. Then we can pick out the shades of brightness and the 
tints of color, and the spatial data given by the sensations 
arising from movements of the eye, and, if you will, the feelings 
of pleasure or dislike that may be involved. And this analysis 
having been completed, the task of the psychologist seems to 
have been done. The analysis is exhaustive and nothing more 
is required. This is a superficial view of the matter, but still 
a view which seems perfectly warranted until one seeks to find 
by experiment just what are the factors in the process of per- 
ception. It then appears that there are two factors. One may 
be termed objective. It involves the elements mentioned in 
the analysis just given. The other may be named subjective. 
This involves the correlation of the data of objective perception 
with that of past experience, — 'apperception' in the Herbartian 
terminology; 'assimilation' in the Wundtian. 



128 University of California Publications in Psychology. E Vo1 - 1 

We may use the words 'perception' and 'apperception' for 
the objective and subjective factors in our apprehension of an 
object. 

In the visual perception of an object there is one point which 
may be regarded as a stage of relative perfection, and that is 
the acquisition of a definite image. In the process of apper- 
ception there is no such stage which may be designated as per- 
fect, nor indeed is it always easy to say whether or not the object 
has been apperceived at all. 

For this reason we may take the acquisition of a definite 
image of an object as a kind of cardinal point and ask ourselves 
what stages of perception and apperception precede and what 
follow the clear visualization of the object. One of the first 
things which becomes apparent in going over the data of the 
experiments is this : Perception and apperception were inter- 
twined in the process of apprehending the common element. 
Concerning the apprehension of the figures surrounding the 
common element the experiments give practically no data. It 
became possible to pick out stages in the apprehension of the 
common element because (a) the subject's attention was directed 
to seeing a figure repeat itself and thereby a special figure had 
to be looked for and impressed on the memory; and (6) the 
process of apprehension was often long drawn out, thereby 
giving an opportunity for the stages to be definite enough for 
detection. 

The experiments in which the development of the knowledge 
of the figure was long drawn out were in the minority, and 
represent those cases where the process of apprehending the 
figure was relatively difficult. Or rather, they represent those 
cases where a focal perception of the common element was 
accidentally delayed. These are the hopeful cases for psycho- 
logical analysis. Any one could look at two of our figures and 
tell at a glance whether they were the same or not. But in so 
doing he could not say with certainty just how he came to that 
conclusion, except that his eyes told him so. Perhaps here one 
really is concerned with a comparison of visual images. But 
even this is not clear. Suppose the rate of succeeding impres- 



191 °] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 129 

sions is so rapid that there is no time to stop and compare 
images; suppose, too, that it, is not possible to see the figure at 
will in the focal point of vision ; what then will tell us that two 
succeeding figures are identical? This is really what was done 
in our experiments. The rapidity of the rhythm of exposition, 
the changing position of the common element, made focal per- 
ception at will an impossibility. As a result, the process 
of apprehending the common element often proceeded in stages 
that were well marked, and thereby it became possible to analyze 
it. For it turns out that the apprehension of a simple figure 
is not itself as simple as one might suppose. Certainly there 
is involved in it something more than mere seeing with one 's eyes. 
Some samples of the subjects' introspections are given below. 
These data were obtained by running through the experiments 
and picking out what the subjects described as the first thing 
to be noted in their apprehension of the common element. The 
samples given may be considered as answers of our subjects to 
the question, "What did you first notice?" if we exclude as 
irrelevant the remarks about certain figures which attracted their 
attention before any idea of a common element was present. 

A. Data acquired before a clear perception op the form. 

1. Feeling Tone: 

An unpleasant unsymmetrical figure. (Bl.) 

2. Appropriate Mental Categories : 

The idea of some kind of a figure; absolutely no determinate 
knowledge of just what kind; a very frequent case, and one 
that represents the earliest stage of perception. 
A horizontally lying curve.* 
Symmetry: 

Subject noticed first that the figure was bi-laterally symmet- 
rical, and only on seeing it somewhat later did he get an 
idea of the form. (Wr.) A pointed symmetrical figure. 
(Mw.) An unsymmetrical figure. (D.) 
An idea of the figure changing its position, before an image 

of its form. (K.) 
A common element similar to the one in the preceding experi- 
ment. (Mo.) 

4 A rare instance of spatial direction being given before a clear image. 
The figure was (8, 13). For an explanation of this manner of referring to 
the figures by number, see page 118. 



130 University of California Publications in Psychology. [Vol. 1 

Familiarity or Unf amiliarity : 

Idea of a common element, then of something strange. (E.) 
In one series of experiments, figures were introduced which 
the subject had not seen before. Z said that with these 
disks he first noticed something new, and afterwards a 
special figure. 

3. Partial Perception of the Figure: 

Subject knew first that a common element was present, then that 

it was circular in form, then he obtained a complete idea of 

form. (G.) 
A pointed figure. (Mo.) 
An open kind of figure. (Mo.) 
Subject knew that the figure was round, and had an idea of about 

how big it was, and could not get true form. (The figure was 

10, 15.) (Mw.) 
A narrowly oblong figure. (Mw.) 
Something with top lines crossed. On stopping the apparatus 

knew exactly what the figure was. The image faded and the 

abstraction, something with top lines crossed, remained. (Mw.) 
Subject first noticed something resembling a heart, then that it 

was different from a heart. (E.) 
"I next noticed that the figure was pointed." (E.) 
At end of experiment subject had forgotten whether the figure 

was a circle or a polygon. (E.) 
A bar in the center with some kind of curves. This the subject 

attempted to draw, but failed utterly to produce the figure. (E.) 

Subject knows that the figure has a square in the middle, but 

cannot place the square where it belongs. (Bl.) 
At end of experiment the subject was certain of two triangles with 

points together, and did not know just how the other lines were 

drawn. (Bl.) 
At end of experiment subject remembered a diamond in the center 

of the figure, but was able gradually to build up the figure from 

this one fact and draw it (3, 3) correctly, (Bl.) 
Had at first the idea of some kind of a polygon. (Bl.) 
Thought a dark spot would turn out to be the common element, 

and so it did. (Bl.) 
A narrow oblong figure. (D.) 
Noticed at first a point and then a square. (D.) 
First notices points and then something crossed; finally obtained 

the true image. (Gr.) 
Knows that figure consists of two triangles, but does not know 

where to place the corners. (Z.) 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 131 

At the end of the experiment the subject knew that the figure 
had something round in the middle. He was able to pick out 
the right figure (13, 11), on another disk, when it was placed 
before him. (Z.) 

B. Data acquired after a clear perception op the form. 
1. The idea of a figure's orientation: 

In some figures a distinct axis may easily be picked out. They 
are built around this axis. And according to the position of the 
axis the figure may be turned to the left and right, or up and 
down, or it may be rotated around the central point of this 
axis. The actual position of the figure, as determined by the 
direction of the axis, is what I mean by the figure 's orientation. 
It frequently happened that the subjects were in doubt about 
the orientation of the figure but felt perfectly certain about the 
form and did have, in fact, a correct knowledge of all the 
details of the figure. This leads one to suppose that since the 
orientation of the figure is not given with the perception of the 
shape and details of the figure's composition, it must require 
for its perception a distinct act over and above the act or acts 
of apprehension that are necessary to acquire a knowledge of 
the form. 

Not only is the subject often left in doubt about the orientation 
of the figure, but he frequently is the victim of a delusion. It 
is an interesting fact that the subject would often be positively 
certain of an orientation that was just the opposite of the true 
one. 

The explanation of this erroneous judgment is not certain. 
Grunbaum has termed the phenomenon mirror-drawing (Spiegel- 
zeichnung), intimating that the figure is drawn as if from its 
reflection in a mirror. The errors, however, are not merely 
such as would be caused by drawing from a reflection in a 
mirror. They may indeed be right and left reversals, but they 
may also be up and down reversals or rotations of the figure, 
through an angle of ninety or of a hundred and eighty degrees ; 
or errors which would be produced by combining the above 
alterations of position. As a possible explanation of the delusion, 
I would suggest the following : The figure was seen by glancing 
at it from another figure. This glance involved a movement 
of the eye. Ordinarily the orientation of a figure is judged 
at leisure, by moving the eye from one part of the figure to 



132 University of California Publications in Psychology. [Vol. 1 

another. But in the rapidly disappearing figures, in our ex- 
periments, this was not always possible. The details of the 
form were seen first. This involved perhaps a single glance, 
which was an up and down movement of the eye, or a right and 
left movement or a rotation of the eyeball. This glance at the 
figure gave rise to the idea of its orientation. It was inter- 
preted as a glance along the axis of the figure or from one point 
of the figure to another. There was no time to correct the first 
idea by a second movement of the eye. And the chance move- 
ment, in observing the figure, gave rise to the delusion of 
orientation. 

From the fact that such delusions and doubts occur fre- 
quently, it seems clear that a true and certain perception of a 
figure's orientation requires a special mental act and is not 
ordinarily given with the perception of its form. Rarely, it 
may precede the full perception of the form. 

The following stages of development give in brief outline 
an analysis of the process of perception : 

The Stages of Perception. 

1. The general idea of some kind of a figure being repeated. In this 
stage there is no definite information about the shape or nature of the 
figure whatsoever. 

2. A more or less specialized idea of the figure. This idea of the 
figure may be expressed by perfectly general terms or it may be accom- 
panied by a more or less perfect image. 

3. A correct idea of the figure and clear knowledge of its shape, but 
doubt about or error as to its orientation. 

4. A correct idea of the figure and its shape with a true knowledge of 
its orientation. 

A pleasant or unpleasant tone of feeling may accompany 
any of these three last stages. I have never found it with 
the first. 

From the above analysis the order of development seems 
evident. The subject does not pass from the individual to the 
general, from the concrete to the abstract, but just the reverse. 
What is offered to vision is individual and concrete enough. 
But what one first sees and holds on to is something that can 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 133 

fit into some kind of a mental category that the figure suggests. 
What one sees and does not hold on to, but at once forgets, 
takes no further part in the process of development. The 
mental category may be as wide as that conveyed by our idea 
of 'something.' Or again, it may pick out some special char- 
acteristic of the figure. There are, indeed, two classes of incom- 
plete apprehensions of the figure used above and spoken of as 
appropriate mental categories and partial perceptions. The 
partial perceptions noted above must not all be put down as 
mere incomplete images. Once a subject said that she knew 
the figure was made of curved lines. She had not the slightest 
image of any curved lines nor any idea of how they were 
arranged. She attempted to draw some curved lines but failed 
utterly to reproduce the figure or any part thereof. Had there 
been a mental image of any part of the figure, that part could 
have been drawn. But there was no image. On perceiving 
the figure, it called up by association the idea of curved lines. 
That the figure belonged to the class of curved-line figures was 
apprehended clearly and remembered. The image of the curved 
lines was not remembered. 

Another instance is that of Mw above. The final result was 
the memory of something with the top lines crossed. On stop- 
ping the apparatus she knew exactly what the figure was. The 
image faded and the abstraction "something with top lines 
crossed" remained. 

Sometimes there may, indeed, be a piece of a mental image 
in the mind. But frequently, perhaps generally, this is not the 
case. The partial memory of the figure means simply that the 
figure called up some such general concepts as points or angles 
or curves, etc. The subject remembers the fact that the sensation 
fitted the concept at the time of perception. The sensation may 
leave no image behind it, but the memory of the fact remains. 

"We may regard the process of perception as terminating in 
a mental state representative of the figure and reproduceable in 
memory. The case of G- above may be taken as representative 
of a good course of development. The subject knew (a) that 



134 University of California Publications in Psychology. ITol. 1 

a common element (12, 13) of some kind was present. (&) He 
then knew that it was circular in form, (c) And finally he 
obtained the true mental image or at least a mental state that 
enabled him to reproduce correctly the figure he had perceived. 

When the subject knew that some kind of a common element 
was present, he was not, of course, seeing a general idea of 
something with his eyes. On the contrary, perfectly individual 
and concrete sensations were being perceived. The process of 
perception was one of normal sensation, but in all probability 
not of focal vision. The process of apperception was the recog- 
nition of these sensations as belonging to the general concept 
"some kind of a figure." Later on, this concept was specialized 
to that of ' ' a figure circular in form. ' ' Still later in the process 
of development, a mental picture was obtained representing the 
figure in its details. 

However, the mental image forms no essential part in the 
apprehension of a figure. It is like the illustration in a book 5 
which is useful but not necessary for the sequence of thought. 
The contention that the mental image forms no essential part 
in the apprehension of a figure is proved by the following ex- 
perimental facts: 

(a) Subjects Be, Bl, G, K, M, W, Z were at times conscious 
of a figure repeating itself before they could say anything more 
than that some figure was being repeated. 

A figure was apprehended as repeating itself. Certainly, 
therefore, a figure was apprehended. But there was no image, 
nor any further knowledge of it than that it was some kind of 
a figure. Therefore the image is not necessary in the appre- 
hension of the figure. One must not confound the visual image 
with the visual sensation. Without the sensations one might 
just as well have his eyes shut. There would be no apprehension 
at all, because nothing to apprehend. But in the resultant 
from the visual sensations, the mental image has no essential 



s In the above statement I do not mean to call in question the conclusion 
of Watt about the utility of the mental image in forming associations. 
Mental imagery is very convenient and useful, but it is not the only element 
in the flow of thought, nor is it an essential element. Cf. Watt, Archiv. f. 
d. ges. Psychol., 4l, pp. 361 ff. 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 135 

part because it may be lacking altogether. The residuum may 
be the bare fact of memory that the sensations did call up 
certain generalizations and did represent something belonging 
in their category. 

(6) These results were not only obtained by a subjective 
analysis of the course of development after it had transpired; 
but were also confirmed by an objective test. Shortened series 
of expositions were given so as to cut short the process of devel- 
opment before it had arrived at completion. For example : 
Subjects who require on an average fifteen expositions to be 
sure that a figure was repeated, were given six or seven. They 
were asked at the end of the abridged series to describe their 
state of mind. In this way a kind of cross-section of the process 
of perception in its course of development was obtained, and a 
confirmation of the results of memory and introspection was 
secured. 6 

(c) The following series of experiments with subject Z is 
noteworthy in this regard. A series of disks was prepared in 
which there were two common elements. Common element a 
appeared in groups 1, 3, 5, etc. Common element b appeared 
in groups 2, 4, 6, etc. The two common elements were thus 
exposed to view alternately. The subject was told to stop the 
apparatus as soon as he was certain of one common element. 
He did not know whether or not there would be one common 
element in each group, or two in alternate groups, or none at all. 

Experiment 1. Common Element (9, 12)-(10, 16). 

Eesult: The subject had a feeling that some kind of a common 
element was present during a period in which no determinate 
figure had as yet been noted. After four exposures he was sure of 
9, 12 and when the apparatus stopped he saw 10, 16 by accident 
and knew that it had been there before. The subject then drew 
both figures correctly. 

Experiment 2. Common Element (10, 15)-(10, 14). 

After ten exposures the subject drew 10, 15 and said that he had a 
feeling that another common element was present. 



« For a fuller account, see below, p. 163. 



136 University of California Publications in Psychology. [Vol. 1 

Experiment 9. Common Element (5, 12)-(4, 12). 

The subject stopped the apparatus after nineteen exposures and said 
that he was perfectly certain of some common element and that 
there should be two, because two certainties kept crossing each 
other in consciousness, but with no image. The feeling of cer- 
tainty could not attach itself to any common element because before 
it could do so, another feeling came of another common element. 
He was unable to draw or tell anything about either of the common 
elements. 

Experiment 12. Common Element (14, 14)-(13, 14). 

After nine exposures the subject stopped the apparatus and said that 
he was certain of two common elements, but what they were he did 
not know. He had a feeling that there was some common element, 
but he could not find it. He judged that there were two because 
of the difference in feeling between these experiments and those in 
which there was but one common element in each group. 

The remaining experiments of this series confirm these 
results. 

Further experiments were made with this subject, in which 
disks were introduced having one common element in groups 
1, 3, 5, etc. In groups 2, 4, 6, etc., there was no common element. 
He sometimes mistook these disks for those of two common 
elements, but he never said that there was a common element 
on a disk where there was none at all. Nor did he mistake a 
disk with one common element in each group for one with two 
common elements. 

These experiments make it perfectly clear that a common 
element may be perceived and that, too, with certainty, while 
in apprehending it there is not only no mental picture left in 
the mind, but not even a more or less specialized general concept 
of its form. 

From the experiments of the above sections (a, o, and c, pp. 
134 ff.), the conclusion is warranted that a mental picture forms 
no essential part of our apprehension of a figure. 

Taking perception as a general term to cover all the pro- 
cesses by which we arrive at a knowledge of the figure, we may 
distinguish therein the following factors: 



191 °] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 137 

A. The Process: 

(a) An objective Factor: 

The sensations to which the figure gives rise. The reception of 
these sensations by the mind institutes a process of apper- 
ception. 
(o) The Feelings: 

Here feeling is taken in its strict sense, as pleasurable or dis- 
agreeable, or a feeling of tension, etc. 
(c) A subjective Factor: 

The sensations are recognized as representing an object which 
belongs to one or more mental categories. 

B. The Kesidutjm: 

(a) The memory of the fact that the object belongs to such or such 

categories. 
(&) The mental image, 
(c) The memory of the figure's orientation. 

In the residuum, (a) is essential, (6) is not essential. I 
cannot have an image of a figure without at least knowing 
implicitly that it belongs to my mental category of figures. 
But the experiments have shown that (&) is not essential, for 
one can apprehend a figure without forming any mental picture 
thereof. 

The above view of the process of abstraction is borne out 
in some important details by the work of Arthur E. Davies of 
the Ohio State University. 7 This experiment regards two facts 
as established. 

"The first is, that perception is a mental process, not an act; 
and the second, that the perceptual content undergoes a growth 
before it can be definitely defined" (p. 189). 

Our own experiments have made these points abundantly 
clear. He also agrees with us in a conclusion that he puts for- 
ward tentatively. "Primitive psychic material does not seem 
to be so much received from without, as developed from within. ' ' 8 
Taking this to mean in our own terminology that in the process 
of perception there is both an objective and a subjective factor, 



7 A. E. Davies, ' ' An Analysis of Psychic Process. ' ' Psychological Re- 
view, 12, 1905, pp. 166-206. 

8 Op. cit., p. 200. 



138 University of California Publications in Psychology. [Vol. 1 

it must be put among the established facts of psychology; and 
indeed the subjective factor does have very much to do with 
the final product — perhaps more than the objective. The author 
points out three stages in the perception of the form : 9 (a) the 
perception of light. (&) An imperfect perception of the form. 
(c) A perfect perception of the form. That the perception of 
light should enter here as a stage prior to any perception of the 
form is indeed remarkable. The explanation, however, is to 
be found in the conditions of the experiment. The subject 
sat in the dark and the figures were illumined by a flash of light. 
Before any perception of the form could take place, there had 
to be a process of adaptation during which only light could be 
perceived. It is strange that the author makes no reference 
to adaptation as accounting for the perception of light prior 
to that of form. The flash of light, too, accounts for the feelings 
of tension, surprise, etc., to which so much attention was given 
by the author. However, it would be natural to suppose that 
a feeling of tension or excitement, or both combined in a weak 
emotion of surprise, might well precede the entrance of any 
objective perception into the field of consciousness. 

The author notes that positive examples of association 10 were 
rare. The experience in our own experiment was that with some 
subjects they are plentiful enough, but rare with others. 

In the following section, he seems to differ from us radically. 
"If therefore by association is meant the subsumption of a 
particular perception under a general idea or class, we do not 
find that such a procedure is characteristic of elementary psychic 
process. ' ni 

¥e take it, however, that his data on this point is negative. 
He did not find it to be so. And indeed he does not say that 
it is not the case. So, even here there is no real contradiction 
of results. The method used was not calculated to bring out 
that stage of perception which we found, in which there was no 



» Page 176. 

io We suppose that there is here meant association of the figures per- 
ceived with various ideas or objects of real life, 
ii Page 191. 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 139 

image but only the bare knowledge of some kind of a figure. 
Davies exposed a figure by a momentary flash of light in a dark 
room. The subject was then required to give an account of his 
experience. There was always but a single exposure and no 
chance for a long-drawn-out development of the process of 
perception such as occurred in our own experiments. The op- 
opportunity for a longer process of development enabled the 
analysis based upon our own experiments to be more complete. 

3. The Factor of Memory in the Process of Abstraction. 

After the common element has been separated from the 
elements that surround it and perceived, it must be held in 
memory. The memory of the isolated characteristic or group 
of qualities is an essential element in the process of abstraction. 
Consequently it would seem desirable to investigate this process 
of memory as it occurred in our experiments. 

There are three factors which are readily seen to affect the 
process of memory: 

(a) The method of memorizing — visual or motor, or whatever 
method may be used. 

(&) The effect of perceiving new groups between the time 
of the figure's first perception and its final recognition as a 
figure that has occurred more than once. 

(c) The focality of perception — the chance falling of the 
figure in the focal point of vision, or more or less outside of it. 

Each one of these points can be easily made the subject of 
experimental investigation and the three following sections give 
the results obtained: 

(a) The Method of Memorizing. 

During the course of the experiments it occurred to me to 
ascertain how long it would take to memorize a group of five 
figures so that they could be accurately drawn. While acting 
as subject in these experiments I discovered that this was largely 
dependent upon the method of memorizing. At first sight it 



140 University of California Publications in Psychology. IT o1 - 1 

would seem that in looking at a group of figures and attempting 
to get them in mind for future reproduction, one has to do with 
a process of memorizing by visual imagery. But one has but 
to attempt the task to discover that besides the visual image 
there is something else which is a powerful aid to memory. 
And this is a more or less complete mental analysis of the figures, 
an analysis which it is utterly unnecessary for the subject to 
put in words. What are the figure's more elemental parts? 
How are they related? Does it resemble anything in real life? 
Such factors as these are elements which, most will admit, do 
not belong to the visual sensation, as such, nor to its more or less 
perfect replica, the visual image. The attempt to picture an 
object so as to be able to see it clearly with the mind's eye, and 
if need be, draw it, is one mental process. The effort to analyze 
an object, to see what it is made of, what it resembles, its pos- 
sible use, etc., is another mental process. And while the two 
may go hand in hand, they need not; and it is possible to 
memorize by either method. 

Experience, however, would indicate that visualization with- 
out analysis is rare and difficult. However, these are two very 
distinct methods of memorizing; and while it is not possible to 
use either in an absolutely pure and unadulterated form, still 
it is possible to make either visualization or analysis the pre- 
dominating feature in the method of memorizing. This was 
attempted in the following series of experiments. The method 
of experiment was very simple. A group of five figures was 
exposed for a constant time and the subject was called upon 
to memorize the group by one or the other method. At the 
end of the time the group was covered and the subject called 
upon to draw what he remembered. The drawings were then 
rated, an approximately perfect drawing being given a credit 
of 1. An imperfect drawing, but still recognizable as being 
intended for one of the figures exposed, was given a credit of 
0.5. An utterly unrecognizable drawing was given a credit 
of 0.1. An omission was counted as zero. It is not always 
possible to assign a drawing with certainty to one of the three 



1910] Moore : The Process of Abstraction. 141 

gradings. However, it is generally fairly easy and is better 
than calling everything perfect or zero. 

After a little experimenting it became evident that the 
method of analysis had a decided advantage over that of visual- 
ization. After this was noticed, there might be a subconscious 
tendency to favor the marking by analysis and thereby 
strengthen the evidence for the point maintained. But however 
much one might do this I am sure that no system of conscientious 
marking could turn the balance in favor of visualization. To 
offset any such tendency I was a little stricter in marking the 
results obtained in memory by analysis than those obtained by 
visualization. And I believe that the markings given for analysis 
are a trifle too low. 

A much more serious difficulty is that which arises from 
the attempt to exclude all analysis of a figure when one is trying 
to get a visual image of it fixed in the mind. Associations crop 
up spontaneously, and one simply cannot exclude all analysis 
of the figure. The subjects were instructed that when they were 
attempting to memorize by visual imagery they were not to 
mind any involuntary associations or analyses of the figure that 
might spring up, but still not to make any great effort to sup- 
press them. The result is that the two sets of experiments really 
represent memory by visualization without attempt at analysis 
or association, and memory by analysis and associations without 
any attempt to acquire a definite mental image. It is much 
easier to memorize by analysis to the exclusion of imagery than 
vice versa. Subjects often remarked that figures were remem- 
bered by some association rather than by imagery when they 
were attempting to memorize by visualization. But it seldom 
happened in attempting to memorize by analysis and association 
that the figure was recalled by its visual image suddenly ap- 
pearing without any apparent associational connections. As a 
result of this the markings for memory by visualization are 
considerably higher than they would be if the method could 
have been used in absolute purity. 



142 University of California Publications in Psychology. IT o1 - 1 



Sept. 27, 1907. 




Imagery. 


Association. 


0.8 


4.0 


0.4 


1.7 


0.4 


2.1 


1.2 


2.1 


0.3 


2.0 


1.6 


2.1 


6) 4.7 


6)14.0 


0.8 


2.3 



Oct. 4, 1908. 




Imagery. 


Association. 


2.5 


3.0 


2.0 


3.2 


2.1 


2.1 


2.1 


3.0 


1.1 


1.5 


2.0 


3.5 


6)11.8 


6)16.3 


2.0 


2.7 



Subject B. 




Oct. 11, 1907. 


Oct. 25,1907. 


Imagery. 


Association. 


2.1 


2.6 


2.1 


2.2 


0.4 


3.2 


3.0 


1.2 


2.2 


2.2 


1.5 


1.5 


3.0 


1.7 


1.3 


3.5 


1.1 


2.6 


2.0 





1.2 


9)20.7 


1.5 


2.3 


12)21.4 




1.8 




Oct. 31, 1907. 




Imagery. 


Association. 


1.5 


3.1 


0.1 


2.1 


3.1 


3.2 


1.6 


2.2 


1.5 


3.0 


5) 7.8 


5)13.6 


1.6 


2.7 



1910] 



Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 



143 







Subject E. 




Sept. 26, 1907. 




Oct. 10, 1907. 




Imagery. 


Association. 


Imagery. 


Association. 


2.6 


5.0 


2.2 


2.7 


2.0 


4.5 


4.5 


3.6 


1.0 


5.0 


3.0 


5.0 


3.0 


2.5 


2.5 


2.7 


3.1 
1.5 


5.0 
5)22.0 


2.0 
5.0 


4.5 
4.0 


6)13.2 
2.2 


4.4 


3.0 
3.1 


3.5 
4.1 






1.5 


5.0 


Oct. 3, 1907. 




1.3 


5.0 


Imagery. 


Association. 


2.1 


3.1 


3.0 


5.0 


2.5 


5.0 


3.0 


1.0 


12)32.7 


12)48.2 


1.1 

4.0 


3.0 
4.1 


2.7 


4.0 


2.2 


2.0 






2.9 


4.4 






2.7 


3.0 






7)18.9 


4.0 






2.7 


8)26.5 ' 
3.3 








Subject Mo. 




April 18, 1907. 




April 25, 1907. 




Imagery. 


Association. 


Imagery. 


Association. 


2.0 


4.0 


4.0 


3.0 


2.0 


5.0 


2.5 


5.0 


2.0 


4.0 


2.0 


3.0 


2.0 


4.0 


2.0 


4.0 


2.0 


4.0 


3.0 


4.5 








2.0 


5.0 


5)10.0 


5)21.0 














6)15.5 


6)24.5 


2.0 


4.2 












2.6 


4.1 



144 University of California Publications in Psychology. [Vol. 1 



Oet. 8, 1907. 




Nov. 7, 1907. 






Imagery. 


Association. 


Imagery. 


Association. 


2.0 


4.5 


3.0 




4.0 


2.0 


5.0 


2.0 




4.0 


1.0 


4.0 


3.0 




5.0 


4.0 


3.0 


3.0 




3.0 


3.0 


4.0 


2.0 




4.0 


4.0 


5.0 


3.0 




3.0 


3.0 


4.0 


3.0 




3.0 


3.0 


5.0 


2.0 




5.0 


2.0 


4.0 


3.0 




4.0 


3.0 


4.0 


3.0 




4.0 


10)27.0 


10)42.5 


10)27.0 


10) 


39.0 


2.7 


4.2 


2.7 




3.9 



The above tables show in every case a decided advantage in 
favor of memory by association and analysis, over memory by 
imagery. It would therefore seem as if the psychological factors 
in the analysis and association of a figure add greatly to the 
mind's power of retaining and reproducing it. An objection, 
however, was suggested by a friend who was not inclined to 
give up so readily the primary importance of mental imagery 
in the process of memory. Perhaps in memory by association, 
he held, there is brought into play the motor imagery which is 
inhibited by the attempt at visualization. So that in what is 
termed memory by association we have really memory by visual 
imagery plus motor imagery, and therefore this is naturally the 
more favored form. That such was not the case is evident 
not only from evidence to be given later, but from the record 
that was kept of the cue by which the subjects fixed the figures 
in mind in memorizing by association. Not once did they 
mention any feeling of movement, as of outlining or drawing 
the figure or its parts, but the associations were always such 
as connected the figure with some known object, or analyzed it 
into parts, or some kind of description was given which was of 
itself insufficient to express the subject's full concept of the 
figure, but stood as a symbol for his mental state in regard to it. 



1910] 



Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 



145 



Below are a few random samples of such associations, divided 
into three classes: 

(a) Associations which connect the figure with an object in 
real life. 

(&) A description which indicates some kind of an analysis 
of the figure. 

(c) A designation which really expresses the subject's in- 
ability to associate or analyze the figure in the given time, but 
which nevertheless serves as a symbol of the figure and aids in 
its recall. 



A. Object. 

Scroll of paper. 

Melon. 

A kind of handle. 

Star. 

Tulip. 

Heart. 

Swastika. 

Diamond with handle. 

Dumb-bell. 

Two turnips. 

Necktie. 



B. Analysis. 

Circle. 

Curved figure with dot. 

A kind of hexagon. 

A kind of oblong. 

A kind of square figure. 

A half -circle. 

A kind of scroll. 

Curves. 

Dots. 
Squares 
Points. 

Pentagon with dot. 
Cut triangle. 
Cut quadrangle. 
Something long and nar- 
row with points. 



C. Symbol. 
Curlyeue. 

Funny figure. 
Something upside down. 

The well-known figure. 
The unassociated figure. 



On looking over this list of associations one might be inclined 
to say that this so-called memory by association and analysis 
is really nothing but a process of naming the figures and remem- 
bering the words used. That might be so if the catch-word 
used to designate the figure generally were sufficient to express 
it truly. But that is not the case. The figure is never com- 
pletely described. And the subject's task is not to remember 
his description of the figure but to remember the figure so as 
to be able to draw it. The word or words used serve to fix and 



146 University of California Publications in Psychology. [Vol. 1 

crystallize the mental state that was experienced in perceiving 
the figure. They are not that mental state nor do they fully 
express it. Why? Because there is more in that mental state 
than is given in the word. And how do we know this ? Because 
the subject draws more than his words express. 

It is an important thing to ascertain the real value of motor 
imagery in memorizing such figures as were used in our experi- 
ments. It is not evident from inspection that it is either 
inferior or superior to "memory by association." Accordingly 
a method was devised by which the value of motor imagery 
could be tested. The subject was allowed to trace the figures 
with a pointer in one set of experiments, thereby giving him 
an opportunity for the development of motor imagery. This 
set of experiments was compared in each sitting with a "visual" 
and "association" set. The time allowed for each experiment 
was that which sufficed for the subject to trace five figures, 
which varied from 10 to 13 seconds, with the three subjects. 
Each subject, however, had for visualization and association the 
time that allowed him to trace comfortably the five figures. 
The order in which the experiments are printed is that of the 
experiment. 





Subject Be. 




Aug. 24, 1908. 






Visual. 


Motor. 


Association, 


1.0 


3.0 


4.0 


1.5 


3.5 


3.5 


0.5 


3.0 


3.5 


3.1 


2.6 


3.5 


2.6 


1.1 


3.1 


1.1 


2.6 


3.6 


6) 9.8 


6)15.8 


6)21.2 


1.6 


2.6 


3.5 



1910] 



Moore : The Process of Abstraction. 



147 



Sept. 28, 1908. 




Association. 


Visual. 


3.5 


2.0 


3.0 


1.6 


5.0 


2.0 


3.5 


1.5 


2.0 


2.1 


2.0 


1.1 


3.6 


2.0 


7)22.6 


7)12.3 


3.2 


1.7 


Oct. 5, 1908. 




Motor. 


Associatic 


1.6 


3.5 


3.0 


4.0 


2.6 


4.0 


2.0 


3.5 


2.5 


3.0 


2.0 


3.1 


6)13.7 


6)21.1 


2.3 


3.5 


Oct. 19, 1908. 




Visual. 


Associatio 


3.0 


2.5 


1.0 


2.6 


2.0 


4.5 


2.0 


3.0 


2.5 


4.0 


2.0 


3.6 


6)12.5 


6)20.2 


2.1 


3.4 



Motor. 
2.5 
3.0 
1.1 
1.0 
3.0 
1.0 
3.0 

7)14.6 

2.1 



Visual. 
3.5 
1.2 
1.0 
2.5 
2.5 
2.1 

6)12.8 

2.1 



Motor. 
2.5 
1.5 
3.5 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 

6)10.5 

1.7 



148 



University of California Publications in Psychology. t Vo1 - 1 





Subject S. 




Aug. 26, 1908. 






Visual. 


Motor. 


Association. 


2.0 


4.0 


5.0 


4.0 


1.5 


4.0 


1.0 


2.1 


5.0 


2.1 


2.0 


4.0 


1.0 


2.5 


4.0 


2.5 


1.5 


1.0 


6)12.6 


6)13.6 


6)23.0 


2.1 


2.3 


3.8 


Sept. 3, 1908. 






Association. 


Visual. 


Motor. 


4.0 


2.0 


3.0 


3.5 


3.0 


4.0 


4.5 


1.0 


1.5 


4.5 


4.0 


1.5 


3.5 


4.0 


2.0 


5.0 


1.5 


3.0 


2.6 


4.0 


2.5 


7)27.6 


7)19.5 


7)17.5 


3.9 


2.8 


2.5 


Sept. 10, 1908. 






Motor. 


Association. 


Visual 


4.1 


2.1 


3.1 


2.0 


4.0 


2.0 


4.0 


4.0 


1.0 


2.0 


3.0 


1.5 


1.0 


4.0 


3.0 


3.0 


4.0 


2.0 


1.0 


3.1 


3.1 


7)17.1 


7)24.2 


7)15.7 


2.4 


3.5 


2.2 



1910] 



Moore : The Process of Abstraction. 



149 



Sept. 17, 1908. 






Association. 


Motor. 


Visual. 


4.0 


3.5 


2.0 


2.0 


6.0 


3.0 


4.0 


1.6 


3.5 


5.0 


2.0 


2.0 


5.0 


3.0 


2.0 


5)20.0 


5)16.1 


5)12.5 


4.0 


3.2 


2.5 


Sept. 24, 1908. 






Visual. 


Motor. 


Association. 


3.0 


2.5 


4.0 


2.5 


3.5 


1.5 


3.0 


3.0 


3.1 


3.0 


2.5 


4.0 


1.0 


1.0 


3.5 


1.0 


2.0 


2.5 


1.6 


3.5 


3.5 


2.5 


2.5 


4.0 


8)17.6 


8)20.5 


8)26.1 


2.2 


2.6 

Subject We. 


3.3 


Aug. 27, 1908. 






Association. 


Visual. 


Motor. 


5.0 


4.0 


5.0 


4.5 


2.5 


3.5 


2.5 


3.0 


3.1 


4.0 


3.0 


1.5 


3.5 


4.0 


3.5 


4.5 


2.5 


3.5 


3.5 


2.5 


1.0 


7)27.5 


7)21.5 


7)21.1 


3.9 


3.1 


3.0 



150 University of California Publications in Psychology. IT o1 - 1 



Sept. 3, 1908. 

Visual. 
2.0 
4.0 
4.0 
2.5 
2.0 

5)14.5 

2.9 



Motor. 
4.0 
1.0 
3.0 
2.0 
2.0 

5)12.0 

2.4 



Association. 
4.0 
5.0 
4.5 
5.0 
4.0 

5)22.5 

4.5 



Sept. 10, 1908. 




Motor. 


Association. 


4.5 


2.5 


4.5 


4.5 


4.0 


5.0 


4.0 


4.1 


2.5 


4.0 


5)19.5 


5)20.1 


3.9* 


4.0 



Visual. 
4.1 
3.0 
3.0 
4.1 
1.0 

5)15.2 

3.0 



Sept. 17, 1908. 

Association. 
5.0 
4.0 
3.5 
5.0 
2.5 

5)20.0 

4.0 



Motor. 
3.0 
4.0 
0.5 
3.0 
3.0 

5)13.5 

2.7 



Visual. 
3.0 
3.5 
2.5 
2.5 
2.0 

5)13.5 

2.7 



* In this set seven figures were recalled by involuntary association. 
Were these excluded the average would be reduced to 2.5. 



1910] 



Moore : The Process of Abstraction. 



151 



Oct. 1, 1908. 
Visual. 
4.0 
2.5 
3.0 
2.5 
1.5 

5)13.5 
2.7 



Association. 


Motor 


4.5 


4.0 


5.0 


4.0 


5.0 


2.5 


4.0 


4.0 


4.0 


3.0 


5)22.5 


5)17.5 


4.5 


3.5 





Subject Br. 






Table of Averages. 




Association. 


Motor. 


Visual 


3.5 


2.6 


1.6 


3.2 


2.1 


1.7 


3.5 


2.3 


2.1 


3.4 


1.7 


2.1 


4)13.6 


4) 8.7 


4) 7.5 


3.4 


2.2 


1.9 




Figure 4, showing the relation between memory by association (a), 
motor (m), and visual (v) imagery for Subject Br. 



152 University of California Publications in Psychology. (Tol. 1 





Subject 


S. 






Table of Averages. 




Association. 


Motor. 




Visual 


3.8 


2.3 




2.1 


3.9 


2.5 




2.8 


3.5 


2.4 




2.2 


4.0 


3.2 




2.5 


3.3 


2.6 




2.2 


5)18.5 


5)13.0 




5)11.8 


3.7 


2.6 




2.3 




Figure 5, showing the relation between memory by association (a), 
motor (m), and visual (v) imagery for Subject S. 





Subject We. 






Table of Averages. 




Association. 


Visual. 


Motor 


3.9 


3.1 


3.0 


4.5 


2.9 


2.4 


4.0 


3.1 


3.9 


4.0 


2.7 


2.7 


4.5 


2.7 


3.5 


5)20.9 


5)14.5 


5)15.5 


4.2 


2.9 


3.1 



1910] 



Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 



153 




Figure 6, showing the relation between memory by association (a), 
motor (m), and visual (v) imagery for Subject Wr. 



These tables and figures show a decided advantage for 
memory by association over memory by imagery. They show 
besides that, so far as this advantage is concerned, it makes 
no difference whether the imagery be visual or motor. In 
motor-imagery we really have motor plus visual, for the subject 
necessarily looks at the figures while tracing them. So that 
even the combined effect of visual and motor imagery cannot 
equal the results obtained by analyzing and associating the 
figures. 

(b) Memory as Belated to the Sequence of the 
Surrounding Figures. 
In the process of abstraction one group of sensations after 
another is perceived by the mind. In each one of these groups 
some common element is always contained. The moment ar- 
rives when this common element becomes separated from those 
that surround it, and approaches the focal point of conscious- 
ness. This is, as we have seen, not an instantaneous act but a 
process with more or less definite stages, and can under circum- 
stances consume a relatively long time. In the meanwhile one 
group of impressions after another falls upon the mind. What, 
we may ask, is the effect of these impressions on the subject's 
memory of the common element? One might jump to the 



154 University of California Publications in Psychology. [ Vo1 - 1 

conclusion that they tend to obliterate the memory of the 
common element. Still, one cannot be sure of this, off-hand; 
experiments have surprises in store. 

Angell and Harwood found that distractions between a 
normal and compared stimulus not only did not always decrease 
the accuracy of recognition, but that at times they even in- 
creased it. 12 A very different result obtains where it is not a 
question of recognizing a stimulus but reproducing that which 
has previously been learned. Under these conditions the effect 
of sensory stimuli between the time of memorizing and of repro- 
duction is to obliterate that which the subject had learned. 
Bigham found 13 the following average errors under these 
conditions : 





Empty interval 


Optical filling 


Acoustical filling 


2 sec. 


25.2 


29.4 


34.7 


10 sec. 


28.8 


31.0 


36.0 


30 sec. 


31.1 


33.0 


37.1 



"We might rest upon the results of Bigham and conclude that 
when a number of new figures are noticed after the perception 
of the common element they will tend to obliterate the memory 
of the common element. The lapse of time between the first 
and the second perception of the common element is not the 
only factor which tends to obliterate the common element. 
Succeeding impressions have a positive tendency to impair the 
subject's memory for the common element which has attracted 
his attention. However it seemed best not to rest content with 
experiments made under conditions that were not precisely the 
same as those under which we studied the process of abstraction. 
We put the point to an actual test. 

The method of experiment was as follows : The subject first 
saw three groups of figures. He was instructed to fixate a given 
position in these groups — i.e., always the first, counting from 



12 Angell and Harwood, "Discrimination of Clangs for Different Inter- 
vals of Time, Part I. ' ' Amer. Journ. Psychol., 11, pp. 67-79 ; Part II, ibid., 
12, pp. 58-79. 

is J. Bigham, ' ' Memory. ' ' Psychol. Beview, 1, 1894, p. 459. 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 155 

left to right, or the second, or the third, etc. After these three 
groups came a fourth exposure. In this there was but one 
figure, which might be in any one of the five positions. After 
this came a certain number of groups — five, or twenty-one, or 
twenty-one blank spaces — according to the nature of the experi- 
ment. At the end of each experiment the subject's task was 
to draw the isolated figure of the fourth exposure. 

The reason for varying the distance between the point of 
fixation and that of the exposure of the figure was to reproduce 
that condition of the previous experiments in which the subject 
is still unsatisfied with his knowledge about the common element. 
I first compared the condition of memory after five exposures 
with that after twenty-one. The subjects were rated as in 
the previous experiments on memory, and then an average of 
all experiments was taken. For memory after five exposures 
the general average for the subjects (twenty-six experiments) 
was 0.46. For memory after twenty-one exposures the general 
average for three subjects (thirty-one experiments) was 0.34. 
"We thus see that increasing the number of exposures, after the 
perception of a figure, has a tendency to decrease the accuracy 
of the memory. I then compared the condition of memory after 
twenty-one groups of figures had followed the isolated figure 
with the condition when twenty-one blank spaces followed the 
isolated figure. The average in the first instance for the subjects 
(twelve experiments) was 0.67. In the second instance the 
average for three subjects (fifteen experiments) was 0.77. The 
perception of new figures seems therefore to have a tendency 
to obliterate the memory of the one already perceived. The 
element of practice, however, has almost doubled the markings, 
so too much reliance cannot be placed on these preparatory 
experiments. 

It seemed possible to get results more quickly if we had 
a material in which each element was more homogeneous. One 
figure is so much more attractive than another and has so many 
more possibilities of association that the element of chance enters 
in to obscure the results. Consequently a set of numbers was 



156 University of California Publications in Psychology. [Vol. 1 

prepared. In each number there were three digits. In no 
number was the same digit repeated. A zero never occurred. 
An arithmetical sequence of the digits was avoided. Such 
numbers as the following were therefore excluded : 112, 120, 123. 
The order of experiments remained the same as before, only 
instead of figures we had numbers consisting of three digits 
each. A comparison was then made between the memory of 
an isolated number after twenty-one blank spaces had followed, 
with that after twenty-one groups of five numbers each had 
been exposed. 

The memory was rated as either good or bad. If the subject 
recalled two or more digits correctly, his memory of the number 
was rated good; if he gave less than two digits correctly it was 
rated bad. The results are given below. The series with the 
vacant spaces are designated by V, the series with the twenty- 
one groups of figures are designated by "21." A indicates the 
difference in position between the point of fixation and the 
occurrence of the isolated element. Under M is given the rating 
of the subject's memory — good (g) or bad (b). 







Subject D. 






V 






"21" 


A 


M 




A 


M 


1 


g 




1 


b 





g 




1 


g 


1 


g 







b 


1 


g 




1 


b 





g 







g 


1 


g 




1 


b 


1 


g 




1 


b 


1 


g 




1 


b 


1 


g 




1 


b 


2 


b 




2 


b 


2 


g 




2 


b 


2 


g 




2 


g 





g 







b 



12g — lb 3g — 10b 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 157 









Subject 


Mw. 








V 










"21" 


A 




M 






A 


M 







b 









b 







g 









b 







b 






1 


b 


1 




g 






1 


b 







g 









g 







g 






1 


b 


1 




g 






1 


b 


1 




g 









b 





7g- 
V 


g 
-2b 


Subject 


E. 




lg — 7b 
"21" 


A 




M 






A 


M 


1 




g 









b 


1 




g 






1 


g 







g 






1 


g 







g 









g 


1 




g 






1 


g 


1 




g 






2 


b 


2 




b 






2 


b 


2 




b 









b 







b 









b 







b 









g 





7g- 


g 
-4b 








5g — 5b 



For all three subjects we have in the V Series 26g-7b and 
in the "21" Series 9g-22b. It is evident by inspection that 
memory is better in the V series. We may, however, express 
this better by using one of Pearson's auxiliary methods of corre- 
lation. 14 The one best adapted to the data at hand is 

. ir V ad — t/ be 

r = sm T r y= 

* y ad+y be 



14 Cf. Spearman, "The Proof and Measurement of Association between 
Two Things." Amer. Journ. Psychol., 15, 1904, p. 82. 



158 University of California Publications in Psychology. ITol. 1 

In this ease a is the number of times the V series was good; b 
is the number of times it was bad ; c is the number of times the 
"21" series was good; d the number of times it was bad. 
Accordingly we have 

a b c d 

Vg VI «21"0 "21" 6 

12 1 3 10 

7 2 1 7 

7 4 5 5 

26 7 9 22 

r==ein - l/(26M22)-l/(7S9) =n71 
2 i/(26).(22)+l/(7).(9) 

1.1 1.1 

Probable error = ,— = .— = rb .19 
V n 1/33 

r = 0.71 ±.19 

(c) Memory as Related to the Focality of Perception. 

To give some idea of the decrease in the accuracy of the 
memory with the distance of the object from the point of fixation, 
I plotted a curve from the few preparatory experiments of the 
previous section. It happens to be of a smoothness that is not 
warranted by the few experiments and which I believe is some- 
what accidental. In spite, however, of some objections that 
can be made to it, its main points represent fairly the decrease 
in the accuracy of the reproduction which is due to extra-focal 
perception. 

A source of error lies in the fact that some figures have a 
greater attractiveness than others; they become more familiar 
to the subjects than the less favored figures. An extra-focal 
glance is sufficient for the perception of such figures, but not for 
that of unfamiliar figures. As a result the curve does not fall 
off as steeply as it should. However, it is not without value, 
and is therefore given. 

The abscissas in the accompanying cut give the difference 
between the point of fixation and the occurrence of the isolated 



1910] 



Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 



159 



figure. The ordinates give the average ratings of memory for 
the corresponding experiments. 















Bz 


.62 
















• 




V47 








- 






s^3S 






, 








sf a 




■ 


1 




• 


• 


• 



O 



A. 
/ 



^ 

a 



3 






It is evident from the curve that the farther a figure is from 
the focal point of vision when it is perceived the less accurately 
it can be reproduced. When it is more than a single space 
away from the focal point the accuracy of reproduction com- 
mences suddenly to decrease. 



160 University of California Publications in Psychology. IT o1 - * 

4. The Process op Recognition. 
(a) Analysis of the Experiments. 

The experiments that are recorded in this section, though 
the last to be mentioned, were the first to be made. They are 
identical in time and nature with those recorded under the 
heading of Perception. The method is there fully described. 
It was found necessary to pick out and treat under separate 
sections that which our raw material offered to us concerning 
perception and recognition. 

In the previous sections we have followed the process of 
abstraction from its initial stage — the breaking up of the group, 
— on through the process of perceiving and remembering the 
common element. We have picked out certain , factors which 
favor and retard the memory of the common element and we 
come now to that mental process by which the common element 
is known to have been seen before when it is noticed again in 
the series. This process is that known as recognition. It is 
a process which is distinct and separate both in reason and in 
time from those that we have already described in our analysis 
of abstraction. The breaking up of the group — perception and 
memory — are more closely related to one another than to recog- 
nition. The breaking up of the group is really an initial stage 
of perception. Everything perceived is remembered more or 
less perfectly for a while. Indeed, the subject's memory of 
the figure is the result of the process of perception, for the 
experiments on memory by imagery and association have shown 
that memory is greatly dependent on the way in which the 
figure is perceived. But the recognition of the figure is a dis- 
tinct and final stage in the process of abstraction. One need 
not make many experiments to prove that a figure may be 
perceived without being recognized. This is witnessed, if wit- 
ness be necessary, by the subjects' remarking occasionally that 
early in the experiment they had noted the figure, which finally 
proved to be the common element. At that time, however, it 
did not occur to them that this figure was the common element. 



191 °] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 161 

There is indeed nothing remarkable in this. But it is somewhat 
strange that at the close of the experiment subjects would often 
say that they had seen the figure clearly, two, three or even 
four times before they stopped the apparatus. Three times 
seemed to be the usual number. Practice, and strict orders not 
to wait, did not stop the occurrence of such dilatoriness. This 
waiting may be due to two things : 

(a) Time is required for the subject to resolve to stop the 
apparatus. 

(&) It often takes an appreciable interval for the process of 
recognition to develop. 

The first may be of importance ; the latter certainly is. For 
in the course of the delay the subjects seem to have a dawning 
sense that the element in question is the common element. In 
fact it happened once that the series came to an end while 
the subject's mind was in this twilight state. He stopped the 
apparatus and then laughed and said: "Why, it just occurs 
to me that a figure I have in mind was undoubtedly the common 
element." There were several other occurrences of the same 
nature. It seems evident, therefore, that in abstraction there 
is a process of recognition distinct from the bare perception of 
the common element. Furthermore, this process of recognition 
may take an appreciable time for development. 

We should expect to find in the process of abstraction a two- 
fold development, the development of perception and the devel- 
opment of recognition. As there are stages in the process of 
perception so there should be stages in the process of recognition. 

What, then, is to be developed in the process of recognition? 
From the experiments of this section it is evident that recog- 
nition involves something that perception does not involve, 
namely, the element of certainty or uncertainty. Certainty 
that the figure has been seen before is what is dawning upon 
the subject in that state before his mind is fully made up. 

If the process of perception were always completed before 
that of recognition began, our task would be a very simple one. 
We should have but to add to the stages of perception the various 



162 University of California Publications in Psychology. ITol. 1 

degrees through which the subject goes in arriving at complete 
certainty, the different shades of probability up to unhesitating 
assent. But only by accident is the process of perception com- 
plete before recognition begins. What happens is that almost 
any degree of the certainty of recognition may coexist with any 
degree of the perfection of perception. And this we shall 
attempt to bring out in the arrangement of our results below. 
Three main points are picked out in the development of 
certainty : 

The intimation of a common element. At the end of an 
experiment the subjects were asked to give a description of 
their mental state during the experiment. The first stage was 
a kind of inkling that a common element might be present. 
This stage I have designated as (1) an Intimation. It is a 
state of very weak probability and is sometimes due to the 
presence of similar figures. A more advanced stage I have 
designated as (2) Probability, and the final stage as (3) Cer- 
tainty. These divisions of course are arbitrary and flow into 
each other. 

With this explanation the various headings given below will 
be understood. The numerals in the parentheses show what 
figure was used as the common element in the experiment in 
question. 15 This will enable any one to see for himself to what 
extent the imperfection of perception was due to the complexity 
of the figure. In some cases at least the complexity of the figure 
must have been a minor factor. The final state of full recog- 
nition with certainty of the fact and a perfect idea of the form 
has not been put down in the following enumeration of the 
stages of recognition. It was the more common termination of 
the experiments and occurred with all subjects. 

In order to give a more complete idea of the subject's mind 
his remarks have been occasionally transcribed and referred to 
by indices at the right of the numbers which designate the 
common element of the experiment. These remarks of the 
subjects, better than any description, give an idea of the course 
of development. 



is Cf. Fig. 1, p. 118. 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 163 

It required anywhere from about five to twenty-five exposures 
for the subject to find the common element. During all these 
exposures the process of abstraction was in a state of growth 
and development. Its stages were at first ascertained only by 
the subject's memory of what occurred during the experiment. 
Would it not be possible to get a direct observation of these 
stages by cutting the experiment short, thus giving fewer ex- 
posures than the subject ordinarily required? At the end of 
the experiment the subject would not have finished the process 
of abstraction; he would not have to recall as well as he could 
by memory the stages he had noticed in the development of 
complete certainty. He would simply have to describe by direct 
introspection his state of mind which would be, at the very 
moment, in some one of those stages of development. 

Simple as the experiment seemed, it was most tantalizing to 
carry out. Sometimes the subject arrived at complete certainty 
before the shortened series came to an end. Sometimes the 
process of abstraction seemed not to have commenced at all, 
and the subject's mind was in a state of negative doubt. 16 By 
persistent effort, however, the various stages were confirmed, 
not all, however, with all subjects. The time necessary for this 
would have been excessive. However, a sufficient number of 
confirmations of the previous results of memory were obtained 
to make it evident that the stages of development so obtained 
were no delusions but states of mind that actually occurred. 
These confirmatory experiments are noted under the same 
division as the previous ones wherever they were obtained. The 
words "confirmed by" precede the numbers that refer to the 
common element of the shortened series. 



is By negative doubt I mean a state of mind in which the subject knows 
of no evidence either for or against a proposition. In this case the propo- 
sition would be: A common element is present on this disk. Positive 
doubt would occur if one were moved equally by the known evidence for 
and that against a given proposition. 



164 University of California Publications in Psychology. [Vol. 1 

The Stages of Recognition. 
Subject Be. 

I. An intimation of a common element, without any knowledge of its 

form. 

(4, 14)-(14, ll)-(7, 10)-(9, 10)-(15, ll)-(9, 13)-(17, 14)-(13, 11)-(14, 
11). 

II. Probability that a common element is present, but an imperfect idea 

of the form. 
(3, 11)*-(17, 11). 
Confirmed by (16, 12)-(5, 9)-(4, 9). 

* Subject knew at first that a curved figure was presented. 

III. Probability that a common element is present, and a true idea of 

its form. 
Confirmed by (15, 16) -(16, 16). 

IV. Certainty that a common element is present, but an imperfect idea 

of its form. 
(10, 14)*-(15, 12)f-(2, 14)-(15, 13)-(11, 13)-(4, ll)t-(15, 13)-(8, 13)- 
(9, 11). 

* Subject could not draw figure at all, but was certain that a common 
element was present. 

f Subject was certain that the figure appeared several times, and that it 
was not one of the ordinary geometrical figures. 

X Forgot the image of the figure, but was able to find it in the table of 
figures. 

Reaction of the subject to disks with no common element : 

(1) Not certain of any common element. But he drew a figure which 
might perhaps have been common. It was an amalgamation of several 
similar figures which had occurred on the disk. 

(2) Negative doubt. 

(3) Negative doubt. 

(4) Negative doubt. 

(5) Negative doubt. 

(6) Inclination to believe that no common element was present. 

(7) Very uncertain. If forced to guess one way or the other would 
say that a common element was present. 

(8) More probably no common element was present. 

(9) Probably a common element was present. Subject drew as the 
common element a figure which was a combination of two similar figures 
that occurred on three disks. 

(10) Perhaps a common element was present. 



1910] Moore: The Process <of Abstraction. 165 



Subject Bl. 

I. An intimation of a common element, without any knowledge of its 

form. 

(7, 10)-(15, 11)-(17, 13)*-(17, 7). 

(Confirmed in two cases, but neglected to note what figure was used.) 

* Subject said he was quite certain that for a time he knew a common 
element was present. What this common element was remained subconscious. 

II. Probability that a common element is present, but an imperfect idea 

of its form. 
(4, 14)*-(10, 7)f-(17, 8)-(15, 10). 
Confirmed by (5, 9). 

* Thought for a time that a dark spot would turn out to be the common 
element, as indeed it actually did. 

t The subject was at first conscious of a cloudy flake, which afterwards 
cleared up. 

III. Certainty that a common element is present, but an imperfect idea 

of its form. 
(5, 12)*-(16, 6)f-(14, 10)-(8, 10)-(16, 6)-(10, 7)-(9, 11). 
Confirmed by (7, 12). 

* The subject felt conscious of a difference in the size of the figures, and 
classified them into large and small. At a certain period in the experiment 
he knew that the common element was not one of the larger figures. 

f The subject knew for a time that the common element was some kind of 
an unpleasant unsymmetrical figure. 

Reaction of the subject to disks with no common element : 

(1) Subject stopped the apparatus after twenty-four expositions and 
said that he noticed no easing of his task as the experiment proceeded. 
When a common element is present he notices that the process of per- 
ception becomes easier as the experiment proceeds. 

(2) Nothing noted. 

(3) Nothing noted. 

(4) Not certain that no common element was present. 

(5) Not quite certain that no common element was present. 

(6) Almost certain that no common element was present. 

(7) More probably no common element present. 

(8) Absolute indecision. 

(9) Indeterminate. 

Subject D. 

I. An intimation of a common element, without any knowledge of its 
form. 
This stage was not found with this subject. 



166 University of California Publications in Psychology. [Vol. 1 

II. Probability that a common element is present, but an imperfect idea 

of its form. 

(15, 10)-(10, 10)*-(8, 16)-(4, 13)-(3, 9)f-(4, 9)t-(16, 8). 

* Wondered for a time whether or not a blurred figure seen out of focal 
vision was going to turn out to be the common element. 

f Subject could describe the figure as symmetrical and oval at one end and 
said she had a visual image of it; but knew that this visual image was 
incorrect. 

$ Probably a funny little figure round at one end, with one line coming 
to a point. 

III. Certainty that a common element is present, but an imperfect idea 

of its form. 
(10, 12)-(10, 16)-(15, 12)-(15, 9). 

Eeaction of the subject to disks with no common element : 

(1) Not sure that no common element was present. 

(2) Possibly a tall, slender figure was the common element. 

(3) Slight probability of a common element. 

(4) Thinks no common element was present. 

Subject Kr. 

I. An intimation of a common element, without any knowledge of its 

form. 
(13, 16)*-(16, 16)-(15, 11)-(15, 10)-(13, 11)-(17, 15)f-(6, 12)-(10, 13)- 

(4, 13)-(17, 10)t-(17, 13)||-(14, 13). 
Confirmed by (7, 13). 

* At end of experiment subject drew figure and said he was perfectly 
certain that it was the common element. Long before he arrived at certainty 
he had a vague feeling that some kind of a common element was present. 
Later he knew that it was changing position. 

f "Zuerst ein unbestimmtes Gefiihl, ohne Object, sehr vag." 
:f At first a general probability. 

|| "Increasing feeling of probability, without contents," was an early stage 
in this experiment. 

II. Probability that a common element is present, but an imperfect idea 

of its form. 
(15, ll)*-(4, 13)f-(13, 11). 
Confirmed by (16, 13). 

* The subject had at first a feeling that probably a curved figure was the 
common element. 

f A feeling that the common element might be a figure limited by straight 
lines. 

III. Probability that a common element is present, and a true idea of 

its form. 
This stage was found with subject Kr in the series of confirmation 
experiments with (16, 14).* 

* The image of the figure came to him only after the experiment was over. 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 167 

IV. Certainty that a common element is present, but an imperfect idea 
of its form. 

(8, 13)-(13, 12)-(16, 6)-(15, 12)-(17, 11). 

Reaction of the subject to disks with no common element : 

(1) Uncertainty. 

(2) Complete uncertainty. 

(3) Thinks no common element present. 

(4) In first part of experiment a very weak feeling of probability 
that a common element was present. During about three-fourths of the 
experiment, an ever increasing probability that no common element was 
present. 

(5) Certainty after 23 expositions that no common element was 
present. 

(6) Very probably no common element. 

Subject Mo. 

I. An intimation of a common element, without any knowledge of its 

form. 
(8, 12)-(11, 12)-(13, 12)-(6, 12)-(3, 13)-(8, 10)*-(12, 14) -(10, 12). 

* There was a first stage of vague probability followed by a blank, and 
then a rising probability accompanied at first by no definite image. 

II. Probability that a common element is present, but an imperfect idea 

of its form. 
(14, 10)*-(14, 15)f-(12, 14)-(10, 12)-(7, 18)4 

* "There was a time when I thought to myself, 'It is a pointed figure.' " 
f "At first I thought an open kind of figure would be present." 

J There was a time when a strong probability attached itself to some kind 
of a figure with an angle cut out. 

III. Probability that a common element is present, and a true idea of 

its form. 
(12, 13)-(2, 16)*-(4, 12)-(14, 11)-(1, 13). 

* "There was a clearly marked period of doubt during which I thought 
that a triangular figure was being repeated." 

IV. Certainty that a common element is present, but an imperfect idea 

of its form. 
(4, 9).* 

* "For a part of this experiment I knew a figure was being repeated, but 
I could not catch it. I had very little or no idea of its form." 

Reaction of the subject to disks with no common element : 

(1) A weak probability that some kind of a common element is 
present. 



168 University of California Publications in Psychology. ["Vol. 1 

(2) A faint probability of a common element with cut-out angles. 

(A confusion of several figures.) 

(3) Faint probability of a common element. 

(4) Saw nothing. 

(5) Very slight probability of a common element. 

(6) Sure that no common element was present. 

(7) Very weak probability of a common element. 

(8) Negative doubt. 

(9) Negative doubt. 

(10) Probably no common element present. 

(11) Probably no common element present. 

Subject E. 

I. An intimation of a common element present, without any knowledge 

of its form. 
This stage was not to be found with this subject. 

II. Probability that a common element is present, but an imperfect idea 

of its form. 
(12, 14)*-(2, 6)t-(13, 11)-(13, 15). 

* The idea of something like a heart came first ; then the thought that it 
was different from a heart. 

f Noticed at first the outer points. 

III. Probability that a common element is present, and a true idea of 

its form. 
(9, 10). 

IV. Certainty that a common element is present, but an imperfect idea 

of its form. 

(13, 12)*-(14, H)-(4, 14)-(2, 6)-(2, 13).f 

* Subject stopped the apparatus before she was sure of the form. There 
was a time in the experiment when the subject knew that some figure was 
being repeated, but did not know just what one it was. 

f Saw figure three times. On second exposition she knew that the figure 
had points and that was all. 

Keaction of the subject to disks with no common element : 

(1) Nothing noted. 

(2) No intimation of a common element. 

(3) Probably a common element repeated. 

(4) Negative doubt. 

(5) Thinks no common element present. 

(6) Almost sure that no common element was present. 

(7) Thinks no common element present. 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 169 



Subject W. 

I. An intimation of a common element, without any knowledge of its 

form. 

(2, 13)1(13, 3)-(4, 12)*-(17, 13)- (17, 12)f-(17, 13)4 
Confirmed by (12, 15)-(2, 6). 

* Subject saw something changing its position before he could make out 
its shape. 

t Subject was conscious of a common element all along, but did not know 
what it was. 

X Subject said he was conscious of a common element before there "really 
was one present." 

II. Probability that a common element is present, but an imperfect idea 

of its form. 
(8, 14)-(8, 12). 
Confirmed by (15, 12).* 

* Subject thinks that a common element of angular form was probably the 
repeated figure. 

III. Probability that a common element is present, and a true idea of 

its form. 
(4, 13). 

IV. Certainty that a common element is present, but an imperfect idea 

of its form. 
(6, 10)-(12, 14)-(3, 6)-(l, 13). 
Confirmed by (14, 13)*- (3, 9).f 

* Subject noticed that the -image faded away very rapidly. 

f Subject saw a rounded thing suggesting two points and knew that it was 
repeated. At end of experiment (10th exposure) he could not draw it. H> 
had a "feeling that it was there before he saw it." 

Reaction of the subject to disks with no common element: 

(1) Sees nothing. 

(2) Thinks none absolutely alike. 

(3) Negative doubt. 



Subject Z. 

I. An intimation of a common element, without any knowledge of its 
form. 
(8, 12)*-(13, ll)-(8, 13)-(4, 14)f-(2, 6)}-(16, 6)|-(3, 6)-(2, 13). || 
Confirmed by (15, 14) in two different experiments. 

* At first it seemed to the subject as if a common element was present. 
Then he looked here and there to find it. 

•f At first there was an abstract feeling of something common. 

% First noted something common and new. 

|| At first there was an indefinite consciousness of something repeating itself. 



170 University of California Publications in Psychology. [Vol. 1 

II. Certainty that a common element is present, without any knowledge 

of its form. 
(3, 11). 

III. Probability that a common element is present, but an imperfect idea 

of its form. 
This stage is not to be found in the records of this subject. 

IY. Probability that a common element is present, and a true idea of its 
form. 
(2, 13)-(5, 12)-(10, 10). 
Confirmed by (16, 13)-(10, 12). 

V. Certainty that a figure is being repeated, but an imperfect idea of its 
form. 
(7, 12)-(13, 11)*-(17, 14). 

* Subject knew that the common element had something round in the 
middle. 

The following observations of this subject are interesting: 

(a) "There is no time to compare one figure with another, 
or one impression with a previous impression." 

(&) When a figure was used as a common element which the 
subject had not seen before, it generally happened that at first 
he noticed something new and then a special figure. 

(c) The perception of the common element has a tendency 
to obliterate the images of the other figures. Before perceiving 
the common element as common, the images of several figures 
that have just passed by float about in the mind. When the 
common element is perceived as such, they vanish at once. 

Reaction of the subject to disks with no common element : 

(1) Stops apparatus after nine exposures, and says he is perfectly 
certain that no figure is repeated in each group. 

(2) After nine exposures the subject was certain that no common 
element was present. 

(3) Subject thinks that a figure (4, 14) might possibly have been 
repeated. He drew it correctly along with another figure; which two 
figures were drawn when he was requested to reproduce everything he 
could remember as having been seen. This also happened with (17, 15). 

(4) No intimation of any figure having been repeated. 

(5) No intimation of any figure having been repeated. 

(6) Thinks that there was no common element. 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 171 

(7) State of negative doubt. 

(8) Almost certain that no common element was present. 

(9) Negative doubt. 

(10) Thinks that no common element was present. 

(11) Subject thought several times that a common element was 
present. Then there came an ever increasing certainty that none was 
present, and at the end of the series he was certain that there was no 
common element. 

Another interesting stage with this subject is that in which 
the figure on being first noticed is recognized as familiar. By 
the word familiar, it is not meant that he had seen it before on 
other disks but that it comes into focal consciousness with a 
peculiar nuance which tells the subject that this is the common 
element. It seems that this tone of familiarity (Belcanntheits- 
qualit'dt) arises from the figure's being seen before but not 
analyzed out from the other figures. 

The subject whose results are about to be recounted could 
give by introspection at the end of the experiment no infor- 
mation at all about the development of the mental process 
he had just experienced. When later on in the semester 
I commenced to confirm the results of self -observation, I tried 
the same method with this subject. I cut the experiment short 
after he had seen fifteen groups of figures and then asked him 
simply: ''What do you think? Is there a common element 
present or not? Are you certain or merely inclined more or 
less to think that you see a common element? Draw what you 
remember!" In this way was obtained what the subject's 
introspective memory failed to reveal. Cross-sections were 
obtained in the course of development and fixed before they 
could fade from memory. 

Subject U. 

I. An intimation of a common element, without any knowledge of its 

form. 
(5, 12)-(7, 13)-(10, 9)-(10, 12). 

II. Probability that a common element is present, but an imperfect idea 

of its form. 
(2, 6)-(17, 15)-(16, 13)-(4, 9)-(2, 12). 



172 University of California Publications in Psychology. IT o1 - 1 

III. Probability that a common element is present, and a true idea of its 

form. 
This stage was not found with this subject. 

IV. Certainty that a common element is present, but an imperfect idea 

of its form. 
(10, 7)-(4, 14)-(8, 10)-(10, 6)*-(5, 9). 

* Certain only that lie had seen the "two eyes" recur. 

Reaction of the subject to disks with no common element : 

(1) No idea of any common element at the end of the experiment. 

(2) No idea of any common element at the end of the experiment. 

(3) Complete uncertainty at end of experiment. 

(4) No idea of any common element at the end of the experiment. 

(5) No common element noted. 

( b) Interpretation of the Results. 
(i) The Immediate Experimental Conclusions. 

When we look at these results it becomes at once apparent 
that an element of certainty and uncertainty is involved in the 
process of recognition. If we ask ourselves what this means 
we must say that whenever the mind is certain of anything, 
it assents; and whenever we have an assent we have an act of 
judgment. One of the immediate empirical conclusions of our 
results may be stated thus : The process of recognition involves 
an element of certainty or uncertainty. 

From this we may conclude : That the process of recognition 
involves a judgment or a suspended judgment. For whenever 
I am certain I assent; and whenever my mind is in a state of 
uncertainty, assent is suspended. In the one case there is a 
judgment; in the other, judgment is suspended. It is not 
necessary that this judgment should be formulated in so many 
words. In fact, one may venture to say that in most cases of 
perfect recognition there is no verbal formulation of the judg- 
ment at all; but the psychological act of judging is nevertheless 
really and truly present. 

The presence of a judgment in the act of recognition proves 
that the act of perception which does not involve a judgment is 



1910] Moore : The Process of Abstraction. 173 

an essentially different and less highly developed mental state. 
Recognition is indeed a perception, and over and above this a 
judgment is passed upon the perception. This judgment in- 
volves the statement that what is now perceived has been per- 
ceived before. If recognition is incomplete the judgment hangs 
in suspense and cannot be definitely passed. 

In the further study of recognition we have only to ask our- 
selves, what is the basis of this judgment? Do the experiments 
help us out? 

If we run through the results we will find that any degree 
of certainty may be accompanied by any degree of the perfection 
of perception. A person can be certain that a figure was re- 
peated and have a perfect image of the figure, or an imperfect 
image, or no image at all. A second empirical conclusion may 
be stated thus: Assured recognition is not dependent upon per- 
fect perception. And why this statement? Simply because it 
is an empirical fact that assured recognition can exist with a 
very imperfect perception, — a perception that is so imperfect 
that it involves no mental image whatsoever. 17 

"While indeed we have not found out, as yet, on what the 
judgment of recognition depends, we have at least discovered 
something on which it does not depend. And that is the mental 
image. This suffices finally to dispose of one theory of recog- 
nition, now generally rejected by psychologists — the theory, 
namely, that recognition is brought about by the comparison 
of the present sensation with a revived mental image. Identity 
being perceived, the object seen is then recognized. That such 
a comparison of images is unnecessary appears from the ex- 
periments. Why? Because recognition takes place not only 
when there is no revived mental image of the past perception, 
but when the present perception itself is too imperfect to leave 
any trace of mental imagery in the mind. Recognition, how- 
ever, may take place by a comparison of mental images. In 
general the rapidity of succeeding impressions made this an 
impossible, or at least a very awkward, process. It once hap- 



" Cf. also above, pp. 134-136. 



174 University of California Publications in Psychology. [Vol. 1 

pened, however, that a subject reported that she had used just 
this metho'd in arriving at certainty of recognition. On thinking 
that she had seen a certain figure twice, she tried to call up 
the previous image that she had in mind as identical with the 
figure just seen, and institute a comparison between the two 
images. However we must note that recognition was already 
in the probable stage when this was done. And the comparison 
that was attempted was after all only an auxiliary method. 

The comparison of images, therefore, may come in as an aid, 
but it is not necessary to recognition nor is it the normal method. 
One might object to the use of the word 'normal' here as 
carrying us beyond the limits of legitimate deduction. Was 
not the rapidity with which the exposures succeeded one another 
expressly chosen to exclude the possibility of comparing mental 
images? That is true, and our experiments prove only that the 
comparison of mental images is not necessary in the process of 
recognition. As to its being the normal method, we can from 
our own experiments only conjecture. But there are other 
experiments along this line. I refer to those on the recognition 
of the identity of time intervals, tones, etc. When a subject 
listens to two raps separated by a short interval, and then, after 
a period of waiting, hears two more raps, how is it that he 
recognizes that the second two raps mark off an interval of 
time equal to that of the first? Does he really compare some 
kind of mental images of the two time intervals? It would 
seem from the experimental research on this point, that he 
does not. 18 

Professor Frank Angell has made it abundantly clear that 
the recognition of tones does not depend on a comparison of 
mental images. In his study of the "Discrimination of Clangs 
for Different Intervals of Time," he arrived at the following 
results : 

"The main conclusion to be drawn from the distraction 
experiments is that judgments of tone discriminations can take 
place, and in the majority of our experiments did take place, 



is Cf. Wundt, Physiologische Psychologic, III, 5, 476-517. 



1910 1 Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 175 

without conscious comparison between the present sensation and 
a memory-image of a past sensation. When, for example, a 
reagent, after a long time-interval filled with interesting reading, 
from which he had to be practically aroused by a sharp signal 
in order to prepare himself for the apprehension of the second 
tone, nevertheless delivered a judgment with a feeling of con- 
siderable security, it is idle to speak of "memory-images" or 
indeed of comparison in the ordinary meaning of the word. 
Or when a reagent, after having accurately discriminated six 
pairs of tones, decided with ease that a tone just given is like 
or unlike a tone 4 vibrations higher or lower sounded 60 seconds 
before, and is correct in these decisions 63 times in 100, it is 
evident that the ordinary theories of tone-comparisons need 
readjustment. 

"No more is it explicable on the theory of memory compar- 
ison that there should not have been a great increase in doubtful 
judgments in passing from undistracted to distracted discrimi- 
nation, or indeed in failures to judge at all, or that the several 
forms of distraction should not have shown a far greater dif- 
ference in effect than was actually the case. ' ' 19 

In the light, then, of our experiments, and also those on the 
recognition of various sensory stimuli, it is not too much to say 
that the comparison of mental images is not the normal method 
of recognition. 

Summing up, then, the conclusions that we may regard as 
established by the experiments of this section we may state : 

A. The process of recognition involves an element of cer- 
tainty or uncertainty. From this follows: 

The process of recognition involves a judgment or a suspended 
judgment. 

B. Certain recognition is not dependent on perfect percep- 
tion. From this it was seen to follow that: 

A comparison of mental images is not necessary to the process 
of recognition. 



is Amer. Journ. Psychol, 12, 1900-1901, p. 69. 



176 University of California Publications in Psychology. [yo\. ! 

An empirical fact rather than a conclusion from these exper- 
iments is stated in the following proposition : 

Certain recognition can take place without the formation of 
any mental image of the thing that is recognized. 20 

(ii) The Basis of Judgment in Eecognition. 

When we are asked to give an account of the real basis of 
judgment in recognition we naturally ask, how is the object that 
is recognized remembered? The factors of memory, one might 
suppose, are active to a large extent in the process of recognition. 
We are naturally concerned with the factors which enabled the 
subjects to memorize the figures used in our experiments which 
represented rather complex conditions. It cannot be taken for 
granted that the basis of recognition is the same for simple 
sensations and complex perceptions. In fact it is rather likely 
that what serves as our cue in one case does not meet the de- 
mands of another, that what is the chief basis of recognition 
of a simple tone may become a very minor factor in the recog- 
nition of a time-interval. And what is prominent in recog- 
nizing a time-interval may become subordinate in the recognition 
of a street or a house as places where one has been before. On 
this account it is desirable to take for experiment such complex 
material as our figures, in order to see if any factors enter into 
the process of recognition that have not been noticed in the 
usual experiments on time-intervals, colors, tones, etc. 

The process by which the figures are remembered should 
give us some clue to the method used in their recognition. In 
the section entitled, "The Factor of Memory in the Process of 
Abstraction" (p. 139), we compared memory by visualization 
and by motor imagery, with memory by association and 
analysis. A marked advantage was found in favor of the 
latter. Memory by association consisted in relating the 
figure to known objects, or analyzing it and thus relating it to 
certain mental categories. These mental categories are the 



20 This conclusion is based in great part upon the experiments given on 
pp. 134 ff. 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 177 

bonds which hold the figure in place and make possible its recall 
when it has left the field of consciousness. In fact, it seems 
that if all the conceptual ties could be cut, or be lacking from 
the beginning, the figure would fade away completely and recall 
would be impossible. We find also that, in the process of per- 
ception, the essential element is not the formation of a visual 
image but the relating of the object perceived to one or more 
mental categories. Nor must we regard this relating of the 
impression of an object to its categories as a manipulation of 
separate and distinct psychical entities. It is rather what 
Wundt would call an assimilation. The sensation and the gen- 
eral concepts form a psychical compound which differs from 
its elements and is a new mental product. What are the 
elements of this compound? Wundt speaks of the feelings 
involved, especially that of familiarity, the sensation and the 
images to which it is assimilated. But we may question the 
completeness of this analysis. 

There seems to be something that is not included therein 
and that something lies in the mental categories that couple the 
perception of the object to the train of memory. These, the 
essential elements of assimilation in perception, are also the 
elements par excellence of recognition. An assimilation does 
take place, and on the basis of our experiments on memory and 
the analysis of perception we may venture to say that the chief 
elements of assimilation are the concepts to which the sensations 
are assimilated in the process of perception. When the figure 
is seen it is at once assimilated to certain mental categories ; 
it is regarded as made of straight or curved lines ; it has elements 
that curve ; it is an open or a dark figure ; it is symmetrical and 
regular, or just the reverse. These phrases do not stand for 
images that are present; this the cases of recognition without 
imagery prove. But suppose they do so stand ; suppose we have 
in recognition an assimilation of a present sensation to a number 
of revived images — of lines, curves, points, etc. Certainly the 
new psychical product should be an image, a product of the 
sensation and the imagery of past experience. But there were 



178 University of California Publications in Psychology. ITol. 1 

eases in which recognition took place without the trace of an 
image. Consequently the assimilation would appear to be of 
elements that are not images. These elements we may speak 
of as mental categories or concepts. The sensation of a figure 
never stands alone. Perhaps no sensation ever does. It is 
related to an appropriate series of concepts. These are not all 
in focal consciousness. Perhaps all remain unanalyzed in the 
background of consciousness until by reflection we consider what 
kind of a figure we have seen. But the sensation plus the con- 
cepts with which it is associated, — these are assimilated and 
constitute a new psychical product. This psychical product is 
what is known as our 'idea' of the figure. My subjects have 
sometimes said: "I have an idea of what the figure is, but I 
cannot draw it." And then after some thought they would 
give a very inadequate description which would relate the figure 
to some concept. On being allowed to look for the figure they 
would find it among the entire lot of figures that made up our 
material. Our 'idea' of the figure is whatever image may be 
present plus the concepts to which it is assimilated. That which 
is the chief factor in perception, that by which we recall figures, 
is also that by which we recognise them. And this is the figure's 
series of associated concepts. When a figure is seen once, some 
kind of an 'idea' of the figure is formed — it is fitted in to one 
or more mental categories. When it is seen again the new 
percept is assimilated to the old. The old series of associated 
concepts falls in with the new. And in this way, perhaps, is 
produced the tone of familiarity. In the process of assimilation 
there is nothing that jars; on the contrary there is a reinforce- 
ment at least of some members of the associated train of con- 
cepts. New concepts may be brought out, but they fit in with 
the old. Merely similar figures, however, might on a later per- 
ception bring out new concepts which would contradict the old 
and thereby destroy the feeling of familiarity and give rise to 
doubt as to the identity of the figures. 

One who is not disposed to give such individuality to the 
concept as distinct from sensation and mental imagery might 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 179 

have recourse, as Wundt does, to the feelings. When we find 
no image in the process of recognition we must not jump to a 
conclusion that a concept distinct from our mental imagery is 
present. There are the feelings to be taken into consideration. 
Perhaps these mental categories are groups of feelings and not 
a class of mental states by themselves. The examination of this 
point leads us to our next chapter, in which we analyze the 
product of abstraction. 



180 University of California Publications in Psychology. t Vo1 - 1 



IV. 
THE PRODUCT OF THE PROCESS OF ABSTRACTION. 

In our analysis of the process by which an abstraction is 
formed, we have necessarily learned something about the final 
product. "We have watched the growth of a complex mental 
state and must necessarily know something about that mental 
state in its final stage. Are there any evident elements in the 
final product of abstraction that we may regard as facts of 
experience? Yes. Our experiments have revealed some to 
which we called attention in our section on the process of per- 
ception. From the results of that section, confirmed as they 
are by the succeeding chapters, there are two important facts 
that were abundantly evident. 

(a) There exist imageless mental contents representative of 
a visible object. Our own experiments are not the only evidence 
on this point. A reference to the history of the problem 1 will 
show that a number of psychologists have determined the ex- 
istence of various kinds of imageless mental contents. The 
consensus of evidence is such that 'thoughts' without imagery 
must be looked upon as established mental facts. And when 
we take perception to mean the result of the process of per- 
ception, our experiments show conclusively that we can have 
a perception of a visible object in which there is no visual 
imagery. Our idea of that visual object is therefore not a 
mental picture, although under such conditions as obtained in 
our experiments we should expect, if at all, to find visual im- 
agery constantly developed. 

Without, however, making any assumption as to the nature 
of these imageless mental contents we may regard their existence 
as an established fact. They are the essential elements in the 
product of perception and abstraction. The existence of any 

i Cf . pp. 76 ff. 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 181 

kind of mental imagery in the complex product is not essential. 
Imageless mental content and not imagery is therefore the true 
product of abstraction. 

The second fact of experiment is this: (&) Perception is a 
process of assimilating the data of sense experience to their 
appropriate mental categories. By this assimilation the object 
is perceived. The word category is not here taken in any pre- 
conceived sense. It is a fact that in perceiving a figure the 
earlier stages were designated as a knowledge that the figure 
was "pointed" or "open" or "round" or "had the top lines 
crossed," etc. These expressions are examples of what I mean 
here by categories. It is a fact, too, that these expressions were 
not descriptions of mental images. The figures, however, had 
been seen with the eyes, and in perceiving them they were inter- 
preted in terms of the previous knowledge of the subject. This 
I have expressed by saying that the figures were assimilated 
to appropriate mental categories. So far this is all that I mean 
by the word category. 

Let us now ask, what are these mental categories in terms 
of our modern psychological terminology? A current psycho- 
logical division of our mental states leaves room for nothing but 
(a) sensations and their images, (5) feelings, and (c) will, which 
by some psychologists is explained in terms of feeling. To 
these states and combinations of them many psychologists have 
attempted to reduce our mental processes. We may now ask 
ourselves to which of these classes do the mental categories of 
perception belong? 

(1) Do they belong to the class of sensations and images? 

The 'mental categories' are not, of course, sensations, and we 
have already shown that they can not be directly interpreted 
as images, because they exist without imagery. Dr. Ach, how- 
ever, has a theory 2 by which they might be the combined effect 
of many images. They are not images but the tendencies of a 
whole host of images to reproduce themselves. This theory 
was excogitated to explain the meaning of words. A word is 



2 Cf . above, p. 86. 



182 University of California Publications in Psychology. [Vol. 1 

understood because it sets a number of images in readiness, 
all of which have a tendency to reproduce themselves. This 
tendency of the images to reproduce themselves is the meaning 
of the word. 

Against this as a theory of the meaning of words one may 
object : 

(a) If a single image can not constitute a meaning it is hard 
to see how the tendency of a whole host of meaningless images 
to come into consciousness would constitute a meaning. 

(6) If we refer to the section in the experiments of Buhler 3 
entitled "Ueber das Auffassen von G-edanken" we will see that 
the 'mental categories' which were used by his subjects in the 
understanding of sentences cannot be analyzed into any known 
form of mental imagery. 

(c) Furthermore, words express objects for which we can 
have no adequate imagery. How then can the mere tendency 
of this inadequate imagery to reproduce itself constitute the 
meaning of the word? 

The same objections which prevent our acceptance of Ach's 
theory as an explanation of the meaning of words preclude its 
application to the 'mental categories' of our own experiments. 

It would explain meaning by the tendency of meaningless 
mental contents to reproduce themselves; for pure sensation 
independent of its associations has no meaning; neither has an 
image. It must be associated with other mental states to be 
understood. If these mental states are themselves but a host 
of images, each one of which has no significance in itself, from 
their combinations we can not bring about meaning. Nor can 
this tendency to appear in consciousness be said to constitute 
meaning. For the mere tendency of meaningless mental states 
to appear in consciousness would give no meaning that was not 
in these states themselves. 

One might challenge the statement that pure sensations or 
mental images independent of their associations have no 
meaning. Let us therefore develop this point a little further. 



3 Archiv fur die ges. Psychol., 12, pp. 12 ff. 



1910] Moore : The Process of Abstraction. 183 

Whatever may be our theory, it is a fact that a complex of 
sensations on being received into the mind is interpreted. This 
is evident from our section on perception. The interpretation 
takes place by means of the something that we may term 'mental 
categories,' to which the sensation is associated. These give 
it a meaning. But suppose the sensation is not assimilated to 
these mental categories? Is this not merely to say that it is 
not understood and has no meaning? What is left to meaning 
when you deprive it of every possible association and every 
mental category into which it might be resolved? It dwindles 
to nothing and ceases to be meaning. 

These mental categories possess meaning by their own right 
and are qualitatively distinct from sensations and images. 

One might bring in at this point Kibot's 'intentional' theory 
of the mental image. 4 Sensations and mental images are signs 
of their objects. But as we said in our passing criticism of 
Eibot, if the mental image is a sign of the object that it repre- 
sents, it must be understood. On one side of the sign is the 
object signified, on the other is the meaning of the sign. If 
the mental image is a sign it must not only have an object but 
also a meaning. Consequently, to say that the image is a sign 
does not help us to get along without any kind of an idea or 
concept which functions as a meaning. If, therefore, by acting 
as a sign sensations and mental images cannot account for 
meaning, if they themselves are not the meaning, we must seek 
for meaning elsewhere than in sensations and their mental 
images. 

However, if we could take Dr. Ach's "Vorstellung" in the 
sense of a mental 'concept with meaning' we have in the theory 
a good analysis of a number of those states which Marbe and 
his followers have termed " Bewusstseinslagen." 5 They are 
mental states in which several concepts tend to appear in con- 
sciousness — but no one succeeds in doing so. As a result, you 
have a more or less unanalyzable mental state without definite 

* Cf . above, pp. 78 ff. 
s Cf . above, p. 85. 



184 University of California Publications in Psychology. t Vo1 - 1 

characteristic. The tendency of the many 'concepts with 
meaning' to appear in consciousness results in an imageless 
mental content, which is hard to characterize, simply because 
many characteristics tend to come before the mind but no one 
succeeds in doing so. 

(2) Are the 'mental categories' feelings? 

Those who hold to the opinion that feelings of pleasure and 
pain constitute the sole elements of our emotional life will not 
be disposed to seek in these affective states an interpretation of 
our 'mental categories.' These 'mental categories' express 
knowledge; and knowledge is not pleasure and pain, though it 
may be pleasurable or painful. Nor does it make any difference 
how we may extend the idea of feeling; if we still mean by it 
something that is not knowledge, then thoughts and 'mental 
categories' can never be explained in terms of feeling. For 
if the word 'feelings' remains an exact scientific term to desig- 
nate those very mental processes which do not give us knowledge, 
if feeling is opposed to sensation and to all our cognitive mental 
processes, then the 'mental categories' we have defined above are 
not states of feeling. 

Such considerations as these could hardly have escaped 
Wundt. Yet he would interpret our 'thoughts,' and I suppose 
what I have termed 'mental categories,' as a complex of images 
and the "adequate" feelings which are involved. Our 'mental 
categories,' he claims, are not feelings alone and not images 
alone, but a complex of both. But if imagery is in itself mean- 
ingless, if we can have 'thoughts' which are not images, then 
the representative function of our thoughts and 'mental cate- 
gories' must be performed by the 'feelings.' No single indi- 
vidual can place a limit to the meaning of a term. Thorndike 
calls every single one of our mental processes a 'feeling.' To 
this even Wundt would object. Still, if he were to insist on 
embracing under the term 'feelings' the representative con- 
tent of our thoughts as well as their affective tone, he should 
at least admit that there are two very distinct classes of feeling 
— one which gives the affective tone and another which repre- 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 185 

sents the object. Wundt has nowhere made this admission. In 
fact, from his writings it would seem that the representative 
function is ascribed by him to the imagery in the complex 
mental content termed a 'thought.' But on being accused of 
this by Buhler he strenuously objected that Buhler had not 
read his works 6 and maintained that in his analysis of thought 
there was also the concept of the feelings. Consequently, the 
question arises: Do these feelings represent the object or not? 
If not, they can never account for the representative function 
of 'thought.' If they do, then surely we must classify our 
feelings into those that represent an object and those that do 
not; for it is certainly clear that there exists a large class of 
feelings which are not representative of objects. 

If then there are 'feelings' which can represent an object, 
how, we may ask, does this come about? How in the absence 
of imagery, and independent of it, can any combination of 
Wundt 's entire tri-dimensional system of feelings account for 
the meaning of words and phrases or the mental categories 
formed in the perception of our figures? Pleasure and pain, 
tension and relaxation, excitement and repose, might conceiv- 
ably combine to form complex emotions, moods, and a variety 
of non-representative mental states which accompany our pro- 
cesses of recognition, abstraction, analysis, etc. But that they 
should take over in their combination a function which is 
qualitatively distinct from any that is inherent in them as 
elements, is an unwarrantable assumption. 

One might bring forward at this point the following objec- 
tion : Tour contention that there exist imageless mental contents 
is based in great measure on the experiments in which a common 
element was certainly perceived, although the subject did not 
at all know precisely what kind of a figure was present. But 
to conclude from such experiments that imageless ideas exist 
is not warranted, because the experiments may be explained 
without such an assumption. These experiments represent those 
cases in which the common element was never seen in the focal 



e Psychol. Studien, 3, pp. 347-348 (note). 



186 University of California Publications in Psychology. IT o1 - 1 

point of consciousness. But wherever it was perceived, however 
far in the background it might be, it gave rise to certain feelings 
of relaxation and restfulness, perhaps even of pleasure or dis- 
pleasure. The peculiar combination of these feelings gave rise 
to the feeling of certainty that a figure was being repeated. 
This feeling had connected with it no visual imagery that the 
subject could recall. From such an analysis it is evident that 
from the lack of mental imagery you can not jump to the 
conclusion that there are imageless concepts. 

Such an objection would not be based upon a complete 
analysis of the evidence. The existence of imageless concepts 
is not founded solely upon these rare cases — but also upon 
cases in which the subject was certain of parts of the figure 
that could easily have been drawn had any visual imagery been 
present. The subject described things such as points or curves 
or angles, which certainly could be pictured, but claimed to 
have no picture and could draw nothing that would represent 
his state of mind. Now, points and angles and curves are not 
mere feelings. And if they are present to the mind without 
imagery they are not images. 

Furthermore, in the cases of recognition of figures without 
any knowledge whatsoever of their special nature, it is perfectly 
true that the basis of the subject's judgment to a large extent 
was some combination of feelings such as was mentioned in 
the supposed objection. But we must not forget that the basis 
of a judgment is not the judgment itself. And we must also 
remember that in all these cases there is in the subject's mind 
the abstraction, 'some kind of a figure' plus the knowledge that 
'the figure was repeated.' The knowledge expressed by these 
two terms constitutes the judgment, 'some kind of a figure was 
repeated.' This judgment is not constituted by the feelings 
which evidenced the presence of a figure. It is based upon 
them, but it does not consist in them. It is therefore something 
over and above them. The elements into which this judgment 
can be analyzed are the abstraction 'some kind of a figure' and 
the knowledge that it ' was repeated. ' 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 187 

Since these elements are not feelings and are not mental 
images, there is nothing left in the current division of elemen- 
tary mental processes into which they can be relegated except 
the acts of will. But certainly we can not place them there. 
We must therefore recognize the existence of another division 
of mental processes to which our thoughts and mental categories 
must be relegated. Consequently in the final product of ab- 
straction there is an element distinct from imagery and feelings. 
This element, since it is the bearer of the meaning, is the kernel 
of the product and it may truly be termed the 'thought' or the 
'concept.' Imagery and feeling may cluster about this concept; 
but as far as the imagery is concerned it is certainly lacking 
at times, as our experiments have shown. As to feeling, we 
can not say for certain on the basis of our experiments whether 
or not it is necessarily present. 

The concept of the figures in our experiments, though dis- 
tinct from imagery and feeling, was not itself an elementary 
process. It was manifestly compound in a number of instances. 
For one and the same figure was assimilated to several mental 
categories. It was a concept made up of several more elementary 
concepts. Between the concepts of which it was constituted 
there was a conscious bond. The sensation in being assimilated 
picked out its categories by the necessary process of its assimi- 
lation and these united to form a concept of the figure which 
the subject was afterwards enabled to analyze with more or less 
completeness. 

If such is the case one may ask how was the first concept 
formed? Does man come into the world equipped with a whole 
system of mental categories by which he is enabled to perceive 
and understand the things about him? This question leads us 
on into a problem far beyond the limits of the present research. 
Our problem has been the analysis of the process of abstraction 
in the adult. The process of perception which is the initial 
stage of abstraction was found to be one of assimilating the 
sensation to previously formed mental categories. Whence 
originated these mental categories, is another problem. These 



188 University of California Publications in Psychology. ITol. 1 

mental categories and their function in perception are facts. 
The origin of the mental categories, and the process of perception 
and abstraction in the child, are very different problems from 
our own. But ignorance of child psychology does not destroy 
the facts of adult mental life. 

However, it may not be out of place to suggest a theory as 
to the origin of our mental categories. And this I would do 
as follows : As Kiilpe suggests, 7 the data of sense are perceived. 
There exists something of the nature of an 'inner sense' — a 
central consciousness which perceives the phenomena of the 
external senses. When consciousness first dawns the data of 
external sensations are perceived. Perhaps at first in the auto- 
matic life of the child the sensations that are perceived are more 
or less intermittent and vary in their nature. But every time 
a sensation arouses consciousness the child is aware of a change 
in its mental life. At first this change is not interpreted because 
there are as yet no mental categories. Every change is just 
an awareness. The child simply realizes that something has 
happened. And this realization develops into his first mental 
category. As time goes on, experiences multiply and the several 
different kinds of experiences make the child not only aware that 
'something has happened' but that something of a more partic- 
ular nature has happened. Something painful, something pleas- 
ant — something hot or something cold, etc. In this way he 
forms still further sets of mental categories into which his future 
experience is received. Out of these develop the categories of 
identity and diversity, — when, we do not know; nor is it neces- 
sary for us to settle this point here. But by a gradual deter- 
mination of the most general of his mental categories — 'some- 
thing' — his experience grows and is assimilated. The first 
determinations are of very particular experiences. The most 
varied things are given one and the same name, simply because 
he has but a few general concepts and his sensations are assim- 
ilated by necessity to whatever categories may have been devel- 
oped. The child's experience — his inner perception of a train 



7 Bericht ii. d. I. Kongress f. exp. PsycJiol. in Giessen, 1904, p. 67. 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 189 

of similar mental events constitute a mental category which is 
his idea of those events. The first mental category, the child's 
awareness of something, enters though not consciously and ex- 
plicitly into all his later concepts. Some of these later ones 
group together, and so on, until under the influence of language 
and education the events of the external world receive their 
interpretation. 



190 University of California Publications in Psychology. IT o1 - 1 



SUMMARY. 

We are now in a position to summarize the process of ab- 
straction as revealed in our experiments. 

1. The process of abstraction is initiated by the breaking up 
of the group presented for perception. In this breaking up 
of the group the common element becomes accentuated at the 
expense of the surrounding elements. These are not merely 
neglected, but are positively cast aside and swept more or less 
completely from the field of consciousness. 

2. This breaking up of the group initiates the process of 
perceiving the common element. This is accomplished by assim- 
ilating to known mental categories the sensations perceived. 
Perception proceeds from that which is more general to that 
which is particular. The formation of a reproducible image 
represents a later and unessential stage of perception. 

3. The retention in memory of the figure perceived depends 
in great measure on the method of memory. Memory by 
analysis and association has a very decided advantage over 
memory by imagery. The memory of the figure depends, fur- 
thermore, upon the focality of perception. The accuracy of 
memory decreases rapidly with the distance of the figure from 
the focal point in the act of vision by which it was perceived. 
The perception of new groups after a figure has been perceived 
has a tendency to obliterate it from memory. 

4. The recognition of a figure once seen involves an element 
of certainty or uncertainty. Consequently there is implied in 
recognition assent or doubt, and therefore a judgment or a 
suspended judgment. In recognizing a figure any degree of 
certainty of recognition can accompany any degree of perfection 
in the perception of a figure, so that a subject may be certain 
of the repetition of a figure and still may have no knowledge as 
to what manner of figure it was — or the subject may know 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 191 

all about a given figure and simply draw it as remembered, or 
as very doubtfully the common element. 

5. The final product of abstraction, that which is perceived 
as common to many groups, is essentially a concept distinct from 
imagery and feeling. It is not an elementary concept, but 
represents the assimilation of that which is perceived by the 
senses to a more or less complex mental category, or perhaps to 
several such categories. These mental categories may be re- 
garded as the results of past experience. 



192 University of California Publications in Psychology. ITol. 1 



REFERENCES.* 

Ach, Narziss: Ueber Willenstdtigheit und das BenTcen. Gottingen, 
1905. 

Angell and Harwood: "Discrimination of Clamgs for Different Inter- 
vals of Time." Part I, American Journal of Psychology, 1899-1900, Vol. 
XI, pp. 67-79. Part II, by Prof. Angell alone. Op. cit., Vol. XII, pp. 
58-79. 

Aster, E. von: "Die psychologische Beobachtung und experimentelle 
Untersuchung von Denkvorgangen. " Zeitschrift fur Psychologie, 1908, 
Vol. XLIX, pp. 56-107. 

Baglet, William Chandler: "The Apperception of the Spoken Sen- 
tence." American Journal of Psychology, 1900-01, Vol. XII, pp. 80-134. 

Berkeley, George: A Treatise concerning the Principles of PLuman 
Knowledge. Vol. I, Fraser's, Oxford (1871) Edition of his works. 

Bigham, John: "Memory." Psychological Review, 1894, Vol. I, pp. 
453-461. 

Binet, Alfred: L 'Etude experimental de I'intelligence. Paris, 1903. 

BfJHLER, Karl : ' ' Tatsachen und Probleme zu einer Psychologie der 
Denkvorgange. " Archiv fur die ges. Psychologie, 1907, Vol. IX, pp. 297- 
365; 1908, Vol. XII, pp. 1-92. 

: ' ' Antwort auf die von W. Wundt erhobenen Einwande. ' ' 

Archiv fur die ges. Psychologie, 1908, Vol. XII, pp. 93-123. 

: "Zur Kritik der Denkexperimente. " Zeitschrift fur Psy- 
chologie, 1909, Vol. LI, pp. 108-118. 

Davies, Arthur Ernest: "An Analysis of Psychic Process." Psy- 
chological Review, 1905, Vol. XII, pp. 166-206. 

DtJRR, E.: "Ueber die experimentelle Untersuchung der Denkvor- 
gange" Zeitschrift fur Psychologie, 1908, Vol. XLIX, pp. 313-340. 

Galton, Francis: "Composite portraits made by combining those of 
many different persons into a single resultant figure. ' ' The Journal of the 
Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, 1879, Vol. VIII, pp. 
132-144. 

: "Generic Images." Proceedings of the Royal Institute of 

Great Britain, 1879, pp. 161-171. 

: Inquiries into Human Faculty, New York, 1883. 

Grunbaum, A. A.: "Ueber die Abstraktion der Gleichheit." Archiv 
fur die ges. Psychologie, 1908, Vol. XII, pp. 340-478. 

Huxley, Thomas H.: David Hume, New York, 1879. 



* The list is not a bibliography of the subject but contains merely those 
works referred to in the present study. 



1910] Moore : The Process of Abstraction. 193 

KtJXPE, O.: "Versuche iiber Abstraktion. " Bericht uber den I Kon- 
gress fiir experiment elle Psychologie in Giessen, 1904, pp. 56-68. 

Marbe, K. : Experimentell-psychologische Untersuchungen uber das 
Urteil. Leipzig, 1901. 

Mayer und Orth: "Zur qualitativen Untersuchungen der Associa- 
tion." Zeitschrift fiir Psychologie, 1901, Vol. XXVI, pp. 1-13. 

Messer, August: " Experimentell-psychologische Untersuchungen iiber 
das Denken. " Archiv fiir die ges. Psychologie, 1906, Vol. VIII, pp. 1-224. 

: "Bemerkungen zu meiner ' Experimentell-psychologischen 

Untersuchungen iiber das Denken." Archiv fiir die ges. Psychologie, 1907, 
Vol. X, pp. 409-428. 

Meumann, E.: "Ueber Associationsexperimente mit Beeinflussung der 
Eeproduktionszeit. " Archiv fiir die ges. Psychologie, 1907, Vol. IX, pp. 
117-150. 

Mittenzwei, Kuno: " Ueber abstrahierende Apperzeption. " Psychol. 
Studien, 1906-07, Vol. II, pp. 358-492. 

Moore, T. V.: "The Process of [Recognition. " Atti del V. Congresso 
intemazionale di Psicologia, tenuto in Soma dal 26 al 30 Aprile, 1905, Roma, 
1906, pp. 286-287. 

Orth, Johannes: "Gefiihl und Bewusstseinslage. " Sammlung von 
Abhundlungen aus dem Gebiete der Padagogischen Psychol, und Physiologic 
Edited by Ziegler and Ziehen, Vol. VI, No. 4, Berlin, 1903. 

Bibot, Th. : "Enquete sur les idees generales." "Revue philosophique, 
1891, Vol. XXXII, pp. 376, 388. 

: L'Evohition des idees generales. Paris, 1897. 

Schultze, F. E. Otto: "Einige Hauptgesichtspunkte der Beschreibung 
in der Elementarpsychologie. I. Erscheinungen und Gedanken. " Archiv fiir 
die ges. Psychologie, 1906, Vol. VIII, pp. 241-338. 

: "Beitrag zur Psychologie des Zeitbeweisstseins. " Archiv 

fiir die ges. Psychologie, 1908, Vol. XIII, pp. 275-351. 

Spearmann, C. : " The Proof and Measurement of Association between 
Two Things. ' ' American Journal of Psychology, 1904, Vol. XV, pp. 72-101. 

Taylor, Clifton O.: "Ueber das Verstehen von Worten und Satzen." 
Zeitschrift fiir Psychologie, 1906, Vol. XL, pp. 225-251. 

Watt, Henry J.: " Experimentelle Beitrage zu einer Theorie des Den- 
kens." Archiv fiir die ges. Psychologie, 1905, Vol. IV, pp. 289-436. 

Wiltse, S. E.: "Observations on General Terms." Am. Journal of 
Psychology, 1890-91, III, pp. 144-148. 

Wundt, Wilhelm: Grundziige der physiologischen Psychologie. 5th 
Edition, Leipzig, 1902-03. 

: "Ueber Ausfrageexperimente und iiber die Methoden zur 

Psychologie des Denkens." Psychologische Studien, 1907, Vol. Ill, pp. 
301-360. 

: "Kritische Nachlese zur Ausf ragemethode. " Archiv fiir 

die ges. Psychologie, 1908, Vol. XI, pp. 444-459. 



194 University of California Publications in Psychology. [Vol. 1 



APPENDIX I. 

THE INFLUENCE OF ASSOCIATION ON PERCEPTION. 

In the course of the experiments a number of eases occurred 
in which the subject's drawing of the common element differed 
from the actual figure in such a way that the error was evidently 
due to the association that was reported. Some of these cases 
are given below. The drawings given under the heading ''sub- 
ject's drawing" reproduce the essential characters of those made 
by the observer. They are not however exact reproductions 
of his drawings. 



Common Element. 


Subject's Drawing. 


Association. 


a 


CO 


"Wurst." 


Q 


Q 


Omega. 


B 


The subject drew the 
figure correctly at first. 
He then changed his 
mind and drew a see- 





ond figure with a n 
double curve, say- lx 
ing that this was more 
correct. He said the 
figure looked like a 
(Laufer). His second 
figure does in fact re- 
semble the bishop in 
some forms of chess- 
men. 



O 



ft 


Mushroom. 


X 


Two half-moons. 


A 


Open scissors. 


6 


Apple. 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 195 

These errors lend additional evidence to the theory of per- 
ception advanced in the body of this work. The actual imagery 
arising from the figure itself is not the first thing noticed. It 
fits into and is interpreted in the light of the subject's past 
experience. The association comes into the subject's mind first. 
He sees that, and interprets the data of vision in its light before 
the true image is perceived. Had the series in which these 
errors occurred been sufficiently long there can be no doubt but 
that the error of assimilation would have been corrected. The 
true image which was constantly being impressed upon the 
retina would have eventually been noticed as it was in itself. 
But because perception does not consist in merely seeing with 
one's eyes but in interpreting the data of the senses, such errors 
as the above are not only possible but natural. 



196 University of California Publications in Psychology. IT o1 - 1 



APPENDIX II. 

GENEEIC IMAGES. 

"What looked like a fusion of mental images occurred twice 
in the course of the experiments. Such fusions are interesting 
in view of the generic image theory of ideas. The first case 
was less evidently one of fusion. The disk was inaccurately 
made. The accompanying figure occurred as the common 
element, now in one, now in another of the two positions as given. 

® ® 

The result was that the two circles were drawn correctly. Just 
what was in the inner one remained doubtful. 

The second case seemed evidently a fusion of mental images. 
It occurred on a disk with no common element. The accom- 

A A 

panying two figures occurred several expositions apart. The 
subject drew the common element. The outline he said was 

subject drew /\ as the common element. The outline he 
said was certain, the dotted inner line was doubtful. Since the 
two figures appeared several expositions apart there can be no 
question at all of a retinal fusion. The phenomenon must be 
due to some central cause. 

Just such cases as these resemble very closely those postulated 
by the Huxley-Galton theory of general ideas. The common 
features are deeply impressed and therefore retained; the vari- 
able, but faintly, and are neglected. There is however a very 
important difference between the universal idea and such 
"generic images," as were found in the entire course of the 
experiments. 

In the formation of a general idea there is a kernel picked 
out as constantly recurring and therefore essential, while that 



1910] Moore: The Process of Abstraction. 197 

which is variable is neglected and forgotten, or recognized as 
unessential. 

If in our experiments there was any fusion of images at 
all, that which was common was indeed clearly impressed, — but 
that which was variable was neither neglected nor forgotten but 
remained obscure and doubtful. 

At all events the extreme rarity of the phenomenon postu- 
lated by the Huxley-Galton theory shows that it cannot be the 
usual way in which we form our concepts, — not even those of 
sensible objects. The analysis of abstraction made possible by 
the experiments points to a process that has little to do with 
composite photography. 



Transmitted December, 1909. 



LBJa'13 



UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PUBLICATIONS-(CONTINUED) 

Vol.2. 1. The Dialectic of Plotinus, by Harry Allen Overstreet. Pp. 1-29. May, 

1909 - 25 

2. Two Extensions of the Use of Graphs in Elementary Logic, by William 
Ernest Hocking. Pp. 31-44. May, 1909 15 

3. On the Law of History, by William Ernest Hocking. Pp. 45-65. Sep- 
tember, 1909 - — - 20 

4. The Mystical Element in Hegel's Early Theological Writings, by 
George Plimpton Adams. Pp. 67-102. September 24, 1910 35 

AMERICAN AECHAEOLOGY AND ETHNOLOGY.— Alfred L. Kroeber, Editor. Price per 
volume $3.50 (Volume 1, $4.25). Volumes 1-7 completed. Volumes 8 and 9 in 
progress. 

BOTANY.— W. A. Setchell, Editor. Price per volume $3.50. Volumes I (pp. 418), II (pp. 
354), III (pp. 400) completed. Volume IV in progress. 

CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY.— Edward B. Clapp, William "A. Merrill, Herbert C. Nutting, 
Editors. Price per volume $2.50. Volume I (pp. 270) completed. Volume II in 
progress. 

ECONOMIGS.— Adolph C. Miller, Editor. 

Vol. 1. Gold, Prices and Wages under the Greenback Standard, by Wesley C. 

Mitchell. 632 pages, with 12 charts. March, 1908 $5.00 

Vol. 2. A History of California Labor Legislation, with a Sketch of the San Fran- 
cisco Labor Movement, by Lucile Eaves. 461 pages. August 23, 1910 4.00 

EDUCATION. 

Vol. 4. The Development of the Senses in the First Three Years of Childhood, by 
Milicent Washburn Shinn. 235 pages and Index. July, 1908 ....$2.00 

A continuation of the author's Notes on the Development of a Child (Volume I of 
this series, 423 pages, 1893-1899, reprinted March, 1909, $3.50). 

Vol. 5. 1. Superstition and Education, by Fletcher Bascom Dresslar. 239 pages. 
July, 1907 : • • • •'■--- — 200 

GEOLOGY— Bulletin of the Department of Geology. Andrew C. Lawson, Editor. Price per 
volume $3.50. Volumes I (pp. 428), II (pp. 450), in (pp. 475), and IV (pp. 462) 
completed. Volume V in progress. 

MATHEMATICS.— Mellen W. Haskell, Editor. 

Vol. 1. 1. On Numbers having no Factors of the Form p (kp + 1). »y Henry W. 
Stager. (In press.) 

MODERN PHILOLOGY.— Charles M. Gayley, Lucien Foulet, and Hugo K. Schilling, Edi- 
tors. Price per volume $2.50. 
Vol 1. 1. Der Junge Goethe und das Publikum, by W. B. R. Pinger. Pp. 1-67. 
May, 1909 



2. Studies in the Marvellous, by Benjamin P. Kurtz. Pp. 69-244. March, 



1910 



2.00 



3. Introduction to the Philosophy of Art, by Arthur Weiss. Pp. 245- 

302. January, 1910 «...- - • - - - 50 

4. The Old English Christian Epic, by George A, Smithson. Pp. 303-400. 

September 30, 1910 • -- l- 00 

Vol. 2. 1. Wilhelm Busch als Dichter, Ktinstler, Psychology und Philosoph, von 

Fritz Winther. Pp. 1-79. September 26, 1910 75 



UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PUBLICATIONS- (CONTINUED) 

„ AnT nrv w E fitter and Charles A. Kof oid, Editors. Price per volume $3.50. 
ZOGLOGY.-W. B . Rittei : ana ^| ries ^ £ } ^ ( 393) ^ v (pp. 440) com' 

Sted VoiuS'v?aM VII ?ta pToSs. Commencing with Volume II, this seriei 
SnSL the^trlhuSs f rom the Laboratory of the Marine Biological Associate 
of San Diego. 

MEMOIRS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA (Quarto). 

Vol 1 No. 1. Triassic Ichtbyosauria, with special reference to the American 
Vol. l. JNo. i.^^ By John o. Merriam. Pages 1-196, plates 1-18, 150 text , 

figures. Septemher, 1908 ...».._ - • ■ - * a, T 

Vol 2. The Silva of California, by Willis Linn Jepson. (In press.) 

Other series in Botany, Economics, Engineering, Entomology, Geology, Lick Observatoj 

Bulfetins, Sck Observatory Publications, Mathematics, Physiology, Publications of t 

Academy of Pacific Coast History, and Zoology. 

TTWTVTTiSlTV OF CALIFORNIA CHRONICLE.-An official record of ^versity life 
UNIVERSITY %^f^^ edited by a committee of the faculty. Price, fl.00 P* 

year. Current volume No. XII. 

ATHvmrr^TEATlVE BULLETINS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.-Edited b; 
ADMINISTRATIVE gg^tor" «» Faculties. Includes the Register, the President' 
Report, the Secretary's Report, and other official announcements. 
Address all orders, or requests for information concerning the above publications K 
The University Press, Berkeley, California. 



Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process. 
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide 
Treatment Date: Nov. 2004 

PreservationTechnologies 

A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION 
111 Thomson Park Drive 
Cranberry Township, PA 16066 
(724)779-2111 



